


GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY  
CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL  
LIBRARY

---

CLASS \_\_\_\_\_

CALL No. 059.0954 J.E.IA

D.G.A. 79.







JOURNAL  
OF THE  
EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

LONDON:


27023

FOUNDED 1866.

059.0954

J. E. I. A.

VOL. XIII.



LONDON:

EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION,  
14, BEDFORD ROW, W.C.


1881.

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL  
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.

Acc. No. 27023  
Date 20.6.57  
Cat. No. 059.0954


J. E. I. A.

LONDON:  
PRINTED BY W. J. JOHNSON,  
121, FLEET STREET.



# CONTENTS OF VOL. XIII.—YEARS 1880-1881.

NO.		PAGE
166.—1880.	March 18. SIR DAVID WEDDERBURN, Bart., M.P.—Popular Representation in India ... ..	1
167.—1880.	June 3. DINSHA D. DAVAR.—England and India, ..	22
168.—1880.	June 16. LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY.—A Court of Appeal for Indian Grievances .. ..	49
169.—1880.	Dec. 15. LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES BROWNE, R.E., C.S.I.—The Retention of Candahar, and the Defence of the North-west Frontier .. ..	75
OBITUARY NOTICES:—		
	Major-General Sir G. Le Grand Jacob, C.B., K.C.S.I. .. ..	109
	Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, C.B., K.C.S.I. .. ..	110
	Lieut.-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B. ..	111
170.—1881.	May 5. REV. JAMES JOHNSTON.—Education in India: a Case for Enquiry... ..	113
	MEMORIAL from Bombay Branch to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, relative to the Afghan War .. ..	142





OF THE

## EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

---

### *Popular Representation in India.*

PAPER BY SIR DAVID WEDDERBURN, BART., M.P.

READ AT THE MEETING AT THE "PALL MALL RESTAURANT,"  
REGENT STREET, MARCH 18TH, 1880.

SIR CHARLES J. WINGFIELD, K.C.S.I., C.B., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members of the East India Association, and others interested in the affairs of India, was held at the "Pall Mall" Restaurant, Regent Street, London, on Thursday afternoon, March 18th, 1880; the subject for consideration being an address delivered by Sir David Wedderburn, Bart., M.P., on "Popular Representation in India." Sir Charles J. Wingfield, K.C.S.I., C.B., occupied the chair, and amongst those present were the following: Right Hon. Lord Stanley of Alderley; General Lord Mark Kerr, C.B.; Lord Reay; Prince Prisdang Choomsai; General Orfeur Cavenagh; General D. Simpson; Major-General G. Burn; Major-General MacLagan; Colonel Dunbar; Colonel Hughes; Colonel Keatinge, C.S.I., V.C.; Colonel G. M. Payne; Captain W. C. Palmer; Mr. J. R. Bullen-Smith, C.S.I.; Rev. James Johnstone; Rev. James Long; Rev. G. Small; Mr. A. F. M. Abdur-Rahman; Mr. Aziz Ahmad; Mr. Sayyid Kazim Ali; Mr. W. B. d'Almeida; Dr. Vincent Ambler; Mr. J. P. C. Anderson; Mr. C. W. Arathoon; Mr. J. H. W. Arathoon; Mr. Robert Bain; Mr. M. N. Banerjee; Mr. P. V. Bose; Mirza Peer Bukhsh; Mr. D. D. Cama; Mr. H. J. Canckeratne; Mr. F. S. Chapman; Mr. Danby S. Christopher; Mr. John T. Christopher; Miss Cobden; Miss J. Cobden; Mr. M. J. Dacosta; Mr. M. D. Dadysett; Mr. Dinsha D. Davar; Mr. Albin Ducamp; Mr. U. K. Dutt; Mr. Alexander Fowler; Mr. H. W. Freeland; Mr. P. Pirie Gordon;

Mrs. Colquhoun Grant ; Mr. Reginald Hogan ; Mr. N. Huda ; Mr. W. A. Hunter ; Mr. James Hutton ; Mr. H. M. Hyndman ; Mr. A. R. Campbell Johnstone ; Mr. Abul Hossan Khan ; Mr. F. P. Labilliere ; Mr. Tyrrell Leith, L.L.M. ; Mr. Charles Grant Logan ; Mr. A. J. Macdonald ; Dr. M. D. Makuna ; Dr. T. R. Mulroney ; Mr. Abdulla Rahanman ; Mr. Owen Seth ; Mr. Syed Sharifudin ; Mr. Offley Shore ; Mrs. and Miss Shore Smith ; Mr. St. John Stephen ; Mr. H. T. Tamplin ; Mr. Thomas Taylor ; Miss Toby ; Mr. E. N. Ward ; Mr. Frederick Young, J.P. ; Mr. Surish Chunder Pal ; Mr. Sirdar Hevakim Singh, &c., &c.

In opening the proceedings, the CHAIRMAN said he thought he would best perform the duties of the position which he occupied by detaining the meeting with no preliminary remarks of his own, but simply introduce to them Sir David Wedderburn, who had undertaken to read a paper on a subject of great importance at the present juncture, and one which is likely to increase in importance as time progresses. (Hear, hear.) He believed that every one in the meeting, and every one who was friendly to India, would feel indebted to Sir David Wedderburn for the interest he is taking in Indian affairs. (Hear, hear.) And it was quite certain that when a member of Parliament unconnected with India, as in the case of Sir David Wedderburn, takes up subjects of that kind, it operated to popularise them among the people at home, and was very gratifying to the people of India. (Hear, hear.)

Sir DAVID WEDDERBURN read the following paper:—

In bringing the subject of Popular Representation for the Natives of India before this Association, my desire is to elicit the views of gentlemen familiar with India, rather than to advocate any special views of my own. In particular, I should like to hear the opinions of Native gentlemen as to the means best adapted for enabling the rulers of India to ascertain the true feelings and requirements of those whom they have to govern. The difficulty of ascertaining these feelings and requirements has always been a cause of regret and complaint to the well-wishers of India, especially those to whom a long Indian experience has only rendered the difficulty more painfully apparent.

Three years ago I had the honour of addressing in Bombay a very large and influential public meeting upon representation for the people of India, and I then promised to do my best to bring the question before the British public and Parliament. As to the form which a scheme of representation ought to assume at the outset, on mature reflection I feel convinced that the Legislative Councils in India are the bodies into

which an independent elective element, representing the Indian taxpayers, could be most advantageously introduced. The scheme of conferring seats in the House of Commons upon a few representatives, or delegates, from the great centres of population in India, so as to give the Natives at least a *hearing* when Indian questions are discussed in Parliament, has much to recommend it in theory, but is beset with practical obstacles. The laws under which India is actually governed, are made, not by the British Parliament, but by the Indian Legislative Councils, and, without any startling or revolutionary change, the representative element can there be readily introduced.

In the Legislative Councils there are already certain gentlemen, Native as well as European, who, being non-officials, may be said to represent the general community, but who are nominated by the Government, and who are in a small minority as compared with the official members of Council. In an assembly thus constituted it is clear that there cannot be any really independent opposition, and that the Government is not only irresistible as regards voting power, but is also uncontrolled and uninstructed by arguments or criticisms, such as may be furnished by an independent minority.

Even at present, however, individual members of Council occasionally criticize the measures proposed by Government, and instructive debates take place. For example, in April, 1879, the Bombay Legislative Council met to consider a "Bill to provide for Irrigation in the Bombay Presidency." Nine members were present—viz., H.E. Sir Richard Temple, the Governor (presiding), two members of the Governor's Executive Council, the Advocate-General, two heads of Government departments, one non-official European gentleman, and two Natives. In the course of the debate Mr. Morarjee Goculdas, while according his support to the general principle on which the Bill was based, objected very strongly to some of its provisions, as being "calculated to make the Bill unpopular, "and its working harsh." In particular, he pointed out the hardship of charging the lands "under command" of a canal with its costs, should it prove financially a failure, whether the owners of such lands are willing to use the water of the canal or not, and although the canal is to be constructed without consulting the wishes of the cultivators. He reminded the Council that in 1869 the Secretary of State for India (the Duke of Argyll) refused his assent to the Punjab Irrigation Act passed by the Viceregal Council, until the provision in respect of a compulsory water-rate upon cultivators, whether they used a canal or not, was expunged from the Bill. He also showed that the Bengal Irrigation Act, passed in 1876, contains no provision for a compulsory water-rate, and that in the case of existing canals in the Bombay Presidency it had been



decided that compulsory rates, levied upon lands indirectly benefited by the canals, were illegal. Similarly he opposed the legalization of *forced labour* under the Bill, referring to the Irrigation Acts for Bengal and the Punjab in support of his objections, as well as to general principles of justice, and to the acknowledged generosity of the British Raj. Mr. Morarjee Goculdas was supported (somewhat feebly) by the only other Native gentleman present, but all his suggestions were ignored by the official members, one of whom had the assurance to say that "Mr. Morarjee was fighting a battle of the villagers, which they would not be inclined to fight for themselves." Seven amendments were moved in committee by Mr. Morarjee, but every one was rejected, and the Bill passed as it was introduced. So strong, however, were his arguments, that they appear to have attracted attention in higher quarters than the Bombay Legislative Council, as the sanction of the Secretary of State for India has been withheld for many months from the Bombay Irrigation Act, and was not notified when the Bombay Port Trust Act, passed nearly at the same date, received that final sanction.

Now, in order to reform the Indian Legislative Councils, by strengthening the non-official element even now so serviceable, and in order to render them at least *partially* representative, we have merely to introduce arrangements already in successful operation as regards the Indian municipalities. Here, again, the case of Bombay may be cited: the Corporation consists of sixty-four members, sixteen being nominated by Government, and sixteen being elected by the bench of justices, while the remaining thirty-two are elected by all ratepayers, who pay a certain amount of direct taxation, and who number in Bombay perhaps 5,000. Among these are included a few persons voting in virtue of "fancy franchises." The elected require qualifications similar to those of the electors; Europeans and Natives are alike eligible, the former being at present a majority, I believe, in the Corporation of Bombay.

The Municipal Commissioner, a Government official, presides over meetings of the Corporation, and with him rests the initiative and executive authority. Although the Corporation exercises a power of financial control, the management of affairs is mainly in the hands of the Town Council, twelve in number, all members of the Corporation, of whom they form a sort of Standing Committee. There are two classes of municipality in British India, those in large places being known as "city," those in smaller places as "town" municipalities; and these two classes administer revenues amounting altogether to nearly two millions sterling.

The municipal constitution of Bombay is in form the most popular of all, and we have the authority of a late Municipal Commissioner,

as well as that of the only two Governors under whom it has existed, for asserting that this constitution works thoroughly well. The only weakness observed has been a tendency to abstention from voting on the part of the electors, but this will probably correct itself as the Natives become accustomed to arrangements so recently introduced.

Sir Richard Temple, in March, 1879, spoke in high terms of "free municipal institutions," saying that he was sure they would never fail in Bombay, knowing as he did "the public spirit and self-sacrificing disposition of the Native community."

It appears, therefore, that in the case of these municipalities there exist already constituencies, to whom might well be entrusted the privilege of electing representative members for the Legislative Councils. A commencement might at once be made by conferring this privilege upon the three Presidency cities, and a few other large centres of population; thus adopting a course similar to that proposed by the present Prime Minister in the India Bill of 1858—viz., to give seats in Council to five members elected by the principal commercial cities of the United Kingdom.

Upon financial questions the opinions and criticisms of members so elected would be of great practical value, so that it would be the interest, as well as the duty, of Government to give them ample opportunities for discussing the Budget, and all measures affecting the incidence of taxation. It is, after all, only by taking the wearer into his confidence that the maker of the shoe can ascertain where and how it pinches.

Countless authorities might be quoted as to the advantages to be gained by the British Government in consulting the Natives, especially upon questions of finance. Viceroy, Governors, Commissioners, and Judges are upon this matter in accord with distinguished and learned Natives.

One of these last-mentioned says: "The Natives are prepared to understand the general working of a representative system. . . . As regards the Provincial Budget, double the amount of the existing deficit may be raised, if the Natives are consulted, if their feelings and prejudices are not hurt, if some importance is given to them, and if taxation be managed in a way and on a system that they approve." The same Hindu gentleman, speaking of over-legislation, says: "'This Act is passed, that Act is passed,' constantly rings in the ears of the people. No time is allowed to the Natives to understand the rules and laws made for them."

Whether factories or forests, arbitration or irrigation, abolition of cotton duties or imposition of licence taxes, be the subject for discussion in the Indian Legislatures, it is desirable that Natives of India should be

permitted to explain their own views, and to receive explanations from the Government.

A "Punjab Officer," in a letter to the *Times*, a few years ago, uses these words: "Having just returned from India, I can testify from personal experience to this discontent; but I can also testify that the impatience felt is not directed against all taxation in any form, but against the manner in which it is imposed. I may say that complaint is altogether of a much more general character than is generally represented, certainly than is put forth in any officially-inspired documents. It is a complaint that the people have no voice whatever in the government of their finances. I would endeavour to convey to your readers the conviction, which is deeply implanted in the mind of every Native of India who thinks at all on the subject, that if they were consulted more freely, not merely as to the mode of levying taxes, but, what is far more important, as to the expenditure, they might give material aid in securing a healthier financial condition than at present exists. I altogether dissent from the notion that the people of India are not fit to manage their own affairs in concert with their British rulers."

Two eminent Governors-General, Lord Minto and Lord Mayo, who belonged to opposite political parties, and between whose administrations sixty years intervened, are fully agreed upon this point.

Lord Minto, during his residence at Madras in 1807, expresses himself as forcibly struck with the mutual ignorance of each other's motives, intentions, and actions, in which Europeans and Natives seemed content to live. He writes: "I do not believe that either Lord William Bentinck (Governor) or Sir John Cradock (Commander-in-Chief) had the slightest idea of the aversion their measures would excite. I fully believe their intentions were totally misapprehended by the Natives." His letters generally show his conviction, that the chief impediment to the improvement of the Native race, and the chief disadvantage under which their European rulers laboured, was to be found in their reciprocal ignorance of each other's language and modes of thought. "One of the first objects of Government should be to assist them to understand each other."\*

Lord Mayo speaks also in the clearest possible language: "There are large and rich districts, from one end of India to the other, wherein there are men of sufficient ability and intelligence who are willing to assist their rulers. What we want is to recognize the principle that we wish to associate with ourselves, whenever it is possible, the Natives of the country."

Sir Charles Turner, Chief Justice at Madras, when presiding recently

\* "Lord Minto in India."

at the anniversary of the Presidency College, said: "The policy I advocate is no new policy. In the year in which I first saw the light, there were uttered by Macaulay in the House of Commons words which more faithfully now than at any time represent the feeling of the British nation: 'The public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown the system; by good government we may expand our citizens into a capacity for better government, that, having been instructed in European knowledge, they may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will come, I know not. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens, would, indeed, be a title to glory all our own.' Since those noble words were uttered by that great man, that poet, historian, and statesman of England, and lawgiver in India, Lord Macaulay, whose sentiments find larger admiration in the hearts of Englishmen now than they did when he first uttered them, half a century has not yet been completed. And already his aspiration has in a measure found its fulfilment. There are thousands in this land desirous of the privileges of citizenship, hundreds who are capable of them. To this city there has recently been conceded what is by no means the first instalment of such privileges—local self-government. Believe me, when the common acquiescence of the enlightened among your countrymen conceive the hour has arrived for advancing the demand, England will not be slow in conceding to her Indian subjects the full privileges of citizenship, for which so many of her wisest sons have laboured to fit them."

Sir Bartle Frere has actually drawn up a scheme of a representative constitution for India. He takes the existing village councils as the foundation of his system, and proposes that the village councils should have the right of selecting and sending up representatives to district councils, these in their turn electing members to serve in provincial councils. By these means he considers that we should obtain organizations analogous to those existing in this country for the administration of parishes and counties; and he maintains that the "provincial councils might be unreservedly consulted as to the funds of the province, and that no measure should be adopted affecting the masses of the people till thoroughly discussed in the provincial assembly."

He condemns the "centralized system of departmental organization, as cutting straight through all the natural organization of villages and districts, which has grown with the growth of the people, and been in existence for so many centuries." And he adds: "If two elected

"members were sent up from each provincial division—suppose you had ten in all sent up to the local Legislative Council,—they would in every way greatly strengthen the Council, and give additional weight to its proceedings. This, of course, would require an Act of Parliament."

Mr. M. J. Shaw Stewart, formerly in the Bombay Civil Service, has within the last few months addressed to the Secretary of State for India a memorial, in which he briefly sketches out a proposal for the formation of a representative consultative council in India. Like so many others who have had a share in the administration, he has come to the conclusion that most of our mistakes in India are due to the fact that we have no power of getting an authoritative independent record of the opinion of the people on the schemes we undertake." He, therefore, suggests the formation of a central representative council, consisting entirely of unofficial members, before whom all projects of an administrative nature should be laid for full consideration by the Government of India. The decisions of this council should take the form of advice tendered on behalf of the tax-paying community, and should have no absolute authority as binding the Government of India or the Secretary of State. The advice of such a consultative assembly would, in Mr. Shaw Stewart's opinion, have saved much unprofitable expenditure in connection with public works, especially irrigation, and would be of great value in dealing with questions of famine and agricultural indebtedness.

Thus from all parts of India we have expressions of opinion, uttered by highly qualified authorities, in favour of adopting some form or other of popular representation, as well for the sake of rulers as of ruled. No one dreams, certainly, of being able to create out of existing materials a "Native House of Commons," and many are disposed to think that the functions of Native representatives ought to be at first merely consultative, with the right of advising, but no power of controlling.

Doubtless it will be prudent to proceed gradually, and to be guided by experience, in extending the privileges of self-government to the Indian people.

It is sometimes asserted that the grand object of British rule in India is to fit the people for ruling themselves, and that we shall be prepared, when this task has been accomplished, to leave India to work out her own destinies. Whether there be any truth in this assertion is extremely doubtful, but it is true that Englishmen desire to govern India with a due regard to the wishes and requirements of her people, and that it is knowledge, not good intentions, in which they are mainly deficient. The time seems now to have arrived for the Government of India to apply to

Parliament for such powers as may be necessary to develop in India the principle of popular representation, already successfully introduced into the constitution of Indian municipalities, and sanctioned by the approval of many distinguished Indian administrators.

The CHAIRMAN said that, prior to inviting discussion on the valuable paper they had just heard, he wished to read a letter from a valued friend of the East India Association,—General Sir Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.,—who, unfortunately, was unable to attend the meeting. It was addressed to Captain W. C. Palmer, the Hon. Secretary of the Association, and was as follows: “12, Queensborough Terrace, 17th March, 1880.—My dear Sir,—Were I able to attend to-morrow’s meeting, I should cordially join in thanking Sir David Wedderburn for his treatment of ‘Popular Representation in India.’ The tentative way he recommends of advancing it is most judicious, and, with him, I believe it a matter of the first importance to ascertain the opinions of the continent before legislating for it. Our neglect of this brought about the dislike and distrust that inflamed, if not actually giving rise to, the troubles of 1857-8. On this score I lament the recent interference of the Home Government, whereby the Indian Council was overruled; for the loyalty of the Indian people cannot be secured without attention to their feelings.—Believe me, very truly yours, G. L. JACOB.” (Hear, hear.) After a reminder of the ten minutes’ rule of the Association in regard to speakers, the Chairman then invited discussion.

The Rev. JAMES LONG said that when persons speak of popular representation in India they are apt to overlook the fact that India is a congeries of states, which have never been united into one until within the last thirty years; that its population amounts to 240,000,000—one-fourth that of the globe—as diverse in nationality and temperament as Europe or the United States of America; that when we speak of the people we have to do with a land where not two per cent. of its rural population can read or write, where caste, with its iron hand, has kept the masses enthralled, and where the ryot, a dumb animal, has few to speak for him. But the Government has been following in the lines advocated by the lecturer. The voice of Natives is heard in Legislative Councils, and in city municipalities; while the authorities have given aid towards the restoration of the old village municipal system; and by fixing its permanent seat at Simla, the Government has placed itself in the position of knowing India better than when in Calcutta, which, valuable, like Liverpool, for its trade, has vainly striven to be the London

of India. Let the voice of the Vernacular Press of India be heard; it is brought more in contact with the masses than the English Press, and treats more of their weal or woe. He could never forget the emphasis with which Lord Canning said to him in the course of an interview, at the beginning of the Mutiny in 1857: "I wish to get at the opinions of the people; I know what the chiefs want." He suggested to Lord Canning having a reporter of the Native Press, and that reports should be published weekly and sent round for public information. Lord Canning agreed to do it. It was carried out, and was working satisfactorily until recently. Measures had now been taken to suppress those reports, allowing them to be sent only to a few individuals who have no time to peruse them; and so they are quietly entombed in red tape. But the Government have established a very useful office—that of Press Commissioner; and it is to be hoped they may abolish the secret system, and thereby make that Commissioner's office still more useful. During a two years' residence in Russia he (Mr. Long) had ample opportunities of observing a state of things similar, in various points, to what we have in India: an ignorant peasantry and partially-educated bureaucracy. The Russian Government, after self-emancipation, dealt with the question of representation of the people by infusing fresh life into the old village system which was common to Saxon England, to Russia, and to England 1,200 years ago. The Russian *Mir*, or village municipality, is presided over by *Starosta*, or elder, elected by the heads of families. He has to deal with the village lands, the poor, the police, and the schools, and to preside at the communal assembly, where men and women have a voice. Above this is the *Volost*, or district assembly, controlling from 300 to 2,000 families. At the head is a dignitary called the *Golova*, aided by a council composed of the village mayors, as well as delegates from the heads of families. They have charge of local taxation, recruiting regulations, and control village officials and select magistrates. At the top is the *Zemstvo*, or provincial assembly, composed of peasant deputies, nobles, merchants, and clergy. They have higher powers, and deal with roads, post-offices, and local taxation. This system was, on the whole, working quietly until the military and bureaucratic parties in Russia gained the ascendant, when a reactionary policy took place; but under the Melikoff régime there is hope that the old lines will be followed. A plan very similar to the Russian one was proposed in the East India Association years ago by Sir Bartle Frere. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Long concluded by submitting the following as *practical* points for discussion: 1. The giving publicity again to the reports of the Native newspapers, as representative of local opinion. 2. The establishing of provincial assemblies, to be held in each *zillah*, or district, composed of

the heads of villages, with representatives from the Native merchants and the educated classes.

MIRZA PEER BUKHSH said he rose to express his hearty thanks to Sir David Wedderburn for his able and interesting paper. It was quite refreshing to see that so important a question as the representation of India was being brought before the English people by members of Parliament. Mr. Long's remarks, too, were especially *à propos*, because they compared Russia with India. To some it might seem monstrous to compare the Russian system of government with the English rule in India,—a barbarous organization with a civilizing organization. Yet what did they find? That in Russia there existed popular assemblies and local government by the voice of the people; whereas in India it was not conceded. It was very easy to say that the Natives of India are not fitted for a representative system; but the English claimed to be the most enlightened nation in the world, and they had ruled India for more than a century; and if the Indian people are not politically educated, whose fault is it? (Hear, hear.) As the matter stands, of the large revenue raised by the Indian Government, say over £60,000,000, half is spent in England, and the Indian people have no voice in the disposition of a farthing of it. Under a proper representative system there would not only be less complaint at taxation, but more money would be raised without discontent. (Hear, hear.) Everywhere else throughout Her Majesty's rule, all is carried on under the control of the people and Parliament; and still our fellow-subjects, the Home Rulers, demand a Parliament for their own country; all the colonies, whether new or old, have their Parliaments; but India, with its 250,000,000 of population, has no voice in its own government. Sir David Wedderburn's request is a very moderate one, for he only asks that a few independent members should be elected by the municipal councils of the chief Presidencies, where such councils exist, and that they should be admitted into the Viceregal Council, so that they may give their advice. As fellow-citizens of this empire, the 250,000,000 of India claim to have a voice in the government of their own country.

General ORFEUR CAVENAGH said he thought there could be no one who had had any experience in connection with the government of India but must fully concur with the leading principle of Sir David Wedderburn's paper—the necessity of making ourselves acquainted with the feelings of the Natives. But there is another necessity which is equally great and important, and that is the necessity of making the



Natives fully acquainted with our views. (Hear, hear.) For instance, many laws which we have enacted with the sincere intention of doing justice to the Natives have met with opposition solely owing to their ignorance of the grounds upon which those laws have been framed. (Hear, hear.) He could mention a forcible instance of this within his own personal experience. In a large district that was under his charge, under the old Dutch laws, the revenue was levied in kind—according to ancient Mahomedan custom—of one-tenth of the produce. It was, of course, impossible for the Government to collect grain, &c., and accordingly the right to the revenue was farmed. He became aware that there was a good deal of oppression and bribery associated with this method, although carried on in such a way as to make it impossible for the Government to interfere. He, therefore, prepared a Bill framed in the interest of the peasantry; the average value of the tithes for several years being taken, and upon that average a fair margin allowed, as the basis of the tax to be imposed upon the land. The Bill became law; the assessment was below the fair calculation of the value of the produce, the tax-farmers were removed, their extortions ceased, and the people were in every way materially benefited; moreover, the new system was brought into operation in the most conciliatory manner; but there was great opposition among the peasants themselves, owing to their ignorance of the intentions of the Government; they became impressed with the idea that the measure concealed a design to increase the revenue, and they would not believe that it was intended mainly for their own benefit. This feeling was, of course, encouraged by the evicted tax-farmers and their officers, who were losing a lucrative business by the change, and as they had much intercourse with the people, their immediate influence was greater than that of the officials of the Government. This was one instance of the result of want of knowledge on the part of the governed; but many others could be specified. While, therefore, he fully concurred with Sir David Wedderburn as to the importance of our making ourselves acquainted with the feelings of the people of India, he must reiterate his conviction that it was of as much importance that the people of India should become acquainted with the feelings of their rulers. The question of giving popular representation to India is, of course, one which requires the gravest thought and consideration. Mr. Long had well reminded the meeting that India contained, not one, but several nations, and in view of this fact he (General Cavenagh) was inclined to think it advisable to have a council in every province containing representatives of the great city which forms the seat of government. Laws that relate to that part of the empire might be submitted to this council, not giving to it the power to veto, but for its

consideration and recommendation; so that when a proposed enactment came before the Legislative Council of India, it would also have presented a thorough representation of the wishes and ideas of the people upon whom the law would be enforced. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. UPENDRA KRISHNA DUTT observed that in most colonies except British India there was some form or other of representative government, through which the people had a voice in the expenditure of the money raised by taxation. In India people had no voice in the government, and could never expect to have, unless some sort of popular representation was conceded to them. (Hear, hear.) For himself, he could not too highly commend the manner in which the lecturer had dealt with this subject, and for his proposal that popular representation should be conceded to the people of India. If this were done, the Natives would have an object before them. They would have the ambition to serve their own people and to benefit their native land. (Hear, hear.) He did not for a moment wish that India should send members to the House of Commons; nor, in his opinion, would it be reasonable to make such a claim, because India as a country has no reason to offer any opinion on the administration of England, or its dependencies and colonies. He did, however, contend that such privileges should be accorded to India in the direction of representative government as should fit it at some future time to govern itself. If ever this principle of popular representation was to be carried out, there must be, in the first place, some form of council by means of which the people of India could advise the English governors to act in the way which would be most agreeable to the people, and most conducive to their welfare. (Hear, hear.) He believed that the people of India were thoroughly fitted to have and to exercise some degree of authority. If they were to be merely consultative, they would be sure not to give any wholesome, independent advice. If, on the other hand, some authority were conceded, and the members of the councils found that their wishes would be studied, they would think then not so much of what would be agreeable to the English, but of what would be most beneficial to the people, and would conduce most to the permanent welfare of their country. (Applause.)

Mr. DINSHA D. DAVAR said that the remarks of Sir David Wedderburn at the beginning of his address, expressing a desire to elicit the views and opinions of gentlemen familiar with India, emboldened him (Mr. Davar) to ask the indulgence of the meeting for a few comments as to the representation of the people of India. He desired to observe that although India at the present time had representation in the

Legislative Councils, the representation was merely nominal in its character, for it was left to the Government to select persons from the Native community, and it necessarily followed that the Government would naturally select men who were likely to be tractable, if not absolutely obedient. Moreover, this element was in such a minority in the Legislative Councils, that if at any time they raised their voices, they were disregarded or absolutely ignored. From this it would be seen that the representation which now obtained was a questionable benefit, if it could be called a benefit at all. (Hear, hear.) When the question of popular representation came up for discussion, it was stated usually that the Government are willing to give that kind of representation to India if they could but devise means whereby they could be satisfied that those who were elected could or would work for the good of the country. It was also added that the people do not grasp politics, and are not fit to make any judicious selection. These pleas he considered to be very weak and unsatisfactory reasons for withholding popular representation. Surely a nation which governed a vast empire such as India, with its differing creeds and millions of different nationalities and races, tolerably well, could, if it desired, devise ways and means whereby a moderate franchise might be extended to the people of India. (Hear, hear.) Moreover, he desired to point out that it was not, as was often said, the differences of opinion between the Natives that rendered this impossible, for the varied nationalities on all important matters agreed in the main. For instance, he could point to a great many measures of the present Government which had been unanimously condemned alike by Hindus, Mahomedans, and Parsees. And as to the people not grasping politics, and not being fitted to make a judicious selection, he thought that when once the privilege was extended to them, there were enlightened, educated men who would go through the country educating the people in politics, just as was the case in England. The Natives of India did not wish at present for a Native representative assembly, nor did they clamour for home rule; happily, India had not produced a Parnell to agitate for it—(laughter)—but what they wanted, and what he thought every right-minded Englishman would be disposed to give, was that Native Indian gentlemen should be selected by the people to represent them, and that such representatives should be so selected as to be able freely to express themselves on all measures which so nearly touch the welfare of the people and the country. Perhaps it would be premature to give such an assembly administrative control, but he thought that there could be no objection to its being merely consultative at first, and for such regulations to obtain that those forming the body should be so appointed as to feel that they were under no compulsion, and that there was nothing to pre-

vent them from freely and fully expressing their views. If the Government really were actuated with the desire that they professed, to learn what were the feelings of the people of India, he believed they could easily do so. (Hear, hear.) The blunders arose from the fact that the Government were always too ready and willing to believe what they desired, and rejected the true sentiments and wishes of the people as the idle clamour of a disaffected few. Thus it was represented that an aggressive war was a popular one, and they were told that the people of India were grateful to the Government for their anxiety about "a scientific frontier." (Laughter.) This was an instance of what he had just pointed out, of the faculty of believing only what the official mind desired to believe. Then again, if a change was to be made in the title of the Queen, the world was told that it would be highly beneficial, and that it would increase the popularity of England, and that the Indian people were pleased; as if the change of a name made the slightest difference in the feeling of deep loyalty which every Indian felt for the Queen. Again, if the Government was really and truly desirous of arriving at the true state of feeling of the people, why, he asked, did they destroy the only means the Natives possessed of expressing their feeling? He held that the only reliable means of getting at the Native feeling was the Native Press; yet this had been virtually gagged; and then the Government complained of the blunders arising from a want of knowledge. If they really desired to know the state of affairs, the suppression of the Press was a suicidal act. (Hear, hear.) In concluding, Mr. Davar said he felt assured that he could offer to the lecturer the sincere thanks of every Indian who had the good of his country at heart, for his able advocacy of their cause.

The Rev. JAMES JOHNSTON said he could not but express the great pleasure he felt in listening to Sir David Wedderburn's paper, because he believed that it boldly and frankly expressed opinions and urged a movement in the right direction. And another gratifying circumstance was the response which had been made by the Native speakers, who showed that they were well able to express opinions worthy of being listened to. He had heard discussions in India, at meetings of Natives, and he had often been struck with the worthy and generous sentiments to which the speakers gave utterance. One of the difficulties in the way of any step in the direction suggested by Sir David Wedderburn and other speakers, was the fact that education in India is, as yet, so limited in its extent. There is a large class of highly educated Natives, but these are, after all, a small number in comparison with the uneducated masses of the population. And inasmuch

as information and knowledge will always give power in India, as in every other country, the present result of giving representation to Natives would be to give the elective power to an oligarchy. We want knowledge to be more widely diffused, and education spread over the country to an extent scarcely yet attempted; for it is calculated that scarcely one in ten of those who ought to be under instruction attend any school. On the other hand, while primary education among the masses is far too much neglected, very much has been done in the way of higher education; and this led him to say that the Government might take a step in the right path by taking off some of the leading-strings in this sphere. Properly stimulated, the Natives are quite capable of providing the higher education for themselves; and some Natives have given liberal endowments for education. The giving them an opportunity of carrying on the higher education entirely on their own account would be a step in the right direction, and it might lead the higher class of Natives to realize their responsibility to diffuse education among their humbler brethren. In conclusion, Mr. Johnston reiterated the pleasure he had felt at the treatment of the subject by the various speakers, and expressed a trust that it would lead to the further enlightenment of England as to the necessity and usefulness of inviting the Natives of India to take part in the management of the affairs of their own country. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. FREDERICK YOUNG, J.P., said he rose simply to express his great sympathy with the views which had been advocated by Sir David Wedderburn, and, as an Englishman, taking a deep interest in the affairs of India, to offer the honourable member for Haddington his hearty thanks for the able way in which he treated the subject. A great orator and statesman of the past—Charles James Fox—declared that “representation was the sovereign remedy for every evil;” and agreeing with that doctrine, he was very glad indeed to see that the question of representation for every part of the British Empire was coming so prominently before the English public. There were few who interested themselves in the welfare of the Natives of India but admitted that, in some shape or way, their feelings and opinions ought to be far more adequately represented than they have hitherto been. What we want is to get at the ideas and feelings of the Natives of India with reference to the way in which they ought to be governed, as well for our own guidance as for their advantage and contentment. Whether we are to continue to rule the Natives of India, or whether they are hereafter to govern themselves entirely, he cared not to inquire. It was in any case of the highest present importance that we should endeavour by every means in

our power to secure the most perfect sympathy between the Natives and ourselves, and to respect their feelings, wherever possible, as to the principles upon which they should be governed as long as they remain under our rule. (Hear, hear.) In saying this he concurred with the last speaker, that the Natives of India require a great deal more of education in the mass before they can be deemed fully fitted to choose representatives to any parliamentary assembly by free public election. Still, in his opinion, we cannot too soon endeavour to lay down the lines upon which developments of the principle of representation may proceed, preparatory to the time when India may be able fully and freely to exercise the privilege of popular election. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. H. M. HYNDMAN said that before the discussion closed he desired to refer to one point on which Sir David Wedderburn had touched, and which appeared to have escaped notice. He alluded to the question of finance; for he could not but think that if there was any portion of Indian administration on which the people could be consulted with advantage, it was that which both to England and India was a most important issue. As an illustration, he referred to the licence tax, being of opinion that if the Natives had been consulted, so low a limit would not have been reached, as they could have shown that the cost of collection, and the disaffection it would produce, would far outweigh the value of the step as a means of increasing the revenue of the Government. In that case, and many others of a like character, he thought it was shown that advantage would accrue from admitting the Natives to the administration. It was not merely a representative system through which advantage would accrue to India, because he had been told—he spoke entirely from other people's knowledge—and had been given to understand that in order to get good popular representation in India, such a scheme as that of Sir Bartle Frere's would not work. He had been told that in the districts of India from which Natives would be chosen, there would be a great difficulty to remove from the mind of the representatives that fear—not personal fear—but still a feeling which would make them fearful of expressing their opinion. The idea prevailed that if they went in opposition to the Government, they would incur an amount of odium. If, however, representatives were drawn from the cities, they might prove of a better class, and it might be possible to get self-sacrificing men of right views. There was, however, this danger to be considered, that those who had the faculty of gaining the ear of the uneducated—for, as had been remarked, the greater part of the Natives are uneducated—might obtain election, and there would

be the risk of having on the councils men who want there simply to gain their own ends and not to represent to the Government that which they honestly thought would tend to the popular benefit. In drawing his remarks to a close, Mr. Hyndman said he thought it a commendable thing to endeavour to get closer to the Native by some such means as Sir David Wedderburn had suggested, but at the same time he thought it exceedingly difficult to apply to India those representative institutions which here in England had grown up for a thousand years, but which in India had never yet been known.

Mr. ABUL-FAZL M. ABDUR-RAHMAN was of opinion that the last speaker had much misunderstood the paper read by Sir David Wedderburn, so far as regarded the presumed impracticability of applying the representative system to India. It was perfectly true that the representative system in this country is the outcome of ages of growth, and that its present form is the result of a remarkable concurrence of circumstances. But that was not the issue before the present meeting: it was the feasibility of popular representation for India. Sir David Wedderburn said in the first portion of his paper that what he wanted was to elicit the opinion of the people as to the practicability of applying anything like the British representative system to India; but he must confess, with all proper deference to those speakers who had preceded him, that the discussion on the subject had greatly disappointed him. He had hoped to hear some definite suggestions made, pertinent to the issue, and that a scheme or schemes would be propounded resembling or differing from those of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir David Wedderburn. The lecturer thought that the municipal elective system should be extended to the Legislative Councils, and had given some explanations regarding the working of the Bombay Municipal Corporation and the Legislative Council; but he had listened attentively, and was, nevertheless, without a clear notion whether the municipal elective system was supposed to have full play throughout India. For himself, he could only say he did not think so. In some places in Bengal they had had a municipal elective system in operation only a very few years, and in Calcutta it had worked remarkably well. It did not follow that the same system could very well be applied in the election of candidates for the Legislative Council, because the men so chosen must be representative of much larger interests and wider districts, and that would entail the expenditure of more money and involve greater and different responsibilities. What he would suggest would be to let the elective municipal system be extended in India to those places where the muni-

cipalities are now created by nomination. And then, when the time comes—perhaps very soon—when the minds of the people have become familiarised with the elective system, let each of these municipalities elect men to the Legislative Councils. Something had been said by previous speakers about the education of the people. He would not stay to maintain that the masses of the people of India were as highly educated as the ordinary British workman, or as naturally clever and intelligent as the ordinary British elector—(a laugh)—and he would admit that there were no School Boards in India yet to spread abroad the wholesome benefits of education. All he would ask was that the object of preparing the people of India for self-government should be kept steadily in view, and that measures should be constantly directed to that object, so that, by familiarising the minds of the people with ideas of freedom and responsibility, they would fructify into the practice of representative government. (Hear, hear.)

The CHAIRMAN then, referring to the discussion, observed that there appeared to be a very general opinion that in order to make English rule in India popular, we must admit the Natives of the country to some share in the administration of their own affairs. He agreed with this, for he thought that history furnished abundant examples to prove that a foreign rule cannot long be maintained which excludes the Natives from participation in the administration of the country. (Hear, hear.) Now he did not think that it was the desire of any one to apply a copy of the English Constitution to India, nor did it appear to be contended by any speaker that India as a whole, or any province of India, is ripe for the fully developed representative institutions such as are possessed by England. On the other hand, there seemed to be a very general idea that we should endeavour to learn the feelings, sentiments, and even the prejudices, as well as the wants, of the people of India in all matters relating to the administration of their affairs, and that some bodies should be constituted which would serve as organs of intelligent Native opinion. In that he agreed, for he believed that every Government was benefited by free criticism on its measures. Now, from all he had heard and read, he had been under the impression that the earlier English officials in India—that was to say, at the beginning of the present century—were more conversant with Native feeling and sentiment, and sympathized more fully with the people, than did those of a later generation. (Hear, hear.) The reason for this was not far to seek. In those days men went out to India to pass their lives there with their thoughts less fixed on home. At that time, too, official business was very light, and done in a rough way. European officers had leisure for intercourse



with the Natives, and were more dependent upon them for society, because their own numbers were few. In those days also knowledge of the customs and feelings of the people was the best qualification for advancement in the public service; but nowadays legal knowledge and power of writing reports, &c., were the qualities more appreciated. That old state of things, which doubtless had also a darker side, had passed away, and a system of greater order, purity, and better judicial administration had been introduced, under which, however, the public servants were so overwhelmed with official duties, that they had not the time that those before them were able to spare for social intercourse and cultivation of sympathy with the people of India. (A Voice: "That is so.") Sir David Wedderburn had quoted both Lord Minto and Lord Mayo, past Governor-Generals, as deploring our ignorance of the feelings of the Natives, and as expressing the desire that the latter should be more associated in the government; and he (the Chairman) would refer to two other authorities. Sir Robert Montgomery, after his return from India, wrote upon the same subject in the *Times*, which was referred to in a leading article, especially noticing that part in which he said that the gulf between the officials and the Natives in India was widening, because our public servants were so tied down to their desks that they had no time to give to the cultivation of friendly relations. The remedy Sir Robert Montgomery proposed was the establishment of councils in each Presidency—provincial Government councils of a consultative character. Lord Canning, too, when he initiated the step of conferring magisterial powers on many of the principal landholders, remarked that he wished to knit them to the administration of their own country, and added that we should abandon the anomalous attempt to govern a country by thrusting aside every man whose birth, education, or social position gave them some claim to a share in the administration. As to the establishment of these representative bodies which had been suggested, there was a difference of opinion as to how they should be constituted. In the councils at present there was no doubt that the official element preponderated too largely to attain the object in view. Whether it would be expedient to enlarge the councils by the admission of Natives chosen by their countrymen, or whether councils of another character should also be established, were questions for consideration. Personally, he (the Chairman) was inclined to think that there should be councils for every provincial administration—say the Punjab, Cude, the North-west and Central Provinces. And as to their powers: Whether the councils should be merely consultative, or whether a decisive voice should rest with them, had not been touched upon; but his opinion was that in all matters

affecting local taxation, the levying of taxes, and the mode of spending them, these councils should be more than consultative. They should have the power of deciding upon many points, and no local work should be undertaken without approval. He (Sir Charles) believed that on most points the Natives were just as capable, and even more capable, of judging of their own interests than any European officials. He would mention a case in point. About eight years ago it would be remembered that there was quite a rage for canals and public works, and there was a proposal for a canal from the River Sarda which would traverse the province of Oude. The landowners protested against the scheme, urging that through two-thirds of the district through which the canal would run the water was close to the surface, and well irrigation easy and abundant; therefore the canal would not pay. He (the Chairman) sent their petition against the scheme to the Duke of Argyll, supporting the prayer, because he believed that the work proposed was unnecessary. The Duke of Argyll sent the petition back, asking reconsideration of the whole matter; and the result was that both the supreme and local Governments pronounced against it, and a fruitless expenditure of two millions of money was avoided. If the Duke of Argyll had not considered the petition of the landholders the work would have been carried out against the wishes of the landowners. He pointed to this circumstance in order to ask, why not in such cases avoid difficulty and risk of waste of money by consulting the people interested first? (Hear, hear.) Before the House of Commons' Committee the question was put to Lord Lawrence, "Do you not think that in a question as to a canal or "any other public work being required in a district, the Natives would "be capable of forming a judgment?" and Sir John answered, "Decidedly." Many like opinions could be adduced. There had been some question as to how these suggested representative councils should be elected in order that they should be what was desired—the organs of Native opinion. It seemed to him (the Chairman) of less importance how they should be constituted, whether by double representation or by giving a vote to a group of villages. The important thing really was to secure that members should be chosen by the countrymen, and not be entirely nominated by the Government. The subject was a most interesting one, and he had to ask the meeting to thank Sir David Wedderburn for the manner in which he had introduced it. (Applause.)

Sir DAVID WEDDERBURN, in responding to the thanks expressed by the various speakers, said he was gratified by the attention with which he had been heard, and by the remarks which had followed. The arguments, and the matter generally, were very nearly the same as

he recently ventured to address to the House of Commons. He felt upon that occasion that his knowledge was greater than that of the majority of his hearers, but on this occasion he felt that the reverse was the case, and that he had been addressing persons who possessed greater knowledge of the practical bearings of the subject than he enjoyed.

The usual complimentary votes terminated the meeting.

---

### *England and India.*

PAPER BY DINSHA D. DAVAR, Esq.

READ AT THE MEETING HELD AT THE ROOMS OF THE  
ASSOCIATION, ON THURSDAY, JUNE 3, 1880.

SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, Q.C., K.C.S.I., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held in the Rooms of the Association, 20, Great George Street, Westminster, on Thursday afternoon, June 3rd, 1880; the subject for consideration being an address delivered by Dinsha D. Davar, Esq., on "England and India."

SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, Q.C., K.C.S.I., occupied the chair, and amongst those present were Sir David Wedderburn, Bart., M.P., General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B., Major-General F. Applegarth, Major-General Lowry, Major-General G. McAndrew, Major-General MacLagan, Captain W. C. Palmer, Rev. J. Long, Rev. W. Morison, D.D., Rev. G. Small, Rev. J. T. White, Raja Rampal Singh, Surgeon-General Balfour, Dr. Vincent Ambler, Dr. Ralph Moore, Dr. D. H. Small, Mr. Abul Hassan Khan, Mr. Ahsanuddin Ahmed, Mr. A. Arathoon, Mr. C. W. Arathoon, Mr. J. H. W. Arathoon, Mr. H. C. Banju, Mr. H. M. Blair, Mr. John Da Costa, Mrs. Crament, Mrs. Day, Mr. Thomas Finlayson, Mr. F. W. Fox, Mr. H. W. Freeland, Mr. A. E. Gasper, Mr. H. A. Gasper, Mr. Lalmohun Ghose, Mr. P. P. Gordon, Mr. W. J. Gordon, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Hakim, Mr. James Hutton, Mr. K. Kawawakami, Miss E. A. Manning, Mr. W. Mogridge, Mr. J. S. Morgan, Mr. Abul Fazl M. Abdur Rahman, Mr. Syed Sharfuddin, Mr. E. A. Sheshadri, Mr. P. B. Smollett, Mr. M. Suajuddin, Mr. William Tayler, Mr. Thomas Taylor, Mr. J. T. Wood, Mr. J. W. Wood, Hamid Ali Khan, Pandit Shyamaji Krishnavarma, Moulvie M. Aanieullak Khan, Mohomed Hamen Ullah, &c.

In opening the proceedings, the CHAIRMAN said: Ladies and Gentlemen,—I conceive it to be the duty of one who takes the chair at a meeting of this kind simply to launch the discussion, to control its course, and, if necessary, to sum it up at the close. This is not a meeting for the purpose of promoting any definite action or any definite doctrine, but for the purpose of increasing our information by means of hearing a thesis dilated upon by a selected speaker, to be followed by such comments and strictures as may be suggested to the audience. The worst thing the Chairman can do is to forestall the speaker by himself attempting to speak on a subject which has yet to be disclosed, and therefore I shall make but a very few remarks, in a very general sense, before calling upon Mr. Dinsha Davar to address you. I think everybody must have observed that the desire of obtaining information on Indian affairs has very much increased of late among Englishmen. It is, indeed, high time that it should increase. (Hear, hear.) The hopelessness, the impossibility, of getting Englishmen to take any interest in Indian affairs has for a long time been a subject of wonder and reproach. But circumstances have changed, and are changing: our intercourse with India is very much more frequent and very much closer than before; distance is practically shortened in all respects, and in one respect may be said to be annihilated. The steamship, the railway, and the telegraph are all doing their work. With that decrease of distance comes a corresponding increase in the influence which the two countries must have upon one another. As we are the governing nation, there comes an increased amount of government which we exercise upon India, and an increased amount of direct appeal from Indians to us. That seems to me to have been the course of events, and to be—if there is anything certain in human affairs—the inevitable course of events as far forward as we can look. When India was a great distance from us—when it took twelve months to put a question and to obtain an answer—we were content to leave, and we were obliged to leave, the government of the country to our officials whom we placed there; but that can be so no longer. There is a possibility of intervention; and with the possibility there is the necessity for it, and the greater responsibility which comes of that necessity. If, again, we were an autocratically-governed country—as has been the case with some nations which have possessed distant dominions—we should be content to name an autocratic pro-consul, who would govern the country as he listed; and we should not interfere with him so long as he sent us the proper amount of tribute. But this is a country not so governed. We are a self-governed nation; we have the responsibilities of freedom, and one of those responsibilities is that we must

judge for ourselves what our agents are about. It seems to me that an increasing number of persons are feeling that responsibility, and that is the reason why there is an increasing desire for information upon Indian affairs. (Hear, hear.) One method of supplying that information, and one of the most effectual methods of increasing interest in any subject, and so exciting people to gain information for themselves, is the method we are adopting—viz., to listen to the opinions put forward by a selected speaker, and then to controvert, or support, or comment upon those opinions among ourselves. Now, Mr. Davar is himself a specimen of a class that has been created by our greater intercourse with India—a class which has been greatly increasing of late years, and one that I hope will increase still more rapidly. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Davar is one of those young Indian students who come here to obtain their general education or their professional education, as the case may be, and who, I hope and believe, go back again to India carrying with them something of value which they would not have got if they had not come to this country. (Hear, hear.) Now, Mr. Davar will state to us those points which strike him as being of the most importance with reference to the connection between England and India, and I trust that what he states will lead to a fruitful discussion.

Mr. DINSHA D. DAVAR then read the following paper:—

Ladies and Gentlemen,—In what I am going to lay before you you will find many imperfections and not a few faults. Fully aware of my shortcomings, I do not for one moment presume to think that my paper can bear comparison with the many very able and interesting papers read before this Association on previous occasions. If any of you have come here with the hope of hearing a paper like those you are in the habit of hearing in connection with this Association, you will be seriously disappointed. However, I trust to your indulgence; and though my paper can claim no other recommendation, it can claim one, and such a one as is most welcome to an audience when a dull paper is being read—I mean brevity.

I do not think it is necessary for me to go into the early history of India, as I feel sure you are all familiarly acquainted with everything I can lay before you on that subject. I will not detain you with a description of the extraordinary and fortunate circumstances which led to the rise and progress of England's Empire in the East. Whether the means by which that Empire was obtained were justifiable, or whether the means employed to extend and enlarge that Empire were strictly honourable, are questions properly within the scope of historians and moralists. Recriminations over the past would be, for us,

both unsatisfactory and useless. The fact stands that England, having acquired India, means, and has all along meant, to exert every nerve and make use of all her strength, if necessary, to retain possession of the magnificent prize she has won. Harassed as India was by foreign invasions, and continually convulsed by internal dissensions, previous to the time when England obtained supremacy there, its occupation by a Power able to hold its own against all comers could not be regarded as anything other than a blessing. That a country divided against itself could not have stood by itself, and must sooner or later have been subjugated by a foreign Power, was inevitable, and it was the good fortune of India that it fell into the hands of a country which has used its power with wisdom and moderation.

The questions that ought to interest us most at the present day are: Having obtained ascendancy in India, have the English governed it wisely and well? Have they used their power for the benefit of the country they acquired? Are the people of India happier now than they were before the English obtained mastery there? Has their rule tended to make life and property more secure? Is the prosperity of the country assured under their rule? In short, have the effects of British rule in India been such as to ensure the moral and material good of the people? Has it tended to the social and intellectual advancement of the inhabitants? Has it led to increased security, prosperity, and happiness of the country? To all these questions I am inclined to answer in the affirmative, but with certain reservations. I willingly grant that England has governed India wisely and well, but I do not grant that she has always governed India for the benefit of the people. The benefit of England has formed a strong consideration in guiding some of the actions of the Indian Government. It is but natural, and it would be almost absurd to expect that a paramount Power would forego its own interests in favour of a country it has conquered. All I object to is the sanctimonious preaching of some men who, laying the flattering unction to their souls, are constantly proclaiming that England's government of India is all a labour of love and charity, and that self-interest has nothing whatever to do with the glorious work Englishmen are doing in India. Again, I admit that British rule has tended towards the security of the people, inasmuch as India is shielded from foreign invasions, to which she was a prey in former times, and is free from internal discord, which used continually to rage in the country. But I maintain that British rule has not led to the prosperity of the people, as may be evidenced by a large bulk of starving and poverty-stricken population. Furthermore, it is quite true that British rule has led to the greater security of life and property; but then, nine-

tenths of the people lead a life of such abject misery and destitution that it is scarcely worth the living ; and as to their property, why, it is *nil*. They have nothing which they can call their own. They barely exist. The scanty clothing they wear, the wretched cots they lie on, their little all, is already the property of the money-lender, into whose arms necessity drives them. For them life is one continued struggle for existence. The life of squalid misery and utter destitution which millions of the peasants and labourers of India lead is a standing reproach to the English Government.

I do not say all these things from a mere spirit of fault-finding. I am perfectly aware of the innumerable benefits conferred on us by the English Government,—benefits for which we cannot be sufficiently thankful. There are many and grave abuses, but I do not attribute them entirely to the folly or wickedness of our rulers, as some do when they are expatiating on Indian wrongs. I believe that England governs with the best of intentions ; but it cannot be denied that in some cases these intentions are frustrated, and in a few cases they are entirely perverted. For this, perhaps, the Government is not so much to blame as circumstances. It is hardly possible to govern numerous nationalities, scattered over a vast extent of land, whose languages, religions, manners, customs, and even the very mode of thinking, are so entirely different, without making mistakes. The English have governed the Indian people now for over a century, but to this day they have not been able to understand their feelings, and as long as the reserve which unfortunately exists between the rulers and the ruled continues, they never will. It is this faulty appreciation of their feelings, and a want of knowledge as to the real requirements of the people, that are at the bottom of nearly all the serious errors into which the Government have from time to time fallen.

The first feeling of an Indian when he comes over to this country is one of regret at the profound ignorance which a majority of home-abiding Englishmen betray respecting the great country over which they rule, and the strange apathy they show to Indian matters in which one may reasonably expect them to take some interest. This ignorance and apathy, I am proud to be able to say, are not mutual. An Indian, at an early age, begins to learn the English language, and when, at the end of his school career, he goes up for his university examination, he not only successfully goes through a searching examination, but generally surpasses his English competitors in the knowledge of their own language. An Indian takes the liveliest interest in everything relating to England, and is generally well informed as regards everything that is happening in this country. He is conversant with your literature, and

most of your standard works find quite as many readers there as here. He has studied the history of your country, and is quite as enthusiastic about the great men of England as Englishmen could be. I could say a great deal more on this point, but, being an Indian myself, perhaps it is unbecoming in me to have said the little I have. I did not say these things from a spirit of self-congratulation and boasting, but merely to point out how much brighter would be the future of India, and how much happier the lot of its people, if the converse of all this were true—if the English people knew as much about India as the Indians know about England, and if they took as much interest in things Indian as we do in things English. Of course I do not include the comparatively small number of men who go out to India. They generally make themselves acquainted with the language of the part of the country in which they are placed, and take the trouble to acquire some knowledge of the manners and the customs of the people; but very few of them have been able to show that they have succeeded in understanding the real feeling of the people, or in forming a true estimate of their character. And here, again, you may ascribe the evil to the want of social intercourse between the two races.

The large and rapidly-increasing class of Indians who have received English education, and who are ordinarily spoken of as the educated Indians, have no particular reason to be grateful to some English gentlemen who are continually taking the trouble to let other people know what sort of a man an educated Indian is. These gentlemen follow the example of our proverbial good-natured friends. They give you credit for some things, of course, for plausibility must be preserved; but before they have finished they have, in their blindest manner, both said and insinuated the most nasty and damaging things about you. According to them, an educated Indian is well up, very well up, in book learning; but then you will, of course, understand that that does not give him common sense, in which an Indian mind is, according to them, particularly wanting. Again, they admit an Indian may be shrewd, and no doubt he is passably intelligent; but then his mind is not large enough nor deep enough to grasp and deal with those important questions which are constantly cropping up in India. They sometimes are very condescending, and even go so far as to admit that some of the Indians are clever, painstaking, and perhaps conscientious, if properly looked after; but—the “but” is always inevitable—they are not practical. The usual way in which the character of an educated Indian is summed up is, that he is a petty political agitator, a pseudo-reformer, and altogether a very meddlesome and objectionable character. This good-natured estimate of an educated Indian has so often of late appeared before the



public, that I suppose, to most of you, it must have become stale. Now if any one of you have taken the trouble to go a step further, and ascertain who the good-natured friend is, you must have found that he is a Government official, who gives the public the benefit of his experience—so true and, above all, so disinterested; and you will further find that these descriptions appear most frequently when the question of giving higher appointments to the Natives is most hotly discussed at home. If the plain, straightforward statement be made that England had conquered India, and she wished to reserve the lion's share in the government of the country to her own people, of course the Indians would be satisfied, or, at all events, they would not feel the same bitterness and resentment which they must feel at these continued and unprovoked misrepresentations. The Indians are a singularly unambitious people. Place or power have not the same charm for them as they have for other people. Their being excluded from a share in the government of their own country is not such a very great hardship to them, considering how long they have been contented to be ruled. Whatever other hard things are said of them—and they are many—their worst detractors have not attributed to them unfaithfulness or disloyalty. They have been patient in suffering, meek and uncomplaining in distress, and true and loyal under, sometimes, very trying circumstances. I appeal to you as Englishmen, whether abuse and obloquy are a fitting return for their faithfulness to your country and their loyalty to your Queen.

When first the English nation obtained supremacy in India, it was a rich and prosperous country. Its resources were believed to be inexhaustible, and in consequence a most expensive system of government was devised and put over the country. The result was that India got good government, but it had to pay dearly for it. Has the country had to pay too dearly for it? I am inclined to think that good government is never too dearly bought—particularly when anarchy and misgovernment have prevailed before the establishment of that good government. But when the result is a steady and continued draw on the treasury of the country, crippling its resources and reducing its people to the very verge of starvation; when the result is that when a famine comes there are no means of saving lives, and thousands of the inhabitants of this once rich and prosperous country die of hunger and want; when the result is dire want and unheard-of misery all over the country,—one may well be forgiven if he hesitates, and doubts whether good government is not, after all, too dearly bought. The fabulous wealth of India and its inexhaustible resources have disappeared, and are now matters of the past, and responsible men are busy devising means of averting the

impending bankruptcy of India. As for us, I think every one of my countrymen would wish the existing state of things to come to a crisis; for something grave, something startling, is needed to make the English people recognize the magnitude of their responsibility, and insist on the introduction of financial reforms on a basis more just to the country and more equitable to its people.

As regards the introduction of reforms in India, the part that the Indian Government plays is very like the part the Sultan of Turkey has been playing in Europe—plenty of promises, but no performance. It is so easy to promise, and so hard to perform. Moreover, promises silence for a time some meddlesome men at home who are continually drawing attention to Indian affairs instead of minding their own business. Their silence gives time, during which people forget a great deal; and if there is fresh agitation, immediately comes forth a fresh batch of promises. How long ago was it that the Government promised to throw open higher appointments to the Natives of India? Has it yet been carried out? It is not largely done, they say (I should say, not done at all), because the Indians have not yet arrived at that stage, &c., when responsible offices could safely be entrusted to them. Of course they would be indignant if any one suggested that they wanted to reserve these offices for their own people as long as they could. We are bound to suppose that the reason they ascribe they believe to be true. I do not question their veracity, but I do question the basis they have for forming such an opinion. Some few high offices have been entrusted to Indians, and the Indians hold a great many subordinate posts. Could they point out one single instance in which the person in whom trust was reposed has proved himself unworthy of that trust? Could they point out one instance of negligence of duty or incompetence in the performance of it? Could they name one single occasion on which Government had cause to regret having entrusted the duty or office to an Indian?

Not only are we debarred from having a share in the government of our country, but, what is still harder, we have not even a voice in the management of our own affairs. To keep up appearances, Native gentlemen are *nominated* to the Legislative Councils. The people are not allowed to choose their own representatives; the Government saves us the trouble by choosing for us; and whenever a suggestion is made that it would be better if the people chose for themselves, the suggestion is voted unreasonable, as, according to them, the people are not able to make a good choice—meaning by good choice one that would be agreeable to the Government. These nominated gentlemen are supposed to have a voice in legislating for the country. It is true

that they have a voice, but that voice is ineffectual. The only real power they have is of being able to talk in the Council, and, if they are so minded, to expend their breath and energy in objecting to Government measures and moving amendments. This is all they can do, because the Councils are so wisely constituted that the voting power of the independent members falls considerably short of the voting power of the official members of the Council. Such is the representation—or, more correctly, the sham representation—granted to the millions of India. In this country public opinion is the most potent factor in the government of the country. In India, unfortunately, public opinion has never been allowed to grow. Directly public opinion is formed, and threatens to be offensive or formidable, a sudden check is put upon it, and ways are devised of stifling it or nullifying its effects. What could have been a better or fitter exponent of the public opinion of India than the free Vernacular Press of the country? That free Press, which had been the growth of forty years, and which was wisely fostered and strengthened by the former rulers of India, who had recognized its importance and appreciated its value—that free Press, which had rendered good and valuable services to the Government in trying times, and which always gave its support to, and co-operation in, all just and good measures of the Government—that free Press was at one single stroke, in one short day, at one fell swoop, destroyed. It was allowed to exist, but its freedom was destroyed. It may speak, but it must speak something good of the Government. While Englishmen at home were expressing horror and indignation at the despotism of Russia in suppressing its free Press, their fellow-countrymen in India, assisted by one of their own Ministers at home, were carrying out a measure in servile imitation of the Russian Czar. This measure, with which Lord Lytton's name will for ever be connected, was remarkable for the storm of opposition it raised. From one end of India to the other loud voices of dissatisfaction, of dismay, were heard, but were unheeded by the authors of this obnoxious measure. This measure was also remarkable for the fact that when it came to be discussed before Parliament, the most illustrious statesman of England solemnly protested against this retrograde measure, and condemned it in the most unequivocal terms. The Indians have remembered, and will always remember, that, with pride and satisfaction; and we will also remember, I need not tell you with what feelings, the fact that the then British House of Commons—the representative assembly of a free and enlightened nation—lent its support and countenance to a measure which deprived two hundred millions of a dependent and conquered country of the only means they had of expressing their wishes and

opinions respecting the government of their own country, and at the same time took away from the already helpless inhabitants of India the only institution which defended their interests and exposed their grievances to the public. As one glaring instance of the attempts to stifle public opinion, I may remind you of the act of the late Governor of Bombay, who refused to the inhabitants the use of their own Town Hall because it was wanted for the purpose of holding a public meeting to protest against a Government measure. I may, in passing, inform you that the inhabitants of Bombay, or rather a few of them, have voted a statue to this same Governor. I hope they will place the statue in this very Town Hall, and inscribe it, "In grateful remembrance of his courtesy." If an association is formed among the Natives for political purposes, it is at once stigmatised as treasonable. If a man has the courage of his convictions, and speaks out what he thinks, he is immediately pointed out as a political agitator. If a strong and unanimous opinion is formed and expressed on any particular subject, and if, after difficulty, we succeed in laying our complaints before the British public—for the British public is, after all, the highest tribunal we can appeal to—steps are immediately taken to throw discredit on the movement, and you are informed that this is the voice of a small section of men who are never satisfied, and who are agitating from interested motives. If a Government makes itself very obnoxious, and the people there raise their voice in prayer for their downfall, and if that voice is heard in this country, in order to prevent its doing any mischief, the Calcutta correspondent of a leading London journal hurries to the telegraph office and communicates the fact that these agitators are like advanced Home Rulers, whose only delight is to be continually in opposition to the Government.\* Sometimes it is alleged against us that the people are so divided in their opinion that the Government are at a loss to find out the real sentiments of the people. That may be, I regret to say is, true of a great many things, but it is not true as regards questions which concern the welfare of the country and the well-being of the people. On all important political questions there has been and can be but one voice, and that voice has, during the last four or five years, been heard, though feebly, in condemnation of the acts of what now is, happily, the late Government.

It has been, and I believe at this moment is, in India widely discussed whether it is wise or unwise for the Indians to identify themselves with either one or the other of the political parties of England. I am of opinion that, under ordinary circumstances, it would be unwise

\* *The Times*, May 3, 1880.

to mix ourselves up with the squabbles of parties in England; but there are circumstances under which I think it is incumbent on us to waive that consideration. When a Government destroys the foremost of our few free institutions, and gags our legitimate organs of public opinion; when a Government imposes fresh taxation on an already overburdened people, and arranges it so that the official and professional classes—most able to bear the burden—are exempted, and the poor labouring classes have to bear the weight of it; when a Government, at a time when the country could least afford it, sacrifices a portion of its revenue in order that they may thereby find a few more supporters at the General Election; when a Government, against the wishes of the people, and in spite of the dissuasions of experienced and wise men, rushes madly into a war to fight a phantom, and imposes the cost on the impoverished treasury of India, and squanders away the money obtained under a strict promise to use it for averting famines only; when such a Government stands before the public to take its trial, and asks for a renewal of its confidence, is it likely that we, who suffered so much at their hands, could be quiet and tamely look on? And when it falls, does any man expect us to mourn over their fall? Have we not cause to rejoice at the change—a change which brings to power men who have always expressed friendly sentiments and borne friendly feelings towards the Indian people; men who have honestly and conscientiously opposed every retrograde and unjust measure of their predecessors? Our place is *not* always in opposition. Give us a Government prepared to introduce salutary reforms, prepared to encourage progress and give us facilities for advancement; give us a Government prepared to improve the condition of the ryots of India; give us a Government ready to perform whatever it promises; in short, give us a Government prepared to act towards us in a spirit of fairness and justice, and I venture to say that that Government will receive the cordial support of the united nationalities of all India.

If, from all I have said, you have come to the conclusion that I wish for a discontinuance of British rule, or plead for its extermination from India, you will have seriously misunderstood my meaning. I believe that the greatest misfortune that could happen to India at the present moment would be the extinction of British rule. That rule has, on the whole, proved very beneficial to the country. If I have devoted the greater portion of my paper to the consideration of some of the abuses which exist, and in finding fault with some of the doings of the Government, it was because I was of opinion that no good purpose could be served by recounting to you all the benefits

conferred on India, and enumerating all the advantages India enjoys under England. History keeps a record of all the great things done by England in India. The history of the world contains no parallel instance of a nation called upon to do the great work of civilization and enlightenment which England was called upon to do in India; and probably no nation in the world could have done the work so well and so efficiently. Every Englishman may reflect with satisfaction and pride on the work his countrymen have done and are doing in the far East. When one comes to consider the difficulties they had to encounter, and the obstacles they had to surmount in doing their work he is irresistibly compelled to overlook the few failures and contemplate only the success they have achieved and the good they have done. Whenever the tenure of British rule in India comes to an end—and I hope it will be a long time before it does come to an end—England will leave behind her broad and deep traces of her beneficent rule. I do not know whether Englishmen are proud of their Empire in the East; we are proud of our connection with England, and whenever that connection comes to an end India will be the greatest loser.

Before I resume my seat I must thank you for the patient hearing you have accorded me, and also express my sense of obligation to the Council for having given me this opportunity of reading a paper before you on the eve of my departure to India.

The CHAIRMAN said he would now read a memorandum from General Sir Le Grand Jacob—a well-known Indian officer, and an eminent member of the East India Association—which he had written after perusal of an early copy of the address which Mr. Davar had just read. “This essay is too sweeping in its charges against Government; it ignores undoubted facts, and is in some respects self-contradictory. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Davar allows that the British Government ‘has used its power with wisdom and moderation,’ yet in the following page, states that ‘nine-tenths of the people lead a life of abject misery and destitution;’ and as to the introduction of reforms, compares it with that of Turkey,—‘plenty of promises, but no performance.’ During my forty years of public life in India I have witnessed the most gigantic reforms, and an increasing disposition to enlist educated Indians in the service of their country. A system of public education is little more than a generation old, and the fostering care of Government has brought it to its present flourishing condition. Mr. Davar is ungrateful to his *alma mater*. (Hear, hear.) Foolish youths have brought odium on the rising generation of educated men

"by venturing beyond their powers into the deep questions of politics,  
 "philosophy, and science; but I deny that either Government or the  
 "thinkers among my countrymen are insensible to the good qualities of  
 "the men trained in our Indian universities. (Applause.) On this  
 "head I will refer to Mr. Henry Fawcett's recent work on 'Indian  
 "Finance,' pages 159 to 161. The outcry against the late restrictions  
 "on the Native Press has been greatly exaggerated. (Hear, hear.)  
 "Criticism of the acts of Government, so far from being suppressed, is  
 "invited. (Oh!) That past Governments have sometimes acted un-  
 "justly, or without due attention to the opinions and feelings of the  
 "people, I by no means deny; take, for instance, their interference with  
 "the right of Hindus to adopt, or, very lately, the removal of the cotton  
 "duties, when imposing harassing taxation on the people. (Hear,  
 "hear.) By all means, let such use of power be animadverted on;  
 "vague general censure is not only useless, but harmful, by depriving  
 "real wants of their due attention, and lessening the chances of redress  
 "for wrongs. I speak from much experience, and I deny that the  
 "mass of the people are in the unhappy condition portrayed. (Oh!)  
 "Of course a famine has dire results, but what previous Government  
 "ever laboured so to mitigate its horrors, and what aliens ever before  
 "gave as English, Irish, and Scotchmen here did for the relief of Indian  
 "distress? (Cheers.) Let any one compare the present state of the  
 "population with what it was under the Moguls, the Peshwas, or the  
 "Mahrattas, and he will agree with me in thinking Mr. Davar must  
 "have neglected this study. (Hear, hear.) Let him travel over the land  
 "and see how every town—nay, almost every village—had to protect it-  
 "self against the incursions of banditti. *Thugs* roamed over the country,  
 "annually murdering their thousands. A *Thug demadar* who, to save  
 "his neck, turned approver, admitted to me having himself strangled  
 "876, and seemed sorry to have been prevented completing his thousand  
 "(Laughter.) He justified his action by saying that, as God had  
 "made tigers, snakes, and alligators for the weeding of the human race  
 "as well as of other animals, so he had made *Thugs*. (Laughter.) Mr.  
 "Davar appears to attribute the whole of the present misery of the  
 "population to the neglect or misdoings of Government, but he forgets  
 "that the human race is under the same natural laws as other gregarious  
 "animals, the increase of whom beyond the means of subsistence is  
 "met by migration, or suffering and premature death. (Hear, hear.) The  
 "very virtues of Government, therefore, in saving life and rendering it  
 "secure, remove one of Nature's ways of dealing with surplus popula-  
 "tion. The other way—migration—is what the ryot is averse to; he  
 "clings to his plot of land or to his village from generation to

"generation, and, heedless of consequences, multiplies his race, contented with little. How can what sufficed for one pair feed a hundred? The treatment of the masses so accumulating is one of the greatest difficulties of the Indian Administration; and as regards reform, no government can in a generation remedy all the evils of centuries of anarchy." (Hear, hear.)

The CHAIRMAN having stated that he had submitted the above letter to the meeting at General Jacob's own desire, added that it was open for any gentleman present to take part in an oral discussion, only keeping in view that each speaker must limit himself to the space of ten minutes.

Rajah RAMPAL SINGH said he rose to make only a few brief remarks, as he was not prepared to do full justice to the admirably written paper which they had just heard. In the first place, he might say that he fully shared Mr. Davar's views regarding the poverty of India and some of its causes. Without saying that the English Government were rapacious or extortionate, it was yet manifest that enormous sums were yearly drawn from the pockets of the Indian people and spent elsewhere. The higher and well-paid appointments were exclusively held by Europeans, while outside the Government the greater portion of the operations of trade and commerce were monopolised in the same way; and in both respects India was a heavy loser. It was constantly retorted that if the blessings of English rule and English trading principles in India have to be paid for, we have ample recoupment in the public works and railways which have been constructed for the Indian people, and in the cheap goods which come from the English markets. But if to procure this result, taxation has been wrung from the people until poverty is the rule among them, of what good are all these public works? To those who have no money or food, of what use are railways? What is the use of cheap English goods being in the market if the Natives have no money to make purchases? As to the point raised by Mr. Davar about the English and the Natives not associating and mixing with each other, candour must compel the admission that the principal fault in this matter arose with the Indians themselves. Those Indians who break through their social rules and mix with Englishmen are always received with courtesy and cordiality, and Indians are admitted with freedom into their pleasant family circles. But while Englishmen bring their wives and children before their guests, the Indian is careful to keep his away; and hence the discouragement to the growing spirit of friendliness and intercourse. With Mr. Davar's



remarks on the unreality of Native representation in the Councils he thoroughly agreed. With Native members it is the custom to vote for anything for which they see the Viceroy is voting; and they do this because they desire to please the Government. Even when there are some who are inspired by a real feeling on behalf of their countrymen, they are outvoted by their English colleagues, and therefore the Native representation is merely nominal. Mr. Davar's observations with regard to the prudence of Indians attaching themselves to one or other of the two English political parties, were rather contradictory, for in one place he deprecates it and in another supports it. For his own part, he considered that as Liberals and Conservatives have ruled India in turn for a great many years the business of the Indians was to take all the good they could get from each without attaching themselves definitely to either. (Hear.) This was of the more importance because what politicians out of office promise is not exactly what they perform when they get in office; and the Prime Minister was a case in point. In the debate last year Mr. Gladstone denounced in the warmest terms the iniquity of the Vernacular Press Law; but now, when he is asked whether it is intended to repeal it, he says it must be made the subject of inquiry, and makes excuses for delay.

Mr. ABUL FAZL ABDUR RAHMAN said he believed his Indian friends present would agree with him in saying that Mr. Davar, while dealing with his subject in an impartial and temperate manner, had still conveyed the true feelings and opinions of educated Indians. (Hear, hear.) Referring to the statement of Mr. Davar regarding plenty of promises and no fulfilment, he asked, was it not the fact that there was an Act passed in 1870 by Parliament to provide for the admission of Natives of India, through merit and ability, into the Indian Civil Service? That was ten years ago, and they had not seen the fulfilment of that Act, either in its letter or its spirit. (Hear, hear.) It was only a year back that Lord Lytton, under pressure from home and pressure in India, drew up rules and regulations which he called the Native Civil Service Rules, and which negatived entirely the spirit of the Act of Parliament, and did away altogether with the admission of Natives on a general and equitable footing into the Civil Service. (Hear, hear.) There was in Mr. Davar's paper a sentence about British rule not having "led to the prosperity of the people." He believed Mr. Davar meant to say the "material prosperity." How could it be said to have done so, when regard was had to the financial condition of India and the increase of its public debt? How could prosperity be expected? The lecturer had referred to the kind and generous way in which the present

Premier took up this question. Indians generally were grateful to him, and applauded his noble feelings, and hoped the day would come, and not be far distant, when that pernicious Act—the Indian Press Act—would be removed from the Statute-book. (Hear, hear.) Then there was the Arms Act—another insult to the people of India. The present Premier, when on the Opposition front benches, and elsewhere, has said that this measure signified not only a withdrawal of confidence in the loyal people of India, but also showed the weakness and fear of the British Government. The people of India felt this Act to be an insult to them, and now that the present Government were in power, he hoped that their power would lead to the removal of the causes of complaint with which they had sympathized when out of office. (Hear, hear.)

Dr. RALPH MOORE said he had just returned from India, where he had had an experience extending over fifty years, or two generations; and his view of the condition of the country was simply this: It is the most expensive government in the world, with the poorest people. The people are ground down by taxation; food is dear, and the outlook gloomy. One thing is wanted, and must take place, and that is, a thorough and independent inquiry into the general state of the empire. (Hear, hear.) He had lived under fifteen Governors-General. Some of these were men of very great ability, and did everything in their power for the Natives; but, unfortunately, one generation of Englishmen goes to India only to be succeeded by another. Their time of service expires, and they hasten home—unlike the Roman soldiers, who settled on the field of their conquests. India is thus suffering under the worst form of absenteeism. Yet every one who has ruled over the people of India has spoken highly of them. He had had perhaps more acquaintance with all ranks there—from the prince to the peasant, the rajah to the ryot—than any Englishman living; and he was in some degree conversant with their laws, customs, manners, and literature; and he, too, could speak in the highest terms of them. They are more easily governed than any other race under God's canopy. (Hear, hear.) There are fewer police officers to the population than in any other nation. He recognized that among Englishmen at home there was growing up a more earnest disposition to do the best for India; and truly it was a difficult task which was imposed upon us. But to him it seemed that the first duty was to greatly reduce the expenses of government. (Hear, hear.) That was indeed the key-stone of the whole, and unless that be done, he really did not see any way of escape from bankruptcy.

Mr. P. B. SMOLLETT (late M.P. for Cambridge) remarked that

he had spent a long time in India, but, as far as politicians were concerned in regard to that country, one party was as bad as the other—(laughter)—and he did not believe that the Indian population would get relief from Mr. Gladstone any more than they had done from Lord Beaconsfield. He believed that the English government in India was very unpopular. (No.) The Natives knew that the English were alien in blood, in religion, and manners from themselves, and that they lived amongst them and went away, leaving not a trace behind—(laughter)—but taking back to England with them good fortunes. (More laughter.) That, however, was not his (the speaker's) case; he brought home very little. The English had introduced into the country a government which was very expensive—a government founded on European principles, not on Asiatic principles; and that he considered a very great mistake. They had, with the government, introduced a judicial system, most expensive and most onerous; and under it the poor were ground down and the rich were ruined. The Government sent out men of great ability as legislators and law-makers, but they went out with the idea of introducing the practices of Westminster Hall and the Court of Chancery into a poor country like India. Then we instituted a most wretched and abominable fiscal land revenue system. He spoke especially of the country of which he had had experience—viz., the Presidency of Madras. There they treated every poor ryot cultivating the ground and paying five or ten shillings rent a-year as if he were a yeoman; granting him a lease, and collecting his revenue through an ill-paid administration which was of necessity corrupt. Under that system they had annihilated what he regarded as one of the blessings of India—the village system. (Hear, hear.) But, worse than all, we had introduced an enormous expenditure, which, in his opinion, was the great fault of the British administration. There was an enormous outlay for military purposes; and all the great civil and military officers in India were, in his opinion, greatly overpaid. The only remedy for this evil was the extensive introduction of native Indian, in supercession of European, agency. Then beyond this, and worse than all, of late years there had grown up a large expenditure on public works. A few years ago, when he (the speaker) entered Parliament as Member for Cambridge, he had some conversation with Mr. Wm. Arbuthnot, since dead, who was then a Member of the Council of India. Speaking of Indian expenditure to him, Mr. Arbuthnot said that there was an enormous and worthless expenditure going on in the Public Works Department. He (Mr. Smollett) had himself made inquiries, and he found that during the last ten years they had been paying for a permanent establishment of English engineers, with a Native contingent,

in this department salaries amounting to a million and a-half per annum. This department had spent for some years back nine millions and a-half annually on what they called repairs and "improvements." If it could be shown that the money was spent in real improvements, he would not say a word; but a vast proportion of the new works were, in his opinion, nothing more than a great curse to the country. He mentioned one of these so-called improvements,—the improvement of the navigation of the Godavery, in which an expenditure of 80,000*l.* was authorized upon the original estimates sent in, but when Lord Mayo inquired some years afterwards, he found that 800,000*l.* had been spent, and no navigation improvement effected; all that could be seen was a deposit of black mud; the river remained perfectly unnavigable. (Laughter.) Estimates were prepared for finishing the work, and they amounted to 1,200,000*l.*; but, before this outlay was proceeded with, inquiries were made as to whether there would be any utility in it. The Commissioner of Berar reported it would be of no benefit in the world, and upon the Commissioner's report the undertaking was finally abandoned. That was an example of how the money was wasted. Lately, a new Governor-General had been sent out to India, and much had been said about his being a Roman Catholic. In his opinion, Lord Ripon would make as good a Governor-General as could be got—(hear, hear)—and probably a great deal better than Lord Lytton had proved to be. But had he (the speaker) been in Lord Hartington's position, he should have addressed Lord Ripon in this fashion: "Your successful administration of India will depend upon your ability to retrench and economize. Your first step to take should be to curtail the outlay on public works. Instead of paying 1,400,000*l.* for salaries, cut down that department to a maximum of 700,000*l.* per annum. Instead of sanctioning an annual outlay of nine millions, sanction an expenditure of not more than four and a-half millions, for ordinary and extraordinary works together. Besides this, your attention must be directed to military, to civil, and to ecclesiastical reductions, and to the removal of some of the highest officials in the Indian Council, who give little or no return for the very heavy salaries which they draw." Lord Ripon might be given twelve months to bring about, by means like these, an equilibrium between income and expenditure; and he should have been informed that if this were not effected, he would be recalled. The creation of a surplus income and the reduction of taxation were the measures needed at this crisis for the honest government of India. The ideal grievance of restrictions placed on the freedom of the Press was, so far as the good government of the Indian masses is concerned, mere rubbish.

MOHAMMED HUSSEIN HAKIM said that the lecture given by Mr. Davar had been very comprehensive, but at the same time it seemed to be too hard on Englishmen. He flattered himself that after a sojourn in this country of eight years he knew the English character very well, and his verdict was that there was no man better than an Englishman. (Hear, hear.) He had mixed with Anglo-Indian gentlemen, some of whom had looked with rather suspicious eyes upon him, and he had spoken upon English political platforms, but on the whole it had been cordially recognized that he loved his country, and that he was not less a loyal subject because he pointed out defects in the government of India. Time would not permit an enlargement upon the political subjects which had been touched upon by Mr. Davar; but he would venture to agree with those who thought it unwise and improper for the Indians to identify themselves with one or the other of the English parties. For his own part, he did not care what an Englishman called himself in regard to his home politics: if he spoke up for India, he would support him. (Hear, hear.) Some Englishmen had fears regarding the permanence of British rule in India. Well, he was proud to be a Mahomedan—a race whom the English superseded as rulers of India; and yet he would say that if the British would administer affairs with impartiality, sincerity, and consideration, there was no need to be doubtful about the permanence of their great empire in India. (Hear, hear.)

Rev. JAMES LONG said he wished to say one word on the subject of the Native Press. No one could be a stronger advocate for the encouragement of the Native Press than he was, but he wished to see something practical submitted to the Government. He had proposed a plan to Lord Lytton eighteen months ago, and that was that there should be in each Indian Presidency a committee, half of Natives and half Europeans, and that no action should be taken against Native newspapers without reference to that body. That was a proposal which had met with the approval of some very high officials in this country, and he would beg that the Native gentlemen present would give the subject their consideration, in order that a practical issue might follow.

Sir DAVID WEDDERBURN said he had listened with the greatest attention and pleasure to the address of Mr. Davar, and he agreed very much with the sentiments that he had put forward, as they were closely akin to those which he had himself on more than one occasion ventured to express. He, however, had always spoken with great diffidence, because, although endeavouring to express the views held generally by educated Indians, he could not be quite certain that he did so cor-

rectly. It was, therefore, gratifying to him to hear them confirmed by the lecturer and other Native gentlemen who had spoken on that occasion. He wished to remark, however, that in the address they had heard there was one phrase used which was misleading. That phrase was, "When first the English nation obtained supremacy in India it was a rich and prosperous country." He thought that a mistake, and the next sentence really put the case more accurately—"Its resources were believed to be inexhaustible." Then the lecturer went on, "and, in consequence, a most expensive system of government was devised." It was probably an oversight on the part of the author, but it would have been better had he altered those words, and said, "It was *believed to be* a rich and prosperous country." However, passing on to the question, how far it would be wise or prudent for Natives of India to identify themselves with political parties, he ventured to submit that it would be an extremely unwise proceeding to identify themselves so far with either party as to necessitate the rejection of any advantages the other party might offer. (Hear, hear.) They had had an example of that during the meeting. Mr. Smollett was known to be a Conservative, but he (the speaker) ventured to think that Mr. Smollett's views would be endorsed by many Liberals as well as by the Natives of India. (Hear, hear.) Indeed, the reforms which Mr. Smollett had indicated were just those which he (the speaker) believed to be essential; and in all that Mr. Smollett said he (Sir D. Wedderburn), as a Liberal, could concur, except when he spoke contemptuously of a free Press. He thought that a gentleman who expressed his opinion so freely as Mr. Smollett had done ought to appreciate the advantages of a free Press, and he (the speaker) was quite sure that if Mr. Smollett were to study the Native Press of India, he would find that it supported the identical reforms which he himself so ably and eloquently advocated. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. DINSHA D. DAVAR then replied, and observed that the discussion had been most satisfactory, and that he was pleased to find that his sentiments were endorsed not only by Indian gentlemen present, but by most of the European gentlemen who had spoken. There were, however, a few things to which he desired to advert, by way of reply. He much regretted that General Sir Le Grand Jacob was not present, as, had he been, he should have referred more fully to his remarks. General Jacob had said that he (the speaker) was self-contradictory, and that he admitted in one place that England had governed with moderation and wisdom, and in another said that nine-tenths of the people were living in misery. He (Mr. Davar) thought there was nothing contradictory in that; he considered it to be strictly correct.

England had governed wisely, and in such a manner as to justify him in saying that she had displayed wisdom and moderation; it did not necessarily follow that the prosperity of the people was thereby insured. There might be plenty of wisdom, but if there was a continual heavy drain on the treasury, thereby taking away the substance of the country, where was the advantage? What would be the use of putting a man in a palace, and not giving him a dinner? (Applause.) General Jacob denied the existence of destitution among the people. But thousands of people perished during the famine; and yet the fund raised for the relief of famine had been misused to carry on an unjust war. Seeing the life of wretchedness and misery which millions live in India, could it be said that there was no ground for complaining of the condition of the masses, or of the heavy pressure of taxation? Referring to the remarks made by Mr. Hakim, Mr. Davar said that, so far from being hard on the English people, he defied Mr. Hakim to excel him in his respect or admiration for them. Whatever he had said in the way of condemnation was not against the people, but against the system of government adopted in India; for he maintained that India would be much better and more justly governed if she were governed according to the wish of the English people, and not according to the views of a few autocratic officials. Mr. Davar then referred to Sir David Wedderburn's criticism upon his statement, that prior to the English rule India was a rich and prosperous country. He adhered to that opinion, and thought, at all events, it would be admitted that it was a wealthy country before English supremacy was established, and that being so, it would follow that money went a long way towards securing prosperity. He felt sure that Sir David Wedderburn would admit that it was, comparatively, a richer country then than it is now. But, whatever was the case, it seemed to him very clear that the continued drain of millions from one country to another necessarily tended to cripple its resources and impoverish the people. He had nothing more to add, except that he was gratified with the discussion that had taken place. As for himself, he begged to assure his hearers that, amongst the many pleasing recollections that he would carry with him from England, the recollection of their kindness to him that afternoon would not be the least pleasant. (Applause.)

Mr. ROBERT H. ELLIOT said that on the question of the supposed wealth of India in ancient times he would remind the meeting that in the report of Mr. Brough Smyth, the engineer sent by the Government to inspect the gold deposits in the Wynaad, there were frequent references to the evidences of ancient native workings, although they were now largely overgrown by jungle, and astonishment is ex-

pressed at their great extent. The traditions of the wealth of India, and the profusion of gold, and the proverbial riches of the East, have some probability lent to them in the fact that gold was evidently largely worked in the mines of Southern India.

Dr. MOORE said that the first British Ambassador who visited India expressed his astonishment at the wealth of the country, and the riches which he saw. There was not that evident wealth now; and that was the point of Mr. Davar's remark.

In closing the discussion, the CHAIRMAN said: I believe that it is customary here for the Chairman to offer some remarks in closing, and it is to satisfy that general expectation, and in response to the invitation given to me by Mr. Davar, rather than in the hope of adding anything to the discussion of the very difficult and extensive subject before us, that I now speak. I was listening, the other day, to a speech by Lord Hartington, in which he said that having got into the India Office, he stood perfectly aghast at the magnitude and complexity of the problems before him. I certainly can say the same of myself when I went to India, and found what was the enormous magnitude and complexity of the problems which beset the whole of our relations as foreign conquerors—for such we are and have remained—with the nation we have conquered. I must say here that I never chanced to meet with any set of men more thoroughly conscientious, or more thoroughly anxious to do their duty in every way, than my colleagues of the Indian Civil Service—(hear, hear)—and I always feel proud of having belonged—short though the period was—to such a Service; and therefore, in any strictures made upon that Service, or upon their system, here or elsewhere, I wish always to testify that I believe that, whatever our shortcomings in India may be, they are due to ignorance more than to anything else. (Hear.) I will not attempt to deal with the number of topics which have been started in this discussion, but I will offer a few remarks upon one point alone—viz., the means of getting knowledge of our Indian subjects into the heads of their rulers. In passing, I think I ought to acknowledge the excellence of the tone of Mr. Davar's remarks. (Hear, hear.) He has had faults to find, and who has not? But he has expressly stated, both at the outset of his lecture and at its close, that he values most highly the connection between England and India, and that he would think it a misfortune to India if that connection were rapidly dissolved. (Hear, hear.) That I believe to be the opinion of all those Indians who are educated enough to know the history of their own country for the last two or three centuries, and who know how we came



there, and the sort of work we have done since we got there; which means that it is the opinion of the most influential classes in India. No reasonable man would contend that we ought not to use all the means we can of getting knowledge of the feelings and opinions of those Indian classes which are educated enough and combined enough with one another to have feelings and opinions upon the political subjects of the day. We all know the fable of the Lion and the Sculptor. The lion was shown a group of a man overcoming a lion, whereat the lion remarked that it was all very well for the sculptor to have designed the man as the victor over the lion, but if a lion had designed the group, it would have been the man who was vanquished. It is quite necessary to look at matters from other people's points of view, if you can only get at them; and every prudent ruler of men seeks to do so. I think there has been a little tendency of late years to pursue methods of more restriction and secrecy than was thought necessary by preceding Governors of India; but, subject to that qualification, I am disposed to agree with Mr. Smollett in saying that, as regards India, one political party is "about as bad" (he says; I would rather say "as good") "as another." I also agree most cordially with the remark which fell from Sir David Wedderburn, to the effect that it would be a great pity if those Indians who are turning their attention to political matters should identify themselves with English party politics. Of course, when political questions arise, there must be a tendency to split into parties. As long as the human mind remains the same there will be some who dread change and some who desire to hasten it; but there is not the smallest reason why that natural formation of party upon Indian political subjects should be laid upon the same lines as English political parties. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Davar says, he would welcome even a crisis if it would produce improvement, and although he did not precisely say what sort of a crisis, I presume he meant a financial crisis. I do not like a political crisis of any kind, and I hope we shall not have such a thing in India. The careful study of Indian subjects promises to bring about gradual reforms, and a gradual reformation is better than a change wrought suddenly out of a crisis. But the question is, how can we manage to increase our knowledge of what the Indian people are thinking and feeling? Mr. Davar says that the voice of the people is not heard in the arrangement of their own affairs; and I am afraid that this is to a great extent true. How shall the people of India have a voice? That is the most difficult of all political problems: how a people shall have a voice in its own affairs. We know how it is contrived in Western Europe, and especially among our own race. We use representative institutions, and in that way the rulers are constantly kept in sympathy with the body of the people. I

must say, with some sorrow, that I do not think there is the smallest chance of having any available representative institutions in India; and for this simple reason, that there is nothing in the shape of a nation in India. India is a congeries of tribes, races, and castes, with different religions, languages, origins, and customs, and differing from one another in degrees of civilization more than the two most distant nations of Europe. (No.) I think I can make that assertion good. I think that the difference between an educated Brahmin or Mahomedan gentleman of Calcutta or Bombay and the Khol or Gond who has practised human sacrifice within the last generation, who perhaps practises it now, who has the most degraded customs of marriage and of religion, is greater than the difference between an educated gentleman of London or Paris and a Lapland or Bulgarian peasant. (Hear, hear.) And I believe it would be as easy to adapt representative institutions to the whole of Europe as it would be to get representative institutions for the whole of India. The thing cannot be done, although there may be some future time when it may be done. Whether there can be such an institution as Consultative Councils is another question, to which some men of experience and observation have returned an affirmative answer. I, myself, should think it very desirable, if possible. I do not believe it to be impossible, and I should like to see the plan tried. Then there is the Press. It so happens that when I was in India I took part in a controversy concerning the restrictions to be placed on the Indian Press; and although I do not understand the Indian languages, I availed myself of translations which were forwarded to the Government every week from official translators, who sent extracts of all that was considered material for the Government to look at; and every week I made it my business, when this question had once arisen, to read those extracts from, perhaps, 150 Native papers. Well, my impression was this, that the Indian Press was very feeble, but that light and life flickered in it, and it told us something of the condition of the people who wrote such papers, and the condition of the people who took a pleasure in reading them. There were one or two papers of considerable ability, but ability was confined to very few. I am speaking, be it understood, of the papers written in Indian languages, not of such papers as the *Hindu Patriot* and others, written in English, which are very well done; and I am judging by translations, which is a disadvantageous way of judging. Judging, however, as I was able, I formed a low estimate of the vigour of their vernacular papers; but as for sedition or disloyalty, I could not find it. (Hear, hear.) I could not find anything like the mass of complaint against Government which you will find in English newspapers in any week. (Hear, hear.) And it seemed to me

to be feminine sensitiveness not to be able to bear such a Press, and to take measures to stop it. (Hear, hear.) It was better than nothing, weak as it was; and it was a thing which might in the course of time ripen into something very valuable. If you go back 100 years, and take up an English newspaper of that time, you will find the writing then very far inferior to the writing in the newspapers now; and as we ourselves have grown in this matter from very small beginnings until the Press has grown to be the powerful instrument we now see it, I do not see why the Indian Press should not grow in the same way. And therefore I regretted extremely when the news came over to England, after I had left India, that a measure was adopted in the course of two or three hours, without discussion or notice, and, I must say, without the slightest reason being assigned beyond the *ipse dixit* of some member of Council that the thing was necessary, to stamp out the independence of the Native Press. The measure was a deliberate foregoing of one means of getting at the thoughts and opinions of the Natives; and I should like to see the Act repealed as quickly as possible, and the Native Press restored to its former freedom. Then there is another point which is noticed by Mr. Davar and other speakers, and one that is always of the greatest interest to an Indian audience, and that is the employment of Natives in the Civil Service. I am not surprised at the complaints we hear that this is not done. General Jacob tells us that for forty years, during which time he has known India, there has been an increasing disposition to recognize the abilities of educated Indians to perform official services. Well, I am sorry to say, however much that disposition may have increased, the fruits of it are not apparent even now. (Hear, hear.) I always feel a little ashamed of myself when my Indian friends bring that topic before me, and intimate that there has not been the readiness to employ them that is sometimes professed, and that ought, at all events, to exist. I am not myself insensible to the considerable difficulties that surround the subject, yet, having a strong opinion, I do not hesitate to express it, that Natives might be employed much more extensively than they are, particularly in those services connected with the administration of the law. I have myself a very high opinion of the capacity of the Natives of India, both as advocates in arguing the law and judges in the administration of the law. (Applause.) I made it my business when in India to inquire of English judges as to the way in which Natives did their business in those smaller employments in which they are actually engaged, and I always received from every part of the country good reports of them. I think, therefore, that men who are faithful in small things may be entrusted with larger things; and I should like to see at once a large addition to the judicial staff taken

from the Natives. (Applause.) My own impression is that they may also be employed in other matters ; still, there are more difficulties in the way of executive employment. I agree, however, with Mr. Smollett, that we shall not govern the country more economically than now unless we employ a larger staff of Natives. In two ways this would tend to economy. In one way, we should not have to give the high salaries necessary to tempt Englishmen to reside in India ; and the other way in which the employment of Natives would be economical would be, that Natives employed in high offices would so much better understand the mode of dealing with their countrymen, that they would suggest more economical and more efficient modes of government. (Hear, hear.) With these few remarks I will close the proceedings, and I am sure the meeting will concur with me in thanking Mr. Davar for the way in which he opened the discussion. (Hear, hear.)

MAHOMMED HUSSEIN HAKIM, in appropriate terms, moved a vote of thanks to Sir Arthur Hobhouse for presiding.

Mr. ELLIOT, in seconding, observed that this was no ordinary vote of thanks ; for the Chairman has signalised his position by some valuable introductory reflections, and by a singularly well-balanced and judicious speech at the close of the discussion. (Hear, hear.)

The motion having been adopted unanimously,

The CHAIRMAN said he would not show himself unworthy of their flattering thanks by inflicting a third speech upon them.

The meeting then terminated.





JOURNAL  
OF THE  
EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

---

*A Court of Appeal for Indian Grievances.*

PAPER BY LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY.

READ AT THE MEETING IN THE ROOMS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION, WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, JUNE 16TH, 1880.

STEWART ERSKINE ROLLAND, Esq., IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held on Wednesday afternoon, June 16th, 1880; the subject for consideration being an address delivered by the Right Hon. Lord Stanley of Alderley on "A Court of Appeal for Indian Grievances."

STEWART ERSKINE ROLLAND, Esq., occupied the chair.

Amongst those present were the following: Sir Algernon Borthwick; Sir Henry Peek, Bart., M.P.; Sir David Wedderburn, Bart., M.P.; Surgeon-General G. E. Trinnell; Rajah Rampal Singh; Syed Ameer Ali; Mr. George Palmer, M.P.; General Orfeur Cavenagh; Colonel W. Nassau Lees; Captain W. C. Palmer; Rev. J. Long; Rev. G. Small, M.A.; Dr. Ralph Moore; Dr. Nash; Mr. A. Arathoon; Mr. C. W. Arathoon; Mr. J. H. W. Arathoon; Mr. George Bain; Mr. Robert Bain; Mr. H. B. Boswell; Mirza Peer Bukhsh; Mr. Ulick Ralph Burke, M.A.; Mr. M. D. Dadysett; Mr. Dolatrao Desai; Mr. E. B. Eastwick, C.B.; Miss Eastwick; Mr. Thomas Finlayson; Mr. A. H. Grant; Mr. James Hutton; Mr. Malet; Mr. W. McGuffin; Mr. E. E. Meakin; Mr. David Nasmith; Mr. William Penny; Mr. Lutfur Rahman; Mrs. Rolland; Mr. Sirajuddin; Mr. Thomas Taylor; Miss M. M. Taylor; Mr. James T. Wood; Mr. Fung Yeo; Moulvie Sameeollah Khan; Mr. Mahomed Rafique; Moonsha Darecy Singh, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said that the subject which would occupy the attention of the meeting was one of the gravest importance, and one which merited the deepest attention they could give. He thought he would do better in not taking up the time of the meeting by offering any preliminary observations further than this: Lord Stanley and many of his friends have come to the decided conclusion that it will satisfy the minds both of the Natives of India and many of those connected with India if something be done to give them a Court of Appeal to decide cases which, having been decided by political officers, are sometimes referred back again to them without any change in the result. For suitable cases it is thought that there should be established a final Court of Appeal, independent and acting without any previous disposition in the matter. Lord Stanley's paper would very well explain itself, but the keystone of the whole matter is contained in the following words: "For these reasons I think that a Court of Commission of Appeal should be appointed in India, to be composed of five members, some of whom shall be judges." In the course of the address his lordship would explain his reasons, and certain cases would be cited in which it would appear that justice cannot be obtained without the establishment of some Court of Appeal.

The Right Hon. Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY then read the following paper:—

The *Bombay Review* of the 10th of April last expresses satisfaction that the subject of "Indian Appeals" was to be brought before the East India Association, and observes, "that appeals to the Judicial Committee have to some extent been choked off by increased expenses." It also desires some "revision in the very strict terms under which appeals to the Judicial Committee are now conducted, as will banish the reproach that the luxury of ultimate appeal is only for the rich, the strong, and the politically influential."

It is not the object of this paper to deal in any way with the appeals which come before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and which at present concern cases of property only, since for some years the Government has not allowed any other cases to reach the Judicial Committee; but it is only doing justice to the judges who now form the Judicial Committee to mention, with reference to the observations of the *Bombay Review*, that last year the Judicial Committee not only consented to give a hearing to the Brahmin Kishen Dutt *in forma pauperis*, but they also gave him a hearing after the time had expired within which an appeal could be heard, on account of his having been

prevented from presenting himself within the proper time by circumstances over which he had no control; in fact, he was shipped back against his will to Calcutta after he had reached England.

It has been apparent for some years that there is a necessity for some court to which Her Majesty's Indian subjects could appeal against the acts of the Indian Government; and this want has become more evident and more pressing since last year, when the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, declared that he could not enter into a subject because it had not been remitted to him by the Indian Government, and that a rule or order to that effect has been laid down by the Indian Government. Formerly many cases were brought before Parliament, and before the abolition of the East India Company it was possible for them to obtain an impartial hearing; but since the separate government of India has been abolished, and merged in the government of the rest of Her Majesty's dominions, no case can be brought before Parliament for redress without its appearing to be of a party nature, or an attack upon the Minister.

At the best of times, even before the abolition of the East India Company, neither House of Parliament ever could be a suitable place for hearing the often complicated cases of dispossessed Princes. I would here observe that in all the cases of injustice, either to Princes of India or to humbler persons in India, that I have known, the wrong has always commenced and originated with some inferior official. The spirit of routine and the *esprit de corps* of bureaucracy is so strong that what is once done comes to be supported by the other officials, ascending upwards; and if ever the matter is inquired into, a report is asked for from the person incriminated, or who made the first mistake; and what else can be expected but that he should show that what he did was right, and be slow to submit to Government any facts which might tell against the decision to which he has been committed?

For these reasons I think that a Court or Commission of Appeal should be appointed in India, to be composed of five members, some of whom shall be Judges.

That the present course of procedure in cases of disputed succession, or of charges made against any of the Indian Princes, no longer commends itself to some of the eminent men who have been responsible for the government of India, may be inferred from the fact that when the Gaikwar of Baroda was accused, it was felt that the procedure in the case of the Newab of Tonk was a precedent to be avoided. I may also state that Lord Napier and Ettrick, lately Governor of Madras, informed me, that in the course of his official experience he has more than once felt that it was unseemly and unjust that the Government



should be in the position of judge and interested party. He said, for instance, that in cases of disputed boundary between English territory and the territory of Native States, or in cases of claims on the part of Indians against the English Government arising out of the interpretation of treaties, or out of some old political action, or on the terms of official documents of a past age, it would be desirable for the honour and interest of Government itself that some impartial and arbitral authority should exist, to which such cases could be referred—sometimes for advice, sometimes for decision. He also thought that, could such a Court of Arbitration be established in India, without appeal to a court of law in England, it might be charged with the duty of deciding disputes between Native States, voluntarily accepting its authority, and questions of succession to Native States, when no question of high policy was concerned. Such a Court of Arbitration, even constituted of purely English elements (if judicial and independent of Government), would, in Lord Napier's opinion, command great respect on the part of the Native community, and relieve the Government of some obnoxious duties which it could not perform with perfect impartiality, or at least with the credit and reputation of impartiality. And, lastly, the Duke of Argyll said, in the House of Lords, on the 16th of June, 1873, in answer to my observations on the necessity of extending the powers for hearing Indian appeals, contained in the statute 3 and 4 William IV., c. 41: "The ordinary course had been to secure a careful report from our Political Resident after he had inquired into the case. The report went through the hands of the higher political officers until it reached the Supreme Government. In that course of proceeding amendment might possibly be suggested. Instead of taking the report of a single political officer, it might be advisable to send down to him a strong Commission, containing perhaps a judicial element, to inquire and take evidence on the spot as to the alleged crime. Such an amendment as that might very well be considered by the Government of India and the Government at home. But of this he was quite sure, that if amendment were required, it would not take the form of an independent court" (Hansard, vol. 216, p. 986).

I should be very well satisfied if, for the present, only as much were gained as the carrying out of this suggestion of the Duke of Argyll's; but a few words may be said as to the Duke's objection to an independent court. In the first place, such a court or commission, the members of which might be nominated for a term of years by the Governor-General, would be as much part of the Government of India as the Political Agents or other officials.

The Sunnuds of Lord Canning, promising in cases of succession to follow Hindu and Mussulman law with the Hindus and Mussulmans respectively, make it obligatory on the Government of India to decide these questions by means of persons of judicial minds, endowed with knowledge of these codes of law; and an independent court, as commissioners appointed for a term of years would be, would carry more weight, and their decisions would be more respected, than those of commissioners named *ad hoc* for each case as it arose. Moreover, at the time of the proclamation of the Imperial title, a Privy Council of India was instituted, and various Indian Princes and eminent men from all classes of Her Majesty's British and Indian subjects were appointed to be Privy Councillors. Were these Privy Councillorships bestowed as empty titles, or were they intended to be a reality? Some of these Privy Councillors would be the very men to be appointed to such a commission as we are considering, and the commission would then be a Committee of the Indian Privy Council, and hold the same position in India as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council holds in England.

In the case of the Newab of Tonk, the investigation, and virtually decision, of the matter rested with a captain; in the case of the Newab of Bungana Pally, the succession was at first arranged by a subordinate Revenue officer; in the case of Suchait Singh, the Raja of Chumba, that Prince was at first set aside by a military officer, who can hardly be said to have been in the service of the Indian Government at the time. I do not now go into those cases, as I should only be repeating what I have already said about them; but I will read a case which has been communicated to me for the purposes of this paper, and which is a good illustration of the way in which mistakes are originated by subordinates, and adhered to for want of independent investigation.

"It was somewhere in the early part of this century, in consequence of the disturbances prevailing in the district of Guzerat, that the Government of Bombay deputed Colonel Walker to investigate the causes of disputes and submit reports thereon, with the view of a permanent settlement of all matters at issue between the various parties at strife. Colonel Walker was selected because of his well-known familiarity with the languages, customs, &c., of Western India; besides, other qualifications pointed him out as a man pre-eminently fitted to undertake such a complicated and important work. He was empowered to make a provisional code of regulations. During several years he and his assistants were engaged in the inquiry. Exhaustive reports were made regarding the disputes in each district of Guzerat, in which were embodied the respective rights of each party at issue, and the Government of Bombay confirmed those rights as represented by him,

Translations were made and issued by the Government in each district which they concerned, with a notification that in future, should differences arise as to matters of right, they were to be adjudicated in conformance with the definition of them contained in the reports. But it must be understood that prior to the deputation of Colonel Walker, the intervention of the British had been sought, and in each instance litigating parties had given their adhesion to the definition of their rights and status laid down by Colonel Walker on evidence taken from documents and other sources in their presence. These reports, printed and bound together, are known in English as Colonel Walker's History of Guzerat. There is a copy in the India Office Library. In the vernacular of Guzerat they are known as the 'Magna Charta' of Guzerat.

"The 'Thakoorate' (or Barony) of Palitana is situated in the Native State of Kattiawar, which is a portion of the district of Guzerat. It was the custom in this small State for the ruling Thakoor to grant certain properties, consisting of one or more villages, to his sons for maintenance. Once given, these properties remained only geographically under the rule of the Thakoor. His authority ceased with the bequest. It went to the recipient and his heirs, together with its entire revenue and all seigniorial rights, for ever. This was the custom; but as years passed by, and the relationship of existing holders of lands given for maintenance became remote from the existing Thakoor, the latter would often resume the holdings in defiance of custom, to bestow them, perhaps, on nearer kinsmen of his own; and this Colonel Walker found to be one of the most fruitful causes of disturbance, for the ousted parties never yielded without a struggle. In his report on Palitana Colonel Walker went minutely into the matter of gift lands for maintenance. He wrote down the hitherto unwritten laws regarding it, and he appended to his report a tabular list of the then existing holders of such properties, and it was guaranteed that seigniorial rights should never depart from them and their heirs.

"The report of Colonel Walker regarding Palitana was made in the time of the grandfather, or great-grandfather, of the present Thakoor, and in the schedule of kinsmen holders of villages for maintenance the name appears of a kinsman to whom the group of villages called the 'Timba' property had been assigned. To him and his heirs this property, with its revenue, was guaranteed by the settlement of Colonel Walker, ratified by the Government. The revenue of villages in Palitana is derived chiefly from what is called a plough-tax, collected from the ryots who cultivate the soil. A ryot's area of cultivation depends on the number of ploughs he can work, and on each plough he

pays a tax to the owner of the land he tills. In Colonel Walker's Settlement Regulations it is chiefly laid down that the Thakoor levies plough-tax from all the cultivators, excepting on the lands assigned for maintenance to kinsmen, who, being themselves owners as independent as he is, levy this tax from their ryots. And so the owner of the Timba property and his heirs levied plough-tax from their ryots without let or hindrance until within the last few years, when the present Thakoor asserted his right to levy the tax from them. Naturally enough, the kinsmen objected, and after considerable quarrelling the case was brought before the Political Agent in Kattiawar, who directed one of his assistants to investigate and decide the question. The assistant happened to be a young officer, only recently appointed to political duties. He decided that the kinsmen were subjects, and not independent of the Thakoor, and as he had the right to levy plough-tax from his subjects, he therefore had the right to levy it from them. It must be presumed that he was not aware of the Settlement Regulations, but it is clear that he either wantonly or ignorantly broke the law. The kinsmen appealed to the Superior Court of the Political Agent, but he upheld the decision of his assistant. They then appealed to the Governor, and he upheld the orders of the lower courts, and authorized the Thakoor to levy the tax. It is very seldom indeed that a decision given in the first place in the Political Department is reversed. Orders are undoubtedly often passed on cases which are illegal and unjust, but as they are almost invariably upheld in appeal courts of the Political Department, one can hardly help thinking, and indeed it is the general impression, that whatever is done in that department, whether contrary to law or custom or precedent, is right and irrevocable. For this reason it is not at all astonishing to find the first decision in this case upheld, and it must not be taken that the double confirmation of the junior's decision adds any great weight to it, as would be the case in a regularly constituted court of law. But to those who are not acquainted with the *personnel* and the traditions and working of the Political Department it would appear in a different light. A double confirmation of an original decision would be to them convincing proof of its propriety. But to resume. When the kinsmen of Timba found their appeal to Bombay fruitless, they decided on appealing to the Secretary of State for India; and selecting three from their number, these were dispatched to England as delegates to present the duplicates of petitions, which were forwarded through the Bombay Government. They reached England in October, 1875 (mark this date). They called at the India Office, in the hope of seeing the Secretary of State, and personally handing him their petitions; but they were told that this

was not possible ; so they gave their petitions to an official, who assured them that the Secretary would duly receive the documents. The title of the official who received them is the Queen's 'Mehmandar' (a Persian word, meaning dispenser of hospitality), and he was specially added to the staff of the Secretariat in order that gentlemen coming from India may be kindly and properly treated. They returned to their lodgings in Bayswater, and after some weeks received an official reply from the Secretary of State (mark this also), saying Bombay orders could not be interfered with.

"Now, when the delegates departed from their villages, and the Thakoor heard of it, he went to the young officer before whom the case had first appeared, and complained that the refractory men of Timba refused to obey the orders of Government to pay him plough-tax, and he obtained from that officer an authority to collect by force if necessary. So early one morning, in 1876 (mark), he sent out a band of his troops to Timba to the kinsmen's family stronghold to demand the tax. The kinsmen refused them admittance. A fight ensued ; a cannon was brought up ; the old stronghold was battered down, and many of the families and retainers of the kinsmen were killed, wounded, or imprisoned. The Thakoor's troops made prisoners of all they could lay hands on, without reference to age or sex or infirmity. They were taken to the Political Assistant, and many of them, notwithstanding that they were defending themselves, sentenced to death and other punishments for resisting the attack. The balance of prisoners not sentenced, consisting of aged men and women, some blind, and young children, were handed over to the Thakoor, who shut them up in his own prison, there to be kept as hostages until the delegates returned and the tax was paid. Their cattle, jewellery, goods, and other property was looted, their sacred groves cut down, their temples, gardens, and wells destroyed. The news of this reached the delegates in London. At once they reported it to the Secretary of State, and begged that at least the palpably innocent—*i.e.*, their old fathers and mothers, and wives and infants—might be released. But they got no satisfaction. Her Majesty's 'dispenser of hospitality' came to them, and as far as they could understand his imperfect Hindustani, told them they might wait as long as they liked in London, writing letters and petitions, but that they would gain nothing by it. His advice was, to go back and obey orders. They hung on, however, hoping against hope, trying first one and then another method of obtaining a hearing ; but without avail. At last, however, on the last day of the Session of 1877\*, Lord Campbell drew attention to their case in the House of Lords. In reply to Lord

\* August 18, 1877.

Campbell's statement, he denied that any injustice had been committed, and he said that they had brought punishment deservedly upon themselves. 'The noble lord,' said he, 'is perhaps unaware of the character of these kinsmen, whose cause he has taken up. Perhaps he is not aware that a short time since they formed a shooting party, attacked their lawful sovereign, and shot his son.' What could Lord Campbell say to that? Coming from the mouth of a Principal Secretary of State, he was bound to believe the statement. All he could feel on the subject was chagrin at having been weak enough to champion a pack of murderous ruffians."

Lord STANLEY added that this report was not entirely borne out by Hansard, where the answer given was that they had "shot some of his soldiers." He then read another communication, showing the difficulties put in the way of Indian Princes to prevent them getting a hearing from the Viceroy, in which these words of Lord Hastings respecting Political Agents were quoted: "They do not act as ambassadors, but they interfere unwarrantably in the affairs of State. They do not even confine themselves to this; they meddle with the private and domestic affairs of the potentate to whom they are accredited." Lord Stanley said these words of Lord Hastings would now be rather out of date, partly from the usurpations of Residents, partly through the fact of the proclamation of the Queen as Empress, which led Residents to look upon subjects of independent States as subjects of British territory; but the change brought about by the change of title made it the more necessary that the Secretary of State for India should reverse whatever was done wrong, and that he should be easily accessible, for, by the custom of the whole of Asia, every subject of the Empress had a right to present petitions to her or to her Minister.

The CHAIRMAN said it was the custom of the East India Association, as they were all aware, to invite full and free discussion after a paper has been read. He thought he would be acting in accordance with the wishes of the meeting if he referred, in the first place, to a letter which had been sent by Mr. William Tayler, a distinguished member of the Association, who would have been present in person but for illness. Mr. Tayler's letter was an important one, and, with the permission of the meeting, he would read it. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Tayler wrote: "As the question which Lord Stanley has to deal with is one which has for years interested me, and on which I read a paper, as you will remember, several years ago, under the heading of 'Publicity the Guarantee for Justice,' I should have been very glad to have had

"the opportunity of saying a few words; and, in default of that, I would venture to ask you to read out the following few observations, which may be useful in concentrating attention on one point which I conceive to be of great importance. In the paper which Lord Stanley is about to read, his lordship has made the following very apposite remark—viz., 'In all cases of injustice, either to Princes of India or to humbler persons in India, that I have known, the wrong has always commenced and originated with some inferior official.' This fact, which cannot, I imagine, be gainsaid, is one which I specially pointed out both in my lecture on 'Publicity' and in my little pamphlet, 'Justitia in Excelsis;' and it is, beyond doubt, a fact which lies at the root of half the dissatisfaction, if not latent dissatisfaction, created by unjust, defective, or incomplete decisions. (Hear, hear.) It not unfrequently happens that an apparently trifling dispute occurs, which, though to superficial vision it seems to be of little consequence, forms, in fact, the cradle of an important controversy—sometimes by accident, not unfrequently by design. The officer before whom the incipient question comes for investigation is most frequently, as Lord Stanley observes, 'an inferior officer'—not inferior, perhaps, in natural intelligence or in honesty of purpose, but in age and experience. (Hear, hear.) Such an officer in the political line who is thus entrusted with investigation in the early stage of a dispute is, as a rule, subject more or less to the influence of one or the other of the Native parties by which he is surrounded, and, spite of his own honest and honourable intentions, is not unfrequently the innocent tool of the most astute among them. (Hear, hear.) This is, in fact, the '*fons et virgo*' of many of those lamentable failures of justice which have, as all who are behind the scenes are aware, at times exasperated the Native mind, and sowed the seeds of disloyalty and disaffection. (Hear, hear.) In the Judicial Department this danger does not exist. The Appellate Court has no bureaucratic tendency which prevents a critical and impartial examination of the proceedings of the lower Court; but in the Political Department this—as pointed out by Lord Stanley, and ably described in the lines following those I have quoted—is paramount. The principle which his lordship describes as an '*esprit de corps*' is, though to some moderate extent reasonable, yet when carried to an extravagant pitch, as it very frequently is, is simply a moral curse, subversive of all the higher demands of justice and honesty, utterly regardless of truth, and a fruitful generator of Native disaffection. The remedy for the evil, ably depicted by the lecturer, might, if there was any deep conviction of its mischievous effects, be easily devised; but whatever may be the character of that remedy,

"*publicity* must be the foundation. (Hear, hear.) It is a most unfortunate circumstance that in the first effort so wisely made by Lord Northbrook to introduce this important element, in the case of Baroda, the principle was damaged by certain defects in the procedure." In conclusion, Mr. Tayler expressed the hope that Lord Stanley's sensible remarks would lead to a full and profitable discussion.

Rajah RAMPAL SINGH said that before he touched upon the points raised he would venture to express his thanks to the noble lecturer for the able way in which he had explained a wrong under which India suffers, and suggested a remedy for it. Nothing could have been better than Lord Stanley's contention in support of the establishment of a Court of Appeal; and he could only say that were the members of the two Houses of Parliament to take this matter into their serious and favourable consideration, they would go far to reconcile the discontented in India. On the point referred to in the lecture—viz., the injustice wrought upon chiefs and rulers in India by their being deprived of the opportunity of appealing to an independent Court against the decisions of the Government of India—Lord Stanley had recounted an old and serious grievance, and he had pointed the way to an efficient remedy. As matters now stand, the Maharajahs, Thakcoors, or other rulers, are almost entirely in the power of the Political Agent in important points, and in matters of less importance the decision lies with inferior agents of the Government. It is true these latter formally report to their superior officer, but he is usually overwhelmed with work, and so, after passing some cursory remarks on the report, he passes it on to the local Government, and they confirm it; and that is, practically, the final decision. In such matters, the truth is that the independent Princes and their subjects are not half so well off as those dwelling under British rule. Instances of the reversal of a decision adverse to an Indian ruler are extremely rare. For the moment, the only one he could recall to mind was the case of the Rajah of Tonk; and even in that case, strong objection was made to making the matter a subject of inquiry in Parliament, because it was said that it would be opening encouragement for a host of others to do the same. It was manifestly improper that disputes involving delicate knowledge of custom and law should be left to the hap-hazard and sometimes wrongly-constructed judgment of a political officer, against whom there is practically no appeal. In conclusion, the Rajah expressed a cordial desire to see the proposals of the noble lord carried into effect, and that some measure should be introduced to improve the administration of Indian affairs and remove the sources of Native grievances..



Mr. W. McGUFFIN, of Dalhousie, in the Chumba State, said he had been asked by a few gentlemen to say something about a case that was now pending before Government, for it was well known there was no appeal in India for political cases, though there was for judicial and criminal cases. The case to which he wished to draw attention was that of Soochet Singh, Prince of Chumba, in which a most glaring injustice had been perpetrated, and although representations had been made, the Indian Government would not reopen the case and allow a trial, much less an appeal, although law, equity, and good conscience were on the side of the Prince-claimant. He (the speaker) submitted that the principles involved in this case were great, and that the action taken was of a character to militate against all morality and right dealing, and such as was calculated to injure the name of the British Government, because the question was raised whether the promises entered into by Her Majesty, and executed with all formality of procedure and observance, ought not, for the sake of the good faith of the British Government, to be carried out. He held that the Government, in this matter of the Prince of Chumba, were morally, if not legally, pledged; and such a pledge ought not to be violated with impunity because the violator happened to be beyond the reach of the civil law. From the circumstances involved in this particular case, he thought with the noble lecturer that it would indeed be well if there were some Court of Appeal open to the Natives. In the case to which he had referred, that of the Prince of Chumba, it was a question of succession that was involved. In Tremlett's "Commentaries on the Punjab Civil Codes" there was the following: "Macnaghten, on Indian Succession, says: 'In default of father and mother, brothers inherit—first, 'the uterine associated brethren; next, the unassociated brethren of 'the whole blood; next, the associated brethren of the half-blood; 'and fourthly, the unassociated brethren of the half-blood.'" Thus this definition of the Indian law of inheritance placed it beyond doubt that Soochet Singh was the next legal descendant to the Chumba *guddee*. Instead of following this, however, the first *unassociated* brother of the half-blood had been put on the throne in preference to the Prince of Chumba, the first claimant. The man who had a stipend of 500 rupees a month allowed him was set aside, and Colonel Reid, of Chumba, had actually taken the fourth in succession, who had but an allowance of 40 rupees a month, and put him on the throne. He (the speaker) held that this was against all law and equity. Though there was a clear case, the Government of India would not deal with it and the injured man could get no redress. He (the speaker) had seen and spoken to some twelve or fourteen Rajahs at Simla and else-

where who were very much grieved and perplexed at the position taken up by the Government in this case, because, as they said, a similar thing might happen to them to-morrow. The Queen's Proclamation was shown to be a nonentity in the eyes of Indian officials, and the rights of religion and succession, which under it should be respected, were deliberately set aside. In judicial cases there was a better chance of justice, but in political cases it appeared that the officials could do quite as they liked. He repeated that the case he had cited was one in point which supported the contention for the establishment of a Court of Appeal, to which claimants such as the Prince of Chumba might readily appeal and obtain justice.

Mr. ULICK RALPH BURKE said that he had obtained some peculiar experience in India, both as a barrister and a planter up country. He had been much interested in Lord Stanley's paper, and was struck with the knowledge of India that it displayed, and especially the sentence: "The spirit of routine and the *esprit de corps* of bureau-cracy is so strong that what is once done comes to be supported by the "other officials, ascending upwards," and so on. He might say that, contrary to the experience of Mr. Tayler, he (the speaker) had found that this spirit permeated not only the Political, but also the Judicial and the Executive Departments. Before saying more, however, he begged leave to refer to another paragraph in Lord Stanley's address. It was as follows: "I think that a Court or Commission of Appeal should be appointed in India, to be composed of five members, some of whom shall be judges." He ventured to say that, instead of the words "some of whom shall be judges," there should be, "all of whom shall be unconnected with the Civil Service of India." Now, the great difficulty with regard to such a Commission or tribunal as was proposed would be the vastness, the possible extent, of its operations. It would inevitably follow that such a Commission, if regarded with favour, would be applied to for the settlement of an endless variety of grievances, in cases not only of a political, but of a judicial and executive character, and of great as well as of small importance. It would, therefore, be difficult, if not impossible, for five gentlemen to deal with all the cases brought before them. The tribunal, in order to suit the wants of India, must have its commission direct from Her Majesty herself, and should be so constituted as to be regarded by the people as something to which they might have recourse with the certainty of being heard. The Commission should be like the box which, it was said, was hung up in the palaces of the Mogul emperors, in which the meanest subject might deposit a petition with the certainty that it would be dealt with by majesty itself.

But, while it was manifestly impossible for the Natives of India to take a journey to Windsor or Balmoral to present their petitions at the present day, there seemed no reason why there should not be a Commission emanating from Her Majesty which should be empowered to receive and deal with all such petitions. Passing on to the allusions made as to failures of justice in judicial matters, he expressed the opinion that these were attributable simply and entirely to the reluctance of the judicial officials to reverse the decrees of their subordinates. Speaking of executive matters in which there was ground for complaint, Mr. Burke cited the case of a planter, the owner of a large estate, who died in India two years ago. His name was well known; his property was well known. He died without leaving a will, and the property passed into the custody of the Administrator-General of Bengal; and the creditors, some two or three of whom were interested to a large amount, had not yet got either money or accounts, and, as far as the prospects went, they seemed as far off as ever. If there was a Royal Commission, a box in which petitions could be placed, he should recommend those interested in the case to which he had referred to avail themselves of it. At present there was no means of obtaining redress. At the same time it would be seen that such a course might have the effect of bringing the Administrator-General and the Commission into conflict, and that might prove a special difficulty. These difficulties, however, ought to be faced; for if such a Commission or Court of Appeal could be instituted, it would prove of very great advantage to the Natives of India, and especially, he would say, to the half-castes, who, under the present condition of things, were less protected than the Natives, and also to those numerous Englishmen who had invested their capital and passed the best years of their lives in developing the resources of India. (Applause.)

Mr. E. E. MEAKIN said he was sorry that Mr. McGuffin did not go further into the case of the Chumba Succession, for the facts were not generally known. Mr. Meakin was proceeding to read a statement which he had drawn up on this subject, when

The CHAIRMAN said he would venture to suggest that the discussion should rather turn upon principles than instances. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. MEAKIN said he had designed to refer to the principle. This Prince has been deprived of his possessions, and even of his liberty; and every possible obstacle has been put in the way to prevent his obtaining redress. It is well known that in a case like this experience has furnished a warning to any one who may feel inclined to assist any

person with a grievance against the Indian Government. And thus the Prince of Chumba has been prevented from getting the assistance he ought to have had.

Mr. JOHN JONES said it was many years ago since, as a member of the East India Company, by right of holding a small amount of stock, he pleaded the case of an Indian rajah. When first the statements of alleged injustice were communicated to him, he went to one of the Directors and asked for the full official particulars of the case. He was received with much courtesy, and promised all he asked for. But when the particulars were furnished it was apparent that many links in the chain were missing; and then, applying for the second time, he was received very coldly and shunted off. In fact, he was told that the Court of Directors could not attend to agents. Now, it happened that his services were as entirely free and voluntary as those of a member of Parliament to his constituents; and therefore, although at that moment, in consequence of the clever arrangements by which officials were able to get rid of him, there was delay, yet he took an early opportunity of explaining his position. In furtherance of his process, he went and saw one of the great retired Indian officials, and received from him a very strong remonstrance and a distinct intimation that he ought to be content with the decision of the Indian officials, arrived at after inquiry on the spot. Nevertheless, he pushed on, and eventually obtained through the Court of Directors the whole of the documents relating to the case, extending back to twenty years before. He had a room set aside for him in the India House, and he was some months engaged in reading the mass of documents out of which he made a *précis*. Upon that he addressed the Court of Directors and made a petition, which was signed extensively by the tenantry of the dispossessed rajah, who collected in such numbers for the purpose that the Government called out troops to secure order. At length the matter was forced into the notice of the higher authorities at home, and Lord Stanley (now Lord Derby), then of the India Board of Control, looked through the evidence, and ordered at once that restitution should be made, and that the long-pending dispute should be ended by the instalment of the Rajah of Chokumputty in his estates. The cavils with which this end was sought to be obstructed were numberless. For instance, he was told that the rajah was not a man fit to manage his property—he was always reading the *Vedas*. Next, it was objected that a new tenantry had come upon the estate since the Government had taken charge of it, and that it would be a great injustice to transfer them into the hands of the original rajah. But it happened that the tenantry had of their own accord sent in a petition, in which they declared that they had never had a good

season or a fair harvest since the Indian Government had dispossessed their rajah. The point of this story was simply that the existence of a corporate body having proprietary rights in India and holding quarterly courts was an advantage which was not replaced at the extinction of the East India Company. (Hear, hear.) The wrongs of the Rajah of Chokumputty were righted by their presentation at the quarterly courts of the Directors of the East India Company, and the cost to that chief was simply the postage of his own letters. It seemed, therefore, to have been a great mistake on the part of our politicians to destroy so healthy and so useful an organization as the East India Company. But it was done as a matter of political expediency, and it is irrevocable. Nevertheless, he was still of opinion that the best manner in which redress could be given to any of the dispossessed or wronged Princes or Chiefs of India is to create a Court of those interested in the Indian Government Stocks to the extent of 1,000*l.* or 2,000*l.* of capital, who should have the power of selecting a certain number of persons to the Indian Council at home, and that in this body there should repose a power which would elevate it into something better than a mere debating society.

Mr. M. D. DADYSETT concurred fully with the remarks made by his lordship and the gentlemen who preceded him, and said that, from their line of argument, it appeared there was a great necessity for the institution of a Court of Appeal to decide disputes arising between the Native States and Government, and also to take cognizance of disputes arising between the Government and its subjects. Instances were cited here of the injustice done by the Political Department, when such grievances were brought about by the inexperience of subordinate political officers, and whose decisions were confirmed by their superior officers, to the detriment of the party aggrieved; and he urged that a grievance of this sort existed not only in the Political Department, but it also exists in the Executive Department. He would cite one instance only, though numbers could be adduced wherein the aggrieved parties were wronged not only by Government officials, but by the Government itself. For instance, the Bombay Government supported the officials in depriving a large body of people of their just rights, granted to the parties more than half a century before by the Honourable East India Company by special grants and deeds, in respect of certain lands and villages. The Bombay Government not only confirmed the decision of its officials, but went further by passing an Act, called the "Abkari Act," in the Legislative Council of Bombay, the effect of which was to deprive the aggrieved parties of the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges. It was a fortunate circumstance that the parties wronged were resolute enough to

petition the Governor-General in Council respecting their grievances. The Supreme Government in India took the right view of the case; they sent back the Act to the Bombay Council, and instructed them to make provision for the just rights of the petitioners before they would give it their assent. Had the Supreme Government not given them redress, the petitioners would have had no other alternative but to lay the case before Parliament. Such a proceeding would have involved them in a large amount of unnecessary trouble, expense, and anxiety; but if there were a Court of Appeal, as advocated by Lord Stanley, such cases would be decided in the country on their merits, and with great benefit to the Natives of India.

Dr. RALPH MOORE said that one passage in the noble lord's paper had fixed itself upon his memory and commended itself to him. It was this: "For these reasons, I think that a Court or Commission of Appeal should be appointed in India, to be composed of five members, some of whom shall be judges." The only question was whether this Court should sit in India or in this country. Dr. Moore could say that he had seen the greatest acts of injustice perpetrated in the name of the British Government in India; and he had seen solemn treaties ignored as though they were mere waste paper. The royal family of Oude, for instance, were true to us in every phase of our fortune. At the time of the first Cabul reverses the King said, "I will give the English the last rupee in my treasury, and the last man in my kingdom." Yet how were they treated? They were dispossessed; and that was one cause of the Mutiny. After complimenting Lord Stanley on his treatment of the subject, Dr. Moore concluded by reiterating his conviction of the necessity for a Court of Appeal, unswayed by any other interest and actuated solely by a desire for justice to the people of our great Eastern Empire.

Mr. DAVID NASMITH desired to say a few words about the principle involved. They were all aware that Indian grievances existed, and if there no proper means of redressing them, India was much indebted to his lordship for bringing the subject before Englishmen at a time when measures could be taken in another place for redressing what was wrong. He felt that there ought to be a perfect understanding between the Natives of India and the British Government. In the early history of the association of England with India, it was pretty clear that we took possession of the country piece by piece, and by the aid of the sword. Under those circumstances, nothing like a legal institution to appeal to them existed; indeed, it would have been an absurdity. But its

absence was a greater absurdity under the altered condition of things that now obtains. We, in common with the Natives of British India, are the subjects of one Queen, and to withhold from our Indian fellow-subjects that which we enjoy—proper guarantees for the security of rights—is an injustice. Rights, when in dispute, should always be determined by lawyers, and not by Political Agents or military officials, who are apt to regard matters from their special point of view. Those gentlemen, so he was told, are frequently unduly sensitive, and disposed to regard a reversal of their decision as a personal affront. Lawyers, on the contrary, entertain no such feelings. Their training familiarizes them with appeals from all but final tribunals; the reversal of any of their judgments never suggests the idea of personal affront. In his opinion, Englishmen were as much indebted to Lord Stanley for his efforts in this matter as are our Indian friends, for it appeared to him to be as much in our interest as it was in theirs that our Indian fellow-subjects should feel their rights secure.

MIRZA PEER BUKHSH said he only desired to make a few remarks, for there had been so many able speakers who had preceded him that he could not venture to occupy much of the time of the meeting; but, as a Native of India, he felt it would not become him to do less than express his profound thanks to Lord Stanley for taking up this important subject in the interest of the Indian people. As a civilized and enlightened nation, ruling one quarter of the population of the world, it should be England's aim to secure strict justice and impartial dealing everywhere within the Queen's realms; and India, ruled with justice and sympathy, would be second to no part of the Empire in loyalty and usefulness. People out of India could have little idea of the power of the officials. Residents were little autocrats; each could do practically as he liked, and all stood by each other; and there was no appeal against their decisions except by coming to the Indian Secretary of State, upon whom their influence is naturally almost omnipotent. If he sends an inquiry relative to a grievance back to the Viceroy, the Viceroy refers it to a great official, who refers it to a small one, who refers it to a lesser, until it gets back to the original source of complaint. Such a process was not likely to procure redress; and, as a matter of fact, what is done is always accepted as having been perfectly right. He regretted very much to have seen that the English nation did not know what arbitrary acts were committed in their name in India; but now he was glad to see the growth of a different spirit, and that, by means of the East India Association and a variety of other agencies, the spirit of inquiry is rapidly spreading amongst the English people. The spirit of

humanity which animated the noble lord in bringing the grievances of the Indian people before the British public was spreading, and the result could not fail to be of the highest advantage to India, and to the prosperity and content of its people.

Mr. A. ARATHOON said it seemed to him that the meeting had a little strayed from the subject. They were not met to discuss whether the Government agents in India had committed wrong in individual cases, but whether the system of governing by means of Political Agents was wise and judicious, and, if not, what would be the best means to remedy the evil. He had waited to hear opinions as to the present system being the best that could be devised, but it appeared to be generally agreed that it was one which occasionally, if not frequently, permitted grievous wrong being done to the Natives of India. He failed to see, however, that such a Court as Lord Stanley proposed would remedy the evil. He spoke with all deference, more especially as every speaker hitherto had been in favour of the view taken by the noble lord, but he did not believe such a Court would be the best means to the end desired. To begin with, there might be great difficulty in the practical working of such a Court. How was it to be constituted in order to give anything approaching complete satisfaction to the varied inhabitants of India? Would they constitute the Court of the differing official elements, the Judicial, the Administrative, and the Executive, as well as of the Native? The nearest approach to such an arrangement had been in the case of the Gaekwar of Baroda. There were in that case three European gentlemen and three Native, and upon the same evidence the three Europeans took one view and three Natives the contrary view; but, notwithstanding that opinion was thus divided, action was taken on the decision of the English gentlemen. And, as a consequence, this had been a constant source of grievance with the Natives. There were other objections. It seemed to him the noble lord himself had pointed out one grave objection in the words in which he referred to his Grace the Duke of Argyll's suggestion for a Commission of Inquiry. Lord Stanley said: "Such a Court or Commission, the members of which might be nominated for a term of years by the Governor-General, would be as much part of the Government of India as the Political Agents or other officials." It seemed to him (the speaker) to be most essential that in any Court of Appeal those who gave the decision should not be in any way connected with the Government of India, for if the members of the Court of Appeal formed part of the Government of India, there would be the same objection to the Court as there is at the present time to the agents themselves. In preference to such a Court as has been advocated by Lord



Stanley, he would advocate the course suggested by the Duke of Argyll, viz., a strong Commission of Inquiry, and subsequent reference to Parliament, on the report of that body, where the case was considered sufficiently important. He was of opinion that Parliament should take into consideration all important political questions arising or having reference to India. India was an integral factor in British European politics, more especially since the last Russo-Turkish War. Indeed, he could not help thinking that many of the steps taken in regard to Turkey had been materially affected by the consideration of our position in, and connection with, India. What was particularly wanted in India was a healthy public opinion, and this they could not have for some time to come, because the educated portion of the community was so small. To supply the deficiency in this respect in that country, there should be brought to bear the public opinion of England in regard to Indian matters, and the best way to procure this was to discuss Indian matters fully in open Parliament. If this were done, an interest would be created in Indian questions, and gradually a public opinion would be created here, the result of which would be that the people of India would feel that even in cases where the ultimate decision was against that country, or any portion of that country, their interests had not been sacrificed in any spirit of bureaucracy or prejudice or negligence, but because the view taken seemed to the public of England the one most consonant with the dictates of justice and equity. Further, since India had become a factor in European politics, it appeared to him but logical that those assemblies which have control over the affairs of Great Britain should also have power, and the means of forming a judgment, to deal with Indian questions. Theoretically, Parliament was supposed to have that power through the Secretary of State for India, but practically it did not possess that power, for the Secretary of State did not possess the information that he would possess if the House of Commons were the proper theatre for the discussion of all Indian political questions of importance. The subject was too extensive to discuss within the time allowed. It must not be lost sight of that there was a hostile feeling in the minds of a great many Natives of India as to the Indian Civil Servants. (No.) If, then, the Court of Appeal was to be subordinate, or in any way dependent upon the Government of India, it would in the mind of the people of India be deprived of that element of independence, the character for which was essential to general confidence being felt in the Court. On the other hand, if the questions at issue were brought before the Houses of Parliament, no Indian would be able to say, whatever the result, but that the decision had been guided by the sense of justice of a whole nation. It must not be forgotten that in those Native States where

wrong was being committed the machinations must be very complicated and difficult to sift. No Court of Appeal could do much good, it seemed to him, without a previous Commission of Inquiry to supply the necessary evidence; but when once that evidence was obtained, there would in ordinary cases be no need of such a Court, and in extraordinary cases, where the charges and the injury done were grave enough, he was of opinion that the matter should be brought before Parliament upon the report of that Commission, and, through Parliament, before the British public; so that the Natives of India might feel that the same means by which the mother country was governed were also employed in the government of the most important dependency of that country.

Mr. J. T. WOOD said it seemed to him that in the course of the discussion there had been a slight mixing up of two things—the purely political question raised by Lord Stanley, and the question of the administration of justice in the Indian States annexed to our dominions. A case had been cited which was simply a judicial case, such as would have been decided in this country by any court of justice, the point being whether the ryots should pay their tax to the kinsmen or the superior. What is actually wanted in India is an independent judicial tribunal who would examine certain kinds of judicial cases, and report upon them to the Viceroy, in the same way as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reports here to Her Majesty. Whether it be called a Court or Commission, or a Judicial Inquiry, matters very little, so that substantial justice be done. The ultimate appeal in all these cases is to Parliament. But if you look to Parliament as a Court for adjudicating on private interests, the enormous expense which must be incurred would always make it beyond the means of any ordinary person. Rich persons get redress; poor persons cannot. In a case where substantial injustice has been done, as in the refusal of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy to listen to the representation of such a Judicial Committee as has been proposed, the question comes before Parliament. It is not a question involving expense or argument by individuals, but it has become a public question; and unless it is a case of sufficient importance to be referred to a Committee, it is better that it should not come before Parliament, for it is manifest that Parliament can only deal with important cases; but in a case of real importance, the difficulty of its being made a party question is obviated by referring it to a Committee of the House.

Mr. ROBERT H. ELLIOT said that although he had listened to the whole of the discussion with much interest, he had waited in vain

to hear any practical solution offered. (Hear, hear.) The fact was that he did not believe it possible to arrive at any satisfactory solution. He could see very well that there were very great grievances, and he quite agreed with Lord Stanley in that respect, but the Court or Commission proposed would amount to a setting aside of the Government of India and the appointment of another Government in its place. (Dissent.) It is true that Lord Stanley had limited his plan to appeals of a certain kind only to come to his Court of Appeal, but subsequent speakers maintained no such distinction, and evidently called for a Court of Appeal against grievances of every kind. (Hear, hear.) Then, he must, therefore, repeat that this was setting up a government of India in a new form; and where the Court of Appeal differed from the Government, it would be the latter which would go to the wall. He did not offer these objections as denying the existence of grievances, or as deprecating earnest efforts to relieve and remedy them; but he must remind the meeting that the Government of India is a despotic government, and that so long as it is so, there must always be those grievances to which such frequent allusion had been made. For his own part, he thought a total reconstruction of the government of India is required. The whole machinery is too complicated and cumbrous. It is quite impossible for those nominally at the head of affairs to settle anything but the very broadest questions; and responsibility being divided among all sorts of high officials, they spend much time in shifting the burden from one to the other. Mr. Elliot proceeded to give a humorous illustration of this in an account of his troubles in reference to the representation of certain grievances of planters of Mysore. Business like his at the India Office was tossed, as it were, into a crucible, and swiftly went out of sight. Yet everybody was vastly polite; a letter to Lord Cranbrook elicited a civil reply, and it would be difficult to imagine a more engaging set of men than the Indian Council. Nevertheless, the constitution of the Indian Government is such that it is next to impossible to arrive at any distinct answer to any given question. That being the case, he reiterated his conviction that the whole system of Indian government requires reconstruction, and that, meantime, the erection of the Court suggested by Lord Stanley and other speakers would lead to little practical good in removing the grievances of the Indian people.

Mr. C. W. ARATHOON, referring to the differences and questions arising between States and Princes in India, and other political questions, expressed the opinion that they should be dealt with by the law officers, and their opinions thereon published in the press, which would then take up the several matters, and so deal with them that public opinion would

be enlightened, and the grievance being thus ventilated, there would be a security that justice would be done. There were numerous cases of dispute of which the public knew nothing, but if they had been first of all placed by the Government of India before the law officers, and their opinions handed to the parties concerned, they would be brought before the public, and a feeling would be created which would lead to confidence being felt in the decisions of the Government based on the opinions of the law officers. He (the speaker) agreed with Lord Stanley to some extent. Let the Government delegate its authority to a Court, say, of Native Princes and Maharajahs, as the first Court or Commission, and having so obtained their valuable decisions, place the same before a regularly constituted Court, as an ultimate Court of Appeal, in this country. Surely the great Princes, Maharajahs, and Chiefs were fitted to give a first opinion in matters which concerned the Natives. In the case of the succession to the Nabha Raj in the Punjab, about ten years ago, he (the speaker) believed a committee of Native Princes was appointed, whose decision gave satisfaction. Lord Stanley had done good in drawing attention to this subject, and specially in referring to the Paltana case as one of the several instances conclusively showing the evils attached to the present system, in which the higher authority almost invariably confirmed the decision of the lower, the decision of the first official generally being, as has been pointed out, that of an inferior, inexperienced official—seldom, if ever, a lawyer. In the case mentioned, the endeavour was made to bring the influence of Parliament to bear, but the House was too busy, and otherwise could not take the matter up, and so the first injustice was repeated, and no redress could be obtained. In such cases, and before a Court or Commission is appointed, as suggested by the noble lord, there should be, above all, a strong public opinion expressed against any of the inquiries being held in secret, and a claim put forward on behalf of the public being fully informed in respect to them. That, in his opinion, was the chief feature to be studied in order to promote confidence in the decisions of any Court or Commission, howsoever constituted.

SYED AMEER ALI said that when he entered the room he had no intention of joining in the debate, but as it seemed to him that there was some misapprehension on the part of one or two speakers regarding the scope of Lord Stanley's suggestion, he thought it right to say a few words before the Chairman closed the discussion. If he understood Lord Stanley's paper aright, the noble lord proposed that a branch of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council should be established in India for the purpose of taking cognizance of the disputes between the Princes

and Chiefs and the Government of India. (Hear, hear.) At the present moment there was no such institution, and the cases which arose were decided by the Executive; and practically there was no appeal nor publicity. What Lord Stanley suggested would meet with no reasonable objection; and if the proposal were carried out, there could be little doubt that it would be of the greatest possible benefit to the country. It would make the Princes of India feel secure of their own rights; they would feel that, happen what may, justice would be done to them. They now see that the party with whom the decision lies is a party in the dispute, and that the arbiter consequently enters into judgment to a large extent influenced by preconceived notions on the matter. (Hear, hear.) The establishment of such a Court of Appeal would not in the smallest degree "upset the government of the country"—(hear, hear)—nor would it reduce the legitimate powers of the Executive. The proposal deserved the greatest consideration from every right-thinking person, and he earnestly hoped that the East India Association would take this matter up seriously, and bring it under the notice of the statesmen who are charged with the government of the country at this time. It was a matter in which no party interest should be allowed to enter, because the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have at the present moment to hear and adjudicate upon the cases of private people from India; and he failed to see why the Princes of India, because they happened to be Princes, should be excluded from privileges given to all other subjects in the Empire. (Hear, hear.) The speaker concluded by reiterating his opinion that the fears which had been expressed about the existing government of the country being upset by the establishment of a Court of Appeal were quite illusory, and originated in a mistaken conception of the tribunal suggested.

The CHAIRMAN said it was his duty to sum up, but that was scarcely necessary on the present occasion, for the meeting appeared to have been the occasion for the recapitulation of grievances and a unanimously-expressed opinion that redress of grievances in India was not so readily attainable as it should be. (Hear, hear.) It reminded him, indeed, of a story told by Lord Beaconsfield in "Vivian Grey" about a traveller on the banks of the Danube being overcharged in a cabaret, and, appealing to the magistrate of the town, finds the decision against him—the magistrate happening to be the same innkeeper that had overcharged the traveller. The latter then proceeded with an appeal to the judge of the district, and, lo and behold! the judge was the same innkeeper who had before acted as magistrate and decided against the appellant. He took it that this was what was suggested as being the

case in India. (Hear, hear.) A suggestion had been made about the House of Commons being appealed to, but he begged leave to remind the gentleman who had made the suggestion that the constitutional functions of the House of Commons were to represent grievances, but not to act as a Court of Appeal. It had been objected that to constitute a Court of Appeal would be to interfere with the authority of the Government of India; but it might as well be said that the High Court of Appeal in England interfered with the authority of the Executive Government in England. The subject, however, that had been treated was a very important one, and although the speakers were not unanimous as to the remedy, they were all agreed in feeling that it was a matter that ought not to be allowed to drop; so that the Council of the Association might consider the advisability of taking further steps for its consideration. At a meeting such as the present, the words spoken should not be allowed to die out, but an effort should be made by some earnest men to work out the proposition with the view of taking constitutional steps for laying what was an obvious grievance before Her Majesty; as, from the agitation of it, good might result that would improve the condition of her subjects in India, and thus tend to fix Her Majesty's empire there on a firm and lasting basis. (Applause.) The Chairman briefly moved a vote of thanks to the lecturer.

Dr. MOORE seconded the vote of thanks to Lord Stanley, and it was carried by acclamation.

Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY, in responding, said he hoped Mr. Elliot was not a member of the Indian Civil Service, and that he never expected to be; otherwise it would not have been prudent for him to launch the wholesale indictment that there is scarcely a Prince or, indeed, a Native of India who has not got a grievance. (Laughter.) He knew there were many with grievances, but he confessed he did not believe it was so bad as he gathered from the assurance of Mr. Elliot. When he contemplated the proposed Court of Appeal, he thought at first it ought to be composed of Commissioners who were quite independent of the Civil Service, and he considered that the High Court Judges would be so. But there are differences of opinion as to the propriety of this; and rather in deference to the suggestions of Lord Napier, he had given the proposal as in his paper. Any grievance connected with property can go before the Courts, from which there is a right of appeal; but these are not the kind of grievances for the province of the new Court, though they might include such as that mentioned by the *Bengalee* newspaper, which complains that a magistrate named Mr. Magrath, in

a case connected with the indigo planters, had kept a man in prison for three weeks without inquiry, and others for nearly a month and a-half—an act contrary to English law anywhere where English law exists. The matter has been taken to the High Court, and the judgment seems simply to be that the magistrate was guilty of “serious irregularities,”—a very slight censure indeed. (Hear, hear.) Of course, the man can write to the Viceroy with regard to the conduct of the magistrate; but it is very doubtful whether he would get anything by that. Some Court should be in existence to secure a remedy for this kind of grievance, among others. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. J. H. W. ARATHOON moved, in cordial terms, and Mr. BURKE seconded, a vote of thanks to the Chairman, which was carried unanimously; and Mr. ROLLAND having expressed his acknowledgments, the sitting terminated.

General CAVANAGH attended the meeting, but was obliged to go away early, and has since written that, “I am of opinion that the establishment of a tribunal such as you have shadowed out would be of great advantage both to the people and to the Government, provided that its decisions should be final, and that there should be no appeal to any higher authority. If it were composed of the three Chief Justices, with one member from each of the Councils of the three Presidencies, and three Natives of high position, I am convinced that its decisions would give general satisfaction.”





KANDAHAR

MAROO

KILLA BABER

ACHUKZAIS  
AFGHAN FRONTIER  
KHWAJA AMRAN RANGE  
PISHIN VALLEY  
ASDULLA HILLA  
DYAUZIE  
PASHIN  
9 WAL  
TALY  
Beland  
Khan Killa  
Kushdai  
Khogak Pass  
CHILZAI CLANS

MEH-ERZAKS

ESCOTS

SULEYMAN  
KHEYL  
CHILZAIS

NASIRS

MUSA MEHRANEES  
KHEYL  
WUZERS  
Kobulatai  
Pajia  
Joharai  
Vaharai  
Kashai Sir

BOZDARS

VEHOMA

MUNGROT

RIVER INDUS

DERA ISMAIL KHAN

DRABUND

Zawa Mayan

Zawa Sir

Phacree Thar

Lywae

Mugge

Tukhrai

Shabzai

Munai

Adraie

Kobulatai

Pajia

Joharai

Vaharai

Kashai Sir

MOOLTAN

Chimaulung

Bala Daka

HON. PASS

Fort Miore

Choti Choti

Choti Bala

Zerdan

Toba

Digri

Futlehpore

RAJANPUR

KHANPUR

Indian Valley

State Railway

BAWALPUR

KUSMOR

DEHRA

BUGTEES

KAHUN

VUTAKRI

Choti Bala

Choti Choti

Choti Bala

Choti Choti

Choti Bala

Choti Choti

Choti Bala

Choti Choti

Choti Bala

Choti Choti

QUETTA

Mustung

Bolan Pass

MUSTUNG

KELAT

DADUR

Sibi

Mitri

Frontier Line or Catchee Ports

CANDAHAR

JACOBABAD

SHIKARPORE

RAILWAY

ROOK

SUKKOR

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore

Limit of Kusmore


Limit of Kusmore

Scale.

16 32 64 0 16 32 48 64 MILES

Candahar Railway, shown thus .....  
Alternative marching routes, " .....  
Grass road to Bore Valley, " .....

(S<sup>d</sup>) J. Browne, D. Col. R. E.  
Political Officer.  
Thal Chotiale Field Force,



*The Retention of Candahar, and the Defence of the  
North-west Frontier.*

PAPER BY LIEUT.-COLONEL JAS. BROWNE, R.E., C.S.I.

READ AT A MEETING HELD AT THE WESTMINSTER PALACE  
HOTEL, ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, DEC. 15, 1880.

GENERAL SIR ALEXANDER TAYLOR, R.E., K.C.B.,  
IN THE CHAIR.

A LARGE meeting of the members and friends of the East India Association, including many distinguished officers of the Military and Civil Services of the Indian Empire, was held at the Westminster Palace Hotel, on Wednesday afternoon, December 15th, 1880; the subject for consideration being an address delivered by Lieut.-Colonel James Browne, R.E., C.S.I., late Political Officer in Southern Afghanistan, on "The Retention of Candahar, and the Defence of the North-west Frontier." General Sir Alexander Taylor, R.E., K.C.B., occupied the chair, and amongst those present were—Lord Kinnaid; Lord Reay; General Lord Mark Kerr, C.B.; General Sir George Balfour, K.C.B., M.P.; General Sir James Brind, K.C.B.; Lady Brind; General Sir George Malcolm, K.C.B.; Lieut.-General Sir A. Horsford, G.C.B.; Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, K.C.B.; Major-General Sir Henry Green, K.C.S.I.; Major-General Sir Henry Thuillier, K.C.S.I.; Colonel Sir Owen Burne, K.C.S.I.; Colonel Sir Richard Pollock, K.C.S.I.; Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, K.C.S.I.; Sir Henry Ricketts, K.C.S.I.; Sir Peter Spokes; Mr. J. R. Bullen-Smith, C.S.I.; Mr. C. E. Pitman, C.I.E.; General Orfeur Cavenagh; General MacLagan, R.E.; General Man; General D. Simpson; Lieut.-General A. T. Cadell; Lieut.-General Crawford Cooke; Lieut.-General James Travers, C.B., V.C.; Major-General A. Cadell, R.E.; Major-General W. A. Fyers, C.B.; Major-General J. Hills, C.B., V.C.; Major-General J. R. Hume; Major-General J. J. Jenkins; Major-General R. W. Lowry, C.B.; Major-General F. R. Maunsell, R.E.; Major-General H. Miller; Major-General E. L. Ommanney, R.E.; Major-General E. W. S. Scott; Major-General C. M. Shakespear; Major-General E. J. Spilsbury; Colonel G. M. Battye; Colonel R. Crewe; Colonel East; Colonel Edgecome, R.E.; Colonel Fitzhugh; Colonel G. L. Fraser; Colonel Malcolm Green,

C.B.; Colonel Keatinge, V.C., C.S.I.; Colonel Peile, R.E.; Colonel Rotton, R.A.; Colonel A. Y. Shortt; Colonel Sibley; Colonel Stirling; Colonel and Mrs. J. P. Turton; Colonel Edmond J. L. Twynam; Lieut.-Col. Ballinfall; Lieut.-Col. H. Blair, R.E.; Lieut.-Col. the Hon. E. Legge; Lieut.-Col. T. B. Mortimer; Lieut.-Col. Beresford Lovett, C.S.I.; Lieut.-Col. Stewart; Lieut.-Col. H. W. Wood; Major and Mrs. R. Athorpe; Major D. J. P. Campbell, City Marshal; Major H. S. Clarke, R.A.; Major Courtney, R.E.; Major G. D'A. Jackson; Major R. Johnson; Major Mackenzie, of Findon; Major C. C. S. Moncrieff, R.E.; Major Thuillier, R.E.; Major Trotter, R.E.; Major J. Waterhouse; Captain Armstrong, R.E.; Captain Broadfoot, R.E.; Captain Eastwick; Captain and Mrs. Palmer; Captain and Mrs. J. E. Porteous; Captain Raikes; Captain Rothwell; Lieut. M. W. Battye, 59th Regiment; Lieut. Alex. H. Gordon, R.A.; Rajah Rampal Singh; Mr. George Palmer, M.P.; Rev. C. Bromhead; Rev. James Long; Rev. Harman C. Ogle; Dr. Vincent Ambler; Dr. J. Fairweather; Dr. P. Oates; Dr. G. F. Trimnell; Mr. J. P. C. Anderson; Mr. C. W. Arathoon; Mr. Fitzgerald Arbuthnot; Mr. George Bain; Mr. Robert Bain; Mr. John Bland; Mr. C. Boulnois; Mr. S. Boyd; Mr. J. R. Boyd; Mr. Crawford Dodgson; Mr. R. W. E. Eastwick; Mr. F. W. Fryer; Mr. Herbert Fyers; Mr. and Mrs. P. Pirie Gordon; Mrs. Grant; Hamid Ali Khan; Mr. W. H. Hudleston; Mr. Richard H. Hutton; Mr. H. M. Hyndman; Mr. and Mrs. E. Jenkinson; Mr. John Jones; Mr. T. E. Ivens; Mr. William Lindsay; Mr. C. E. Corry Lowry; Mr. W. McGuffin; Mr. J. M. Maclean; Mr. W. C. Niblett; Mr. W. F. Parmer; Mr. B. Palchindhuri; Mr. Paton; Mr. W. Erskine Reid; Miss Ricketts; Miss E. C. Ricketts; Mr. A. Rogers; Mr. A. L. Simon; Mr. D. H. Small; Mr. P. M. Tait; Mr. Henry Tapp; Mr. Taylor; Mrs. B. Taylor; Mr. T. H. Thornton, C.S.I.; Mr. F. S. Townsend; Mrs. Travers; Mr. H. St. George Tucker; Mr. M. J. Walhouse; Mr. James T. Wood, &c., &c.

General Sir ALEXANDER TAYLOR (the Chairman) said: Colonel Browne has undertaken to give us this afternoon a lecture on "The Retention of Candahar and the Defence of the North-west Frontier." A long time ago, when a subaltern, Colonel Browne for several years led a very active life on this frontier. He was engineer in charge of the public works along the line from the Kohat Pass in the north, to below Dehra Ghazee Khan in the south. It is a long line of over 300 miles, and is bounded on the west by many tribes, with whom his duties kept him more or less in contact. During these years he learned their common language—Pushtoo—cultivated the acquaint-

ance of their chiefs. Indeed, if report speaks true, he "made a night of it" more than once in their homes beyond the frontier. He certainly won their confidence, and succeeded in making personal friends among them in a most remarkable manner. He has left behind him on this frontier a name well known to the present day. When the war broke out Major Browne was in political employment at Quettah. He accompanied General Biddulph's force as political officer on its return march from Pesheen, through the Bori Valley to Dehra Ghazee Khan, and fed it during its march through this, at that time, unexplored country. Afterwards he did similar duty with Sir Donald Stewart's force as far as Khelat-i-Ghilzai on its march from Candahar to Cabul. I mention these few details to show that Colonel Browne has had most unusual opportunities for forming sound opinions on the subjects on which he is about to lecture. Indeed, there are few Englishmen who so thoroughly understand these independent tribes as Colonel Browne does.

Colonel BROWNE then read the following paper:—

It may be well, in treating of a subject which has of late created so much interest—I should rather say so much strong feeling—to plunge at once into a confession of faith; and to say that I propose to lay before you the reasons which have led me to the conclusion, that we have nothing now to gain by the permanent retention of Candahar. I would at the same time entirely repudiate any return to the old Indian frontier of 1876; which sinned in omission, as much as our holding Candahar would sin in commission. I propose in fact to show that our best chance of obtaining a secure frontier in Southern Afghanistan lies in the occupation of the Pesheen Valley alone.

I have chiefly been induced to accept the invitation of the East India Association to lecture on this subject, from a feeling that although the military, political, and financial aspects of the question have been so fully discussed, the engineering view of the matter, which is perhaps the most important, as partly including all the others, has been almost entirely overlooked. I must, therefore, ask your indulgence if I detain you some time on this somewhat uninteresting part of my subject.

The ultimate proposed line of communication between Candahar and India is a railway from Sukkur on the Indus Valley line, which, crossing Scinde and the Cutchee desert to Sibi, rises to Gwal on the plateau of Southern Afghanistan, and thence through the Pesheen Valley down to Candahar. The Bolan Pass, leading to Quettah from Dadur, and which is very much more to the south, is a supplementary line to Pesheen; but as a line for a railway is in every way inferior to that from Sibi along the Jawur and Hurnaie valleys.

It will at once be admitted, that it is a *sine qua non* to the occupation of Candahar that we should, at all seasons of the year, possess between it and British India a thoroughly reliable line of engineering communication. I shall endeavour to show how a railway from Sukkur to Candahar entirely fails to meet this condition, unless supplemented by an alternative route, involving new political and military considerations.

I would first call your attention to the enormous drainage area represented by the flood discharge of the Indus at Sukkur; from Umballa to Bamian on the east and west, from Sukkur to Gilgit and the Manasarewar Lake on the south and north. The bed of the river at Sukkur is throughout of the very hardest rock, which for centuries has not worn down under the action of the water; and the cross section of the stream, thus quite incapable of increase by scouring, is just barely sufficient to carry off one-half, probably not more than one-third, of the drainage of the Indus basin. Before our occupation of the Punjab and Scinde, one-half or two-thirds of the flood discharges were allowed to flow quite unchecked over the right and left banks of the river, from Mithankote to Sukkur; thus relieving the outflow at Sukkur, by flooding what were then the deserts of Upper Scinde and Rajpootana. We have now constructed a railway embankment—the Indus Valley Railway—from Sukkur to Bahawalpore, on the left bank of the Indus; and an embankment for the flood protection of Upper Scinde, from Sukkur to Kusmore, on the right bank of the Indus. Into this funnel, seventy-five miles long, of rotten earth-banks, we have driven the mighty drainage of the Indus, fondly hoping that the floods will quietly wait their turn to pass off through the utterly inadequate rock-bound outlet at Sukkur, without asserting the law of nature in bursting somewhere through the banks, as being the line of least resistance. In this almost incredible blunder, to which we are now committed, and its effects upon a line of railway from Sukkur to Sibi, lies the great difficulty in obtaining that *sine qua non* to our occupation of Candahar—a reliable line of communication.

It might at first sight be thought, as the Indus Valley Railway is bridged at intervals between Sukkur and Bahawalpore, that the openings so provided might be sufficiently increased to pass off the Indus floods without injury to the Kusmore embankment; but any engineer who has practically had anything to do with the management of a great Indian river, will at once see the fallacy of such an idea. The Indus, during the cold season, forms enormous silt banks, sometimes two to three miles in breadth, which dam up the bed of the river, and just admit of a comparatively small trickle of water getting past them. The

position of these silt banks is entirely beyond engineering control, and when sudden freshets come down from the Himalayas, the scour of the silt does not take place sufficiently fast to accommodate the increased discharge; and the pent-up floods burst out wherever they can, and without any guarantee whatever that they will flow off through the bridged openings provided for them through the lateral retaining embankments. That this is no theory, but sound fact, is proved by the behaviour of the Indus in 1874, '76, '78, when it burst through the Kusmore embankment, whilst leaving high and dry a number of gaps, half a mile in length, which had been left open by our engineers as a kind of safety valve which the river contemptuously declined to avail itself of.

The effect of the bursting of the Kusmore embankment upon a line of railway from Sukkur to Candahar, is better described by numbers than by words. It means, for three months in the year, a river thirty-eight miles wide, and from three to twelve feet deep, flowing right across our communications with Candahar, and extending from Shikarpore to twelve miles beyond Jacobabad. Nor is this all. Our attempts to coerce, instead of humouring, the Indus, have forced this enormous portion of its flood discharge to flow along its old bed, the depression of which is clearly traceable from near Kusmore, past Jacobabad, to Schwan. As Jacobabad is seventy-five feet lower than Kusmore, and many feet below Sukkur, we have now to thank ourselves for having brought about a state of things, which may very possibly end in leaving Sukkur, Shikarpore, and Jacobabad on the left, instead of the right bank of the main channel of the Indus; and has introduced an element of insecurity in the maintenance of our Candahar communications, which need never have existed, and which cannot now be remedied. Further, the peculiar engineering which has forced the Indus floods into Jacobabad has resulted in the utmost danger to the line between Sukkur and Kurrachee, at Schwan, where the Khelat mountains touch the river and drive the floods, through the railway, back into the parent stream. Whilst the Russians are endeavouring to strengthen their position in Turkestan, by diverting the Oxus along its old bed into the Caspian Sea, we have succeeded, at enormous cost, in so engineering the Indus and its floods that we may expect them on any given year to cut off Mooltan to the north, Candahar to the west, and Kurrachee to the south, from railway communication with Sukkur, which would otherwise have been an excellent base of operations against Southern Afghanistan.

Time after time, for many years back, has every exceptionally rainy season in the Punjab caused the bursting of the Kusmore embankment, which is largely composed of, and rests entirely upon, salt river

silt, which dissolves into quicksand on the first contact of water. Time after time have we been informed that this was positively to be the very last collapse; but, unfortunately, in such a matter, we cannot be as easily satisfied as the doughty knight Mambrino, who, finding his cardboard helmet collapse under the first sword-cut, pronounced it a good and serviceable helmet, without further trial.

From twelve miles beyond Jacobabad into Sibi, the railway crosses the plain of the Cutchee, which has a very considerable slope of from three to five feet in the mile. Down this slope, the hill floods rush with all the initial velocity acquired in the great mountainous catchment basin north and west of the Cutchee; and they have already asserted their power for mischief, by tearing up the railway in July, 1880, and rendering it useless at the time of our utmost need.

Such then are the conditions of stability of the unbridged surface line from Sukkur to Sibi; and on such a broken reed it is impossible to trust for our communications with Candahar. The line must be completely bridged throughout before we can rely upon it; and even then, in the certain event of the bursting of the Kusmore embankment, a long bridged causeway through miles of flood, where the failure of one pier might stop traffic for weeks, would not in itself afford sufficient security.

From Sibi, to Gwal in the Pesheen Valley, the railway rises about 5,800 feet, and is entirely a mountain line, subject to such conditions of drainage, that nothing but the most solid class of bridge-work throughout can at all insure its permanency. It will scarcely be credited that the Indian Government had deliberately resolved to break the gauge at Sibi from 5 ft. 6 in. to 3 ft. 3 in.; but such is the fact, and it needs no comment. From Gwal to Abdallah Khan Killa, through the Pesheen Valley, the line is only of average difficulty; but here, again, a mere surface line would not suffice.

To sum up, therefore, the engineering view of the question, a British garrison at Pesheen or Candahar must, for the first and most dangerous years of its occupancy, and until the completion of a line of bridged railway throughout, be prepared to be constantly cut off from Sukkur by natural causes; Sukkur itself being dependent for its connection with Afghanistan on one side, and with the general railway systems of India on the others, upon the accident of a few inches, more or less, of rainfall in the Himalayas. Such a condition cannot prudently be accepted; and an alternative engineering line, quite independent of Sukkur, becomes an absolute necessity.

An alternative political line of communication with Candahar is equally indispensable, and from very similar reasons. The disaster at



Maiwand was immediately followed by the rising of the Murree, Bugtee, and Kakur tribes, and the abandonment of all the railway works from Sibi to Gwal ; just as a heavy rainfall in the Punjaub would have utterly wiped out the railway through Jacobabad, and as a storm in the Murree mountains actually did tear up the line into Sibi. The line from Jacobabad to Gwal, as well as the Bolan Pass, is dependent upon the good-will of the Khan of Khelat and of his quasi-subjects, the Belooch, Murree, and Bugtee tribes. It would be imprudent to trust entirely to Belooch influence on one line of communication with Afghanistan, and it becomes a political necessity to dispel the idea that the Beloochees are indispensable to us, by occupying a line into Pesheen, over which they would have no control whatever, and which would connect Candahar directly with Mooltan and the Southern Punjaub.

Admitting the political and engineering necessity of such an alternative route, it follows that the only mode of securing it is to place a garrison in the Bhoree Valley, mid-way between Pesheen and Dehra Ghazee Khan ; thus insuring a road to Candahar independent of Belooch influences, and unaffected by the Kusmore floods, whilst protecting the railway, by commanding from the rear the whole of the Murree, Bugtee, and Kakur clans. Whilst, in ordinary times, the railway would necessarily be the main communication with Candahar, the possession of an alternative route would permit of the section between Sukkur and Sibi being left, as at present, an unbridged surface-line, any interruption to which would then be comparatively unimportant. It would thus admit of all our money and efforts being concentrated on the mountain section from Sibi to Gwal, along which, as already explained, a complete bridged line of rail could alone be of use.

The line which has been found best suited for a railway from Sibi to Gwal cannot, evidently, be in any way protected by a garrison at Quettah or Pesheen. From Hurnaie, on the line of railway, to the heart of the Bhoree Valley at Uriazgye, is a distance of about forty miles, by an easy cross road. This would allow us to place a cantonment at Uriazgye in the best possible position for covering the line, whilst sufficiently close to it to be reinforced rapidly by rail, if it were itself threatened. In ordinary times, the routes leading direct from Uriazgye to Rajanpore and to Pesheen could be left to take care of themselves ; the garrison only supplying detachments to protect the cross road to Hurnaie, and thence along the railway to Sibi or Mittri. The Native troops could thus proceed on long furlough by rail—a most important consideration in our present recruiting difficulties.

In case of war, and of anything happening to the railway, Uriazgye could be reinforced in fifteen marches from Rajanpore, the first eight

being in what is practically our own territory, the Khetran country, and the last seven crossing what is, for Afghanistan, remarkably easy ground. In like manner, Pesheen could at once be reinforced in seven marches from Uriazgye, quite independently of the railway. It would be tedious to further describe this alternative route. It will suffice to say that a large British force marched along it in March—May, 1879, and found it perfectly practicable; and that the Hun Pass, which is in Khetran territory, and the only serious obstacle on the road, could in a few days be made passable for wheeled guns.

I have no wish to give "*couleur de rose*" accounts of the Bhoree Valley as a cantonment site; but as a food-producing district, it is undoubtedly superior to any portion of Southern Afghanistan, except the immediate neighbourhood of Candahar, and perhaps the Zhob Valley; which is, however, so near the Bhoree Valley that, for commissariat purposes, they may almost be considered as one. The water-supply is magnificent, and the elevation, averaging 5,000 feet, gives good promise of a salubrious climate. I admit that, if merely political and military requirements were considered, there might be room for doubt as to the wisdom of establishing ourselves at Bhoree, and even in Pesheen. But the stern logic of natural drainage and of gradients, which asserts that the best railway line lies far north of Quettah and the Bolan, also asserts the double necessity of a cantonment at Bhoree, and of the retention of Pesheen.

Having now shown how, by a suitable selection of garrison sites, we can obtain alternative routes to Pesheen by road and railway which are absolutely necessary, on engineering as well as military and political grounds, we may now fairly consider the question of a permanent occupation of Candahar, with a full appreciation of the work that has to be done before our stepping-stone at Pesheen is thoroughly secured. Whilst admitting that we may not yet have had a good opportunity of retiring from Candahar, its permanent retention would, I believe, only be a hindrance to the carrying out of a programme which will, in itself, strain our resources to the uttermost; and which, when completed, would enable us to deal with Candahar exactly as circumstances may suggest or our interests require.

We are often told, that to give up Candahar will affect our prestige in India. But what prestige we had to lose we have already lost by abandoning Cabul. The fair inference to be drawn from our retaining Candahar would be that we were afraid to hold Cabul; whereas, to leave Candahar would explain our action at Cabul; both measures being in accordance with our earnest professions of having no wish to annex Afghanistan.

The idea that by retaining Candahar, by developing its agricultural and trade resources, &c., we could make it pay its expenses, is another illusion; as, under British administration, it would not pay a tithe of the cost of its occupation. Let any one who knows both Peshawur and Candahar, and their relative trade, agriculture, and distance from the Indus, consider the fact that after thirty-two years of English administration the revenues of the Peshawur district are entirely inadequate, in time of peace, to pay for its garrison. In face of such a fact, can it be gravely argued that Candahar might be made to pay for the expenses of a garrison on a war footing?

However inadequate the revenues of the province of Candahar would be to support our costly administration, it should not be forgotten that they represent more than one-third, and that the most easily collected, of the income of the Afghan kingdom. Further, without holding Candahar, no revenue can be levied from Herat; and it is quite preposterous to suppose that any Cabul ruler, shorn by our action of fully two-thirds of his revenue, could be other than our bitter enemy. To act up to the spirit of our non-annexation professions, it would be wise to announce that we were willing to pay to any ruler whom we recognized at Candahar a subsidy amounting to the net annual profits of Pesheen under the Ameer Shere Ali's government. Whilst asserting our right to retain Pesheen in the interests of British India, such a subsidy would clear us of any mercenary motives, would allow us to assist any ruler we might approve of, and would amount to only a fraction of the additional cost we would incur, in holding Candahar, as against holding Pesheen.

As to this question of the comparative cost of holding Candahar or Pesheen, nothing could be more deceptive than to be guided by the mere consideration of the extra distance. Our occupation of Candahar involves dealings with a whole crowd of tribes whom at Pesheen we would have nothing to do with, and a quite indefinite increase of political complications. Dealings with Afghan tribes mean troops to coerce them, or subsidies to bribe them. Ghilzaies, and Doorancees, and Noorzaies, from the north, Zemindawarees from beyond Girisk, Beloochees from the Lower Helmund, all would force their disagreeable attentions on us by stopping our trade or our supplies in the outlying districts, or by plundering on the railway, which would be exposed to attack from the north, down the Kudunaie, Mel Munda, and Arghasan Valleys; whilst, from the south, it would be open, along the whole distance from the Khwaja Amran range to Candahar, to endless marauding from Shorawak, Nushki, and Kharun. We have as yet had no experience of protecting a railway in a country like Afghanistan; but such protection will certainly be a police question of so many soldiers required per mile run

of rail, and not a military question of garrisons occupying strategic points like Candahar, which would have no influence whatever in diminishing the number of men actually required to police the line from Sibi to the Khwaja Amran.

Grave as was the position of affairs after the Maiwand disaster, we should, further, not forget that, but for the accidents of General Roberts's force being available at Cabul and of our holding Khelat-i-Ghilzai, the whole of the country from below Cabul or Ghuznee might have joined Ayoob; and that, therefore, the garrison required to hold Candahar must be calculated to resist double the strain it has ever yet been exposed to. At Pesheen, on the contrary, it would be quite impossible for the whole strength of Herat to attack us from the front, and the whole strength of Cabul to attack us from the rear, as might very well happen if we held Candahar.

Everything considered, I am therefore inclined to think that to occupy Candahar would require double the number of troops, and three times the cost of holding Pesheen alone. The garrisons would, roughly, be as follows in the two cases:—

Candahar ...	...	10,000 men			
Pesheen ...	...	2,000 „	Pesheen ...	...	4,000 men
Bhoree Valley ...	...	2,500 „	Bhoree Valley ...	...	2,500 „
Quettah and Khelat	...	1,500 „	Quettah and Khelat	...	1,500 „
<hr/>			<hr/>		
Total ...	...	16,000	Total ...	...	8,000

The relative annual costs being approximately three millions and one million sterling. On these data we may examine whether the benefits to be derived from holding Candahar are worth the price we must pay for them.

Candahar is possibly healthier than Pesheen, and supplies are more abundant; but as the fact of our being at Candahar would only expose 2,000 men less to the supposed bad climate of Pesheen, whilst exposing 10,000 men more to all the unsanitary conditions of a huge graveyard underlying a great, filthy Afghan town, the advantages on the score of health seem very doubtful. As to supplies in Pesheen, I believe that just as the bazaar at Quettah was, before the war, resorted to by the Pesheen villagers, so a cantonment in Pesheen would draw to itself the resources of Candahar, which would not then be absorbed by local requirements.

It is sometimes supposed, that by occupying Candahar we might develop to our advantage a great Central Asian trade, and remove the vexatious dues which have hindered its expansion. This is a pretty

theory founded on European ideas of civilized trade. As a matter of fact, the dues on Central Asian trade are levied at Herat, and Maimanah, and Balkh, and will not be in the least degree affected by our holding Candahar. There are plenty of exactions practised on traders within the Afghan frontier, but these too we cannot yet remedy. If we were in Pesheen, the local exactions would be made at Candahar, where our remonstrances might do some good; if we were at Candahar, they would only be laid on at Girisk, or Furrab, and at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, with greater severity by petty officials. A Central Asian merchant from Bokhara or Meshed, having reached Candahar, would think but little of going 100 miles further to a railway at Pesheen, if he could there obtain cheap English goods, 300 miles in advance of Sukkur and Shikarpore. This enormous step in trade should for the present suffice; for the Englishman, as a caravan merchant, has nothing to teach the Afghan, who is quite able to take care of himself, without our fussy attempts at protection. I have no doubt whatever that an Indo-European line *via* Candahar is merely a question of time; but as the caravan journey from Pesheen to India presents immense difficulties, whereas that from Pesheen to Candahar is perfectly easy, there would not be sufficient inducement to, and consequent increase in, traffic to warrant an immediate and premature extension to Candahar. I would take a very hopeful view of the financial prospects of a railway to Pesheen, and believe a great trade would spring up in wool, silk, indigo, madder, hides, tea, assafoetida, and dried fruit, and, above all, in Indian salt, as the whole of Southern Afghanistan, Herat, and Beloochistan consumes saltpetre instead of rock or sea salt. But, as on the commercial success of the first trial section of railway to Afghanistan depends the rate of interest at which it will be possible to borrow money for a complete Indo-European line, it is all the more necessary to avoid outlay on any extension which would certainly increase the risks, without so certainly increasing the returns.

Pesheen is not very extensively cultivated, but this is due to a fact very favourable to trade development, which is that most of the inhabitants are merchants who have visited India. They are bigoted Mahomedans; but know our power too well to attempt to molest us, even under the sudden influence of a disaster like Maiwand. We would, in Pesheen, avoid much of the dangerous element existing at Candahar. During the first month of the opening of the telegraph office at Quettah, the Syuds of Pesheen forwarded over 50,000 rupees by telegraph orders to Ceylon, showing how completely they understood and trusted us.

It is very justly claimed for Candahar, that it is a point of immense strategical importance; and I fully admit, that if we were actually at

war with Russia aided by the Afghans, it would be very foolish to give it up. Further, it would, no doubt, be inexpedient to abandon it before Abdurrahman, or any other pretender, is in a position to take it over, or before Ayooob's position and intentions at Herat are better defined. But at present we are not at war with Russia, and it is above all things to be desired that, should she enter Afghanistan, she may meet with no better welcome from its people than we have done. The only chance of obtaining this result is to retire to a position whence Candahar will be within easy grasp, but where our presence would not be a red rag to the Afghans, Pesheen being distinctly outside the limits of Afghanistan proper.

The occupation of Candahar would inevitably bring on an attack from Cabul or Herat, our answering move being, as inevitably, an occupation of those places. An attack on Pesheen would be sufficiently answered by the capture of Candahar, leaving the next move to the Afghans, whilst allowing us to attack if we thought fit. The Khwaja Amran range may not be very formidable, but Afghans are so averse to fighting with any enemy or barrier, however weak, in their rear, that a line of posts, like those on the Punjaub frontier, built on the crest of the range, and commanding the chief passes, would, in all probability, always leave the initiative in the hands of a force at Pesheen. At Candahar our hand could always be forced at our enemy's convenience. From Pesheen we could strike at Khelat-i-Ghilzai direct, by the easy route along the Kudunaie Valley from Chummun; or at Ghuznee and Cabul, from Khushdil Khan Killa, along the Maruf route, followed, in 1841, by Gen. Willshire's column. On this latter line, any movement for attack or defence would be well supported by a garrison in the Bhoree Valley. It is true that transport animals might suffer between Pesheen and Candahar, and that transport difficulties might delay our advance; but if the initiative be in our hands, we need not start till we are ready. Further, whether we occupy Candahar or not, the garrisons east of the Khwaja Amran will need to keep up transport; and the carriage for a flying column, which would be kept up at Candahar if occupied, might be more cheaply kept in reserve in Scinde, if the very doubtful difficulties of crossing the eighty miles between Chummun and Candahar warranted such expenditure.

If, however, it be considered indispensable to have the means of re-occupying Candahar rapidly, with a railway at our back, so as to thoroughly convince the Afghans of our determination to be the paramount power, without wishing to interfere with their independence, it might be well, whilst openly avowing our intention of leaving Candahar, to complete, this cold season, the whole of the rough earthwork

for a railway from Pesheen to Candahar. The cost would not be great; the earthwork cannot practically be injured, and our meaning would not be mistaken. With temporary sleeper bridges, such an embankment could very quickly be utilized as a contractor's line; and on the railway being completed to Pesheen, a reserve of sleepers, rails, and girders could be stored at Abdullah Khan Killa, for an extension to Candahar.

It must not be forgotten that we have got more practical work in India to do than to watch Russia, and that is to protect our subjects from marauders along the Punjaub frontier. Whilst occupying Candahar, and thereby inducing the Ameer of Cabul to back up the tribes in giving us all manner of trouble, we are locking up 8,000 men in a position whence they can exercise no influence whatever on the Punjaub frontier clans, amongst whom the close of the Afghan war will now inevitably develop serious raids and disturbances.

We have a long account to settle with the Mahsood Wuzeerees, and these 8,000 men might be much better employed in marching from Pesheen and Bhoree, down the Zhob Valley, and on to the back of the Wuzeeree Country. Our positions in Pesheen and Bhoree, if freed from the heavy burden of supporting Candahar, would thus serve to bring pressure on all the independent frontier tribes from Bunnoo to Kusmore. The routes to Dehra Ishmael Khan and Vehowah are not very well known, but there is no reason to doubt their being very easy; the Zhob Valley, which drains directly down into the Gomul River, being much richer and more populous than the Bhoree Valley.

Whereas Pesheen, with several alternative approaches, has thus got a distinct practical bearing on the protection of the Punjaub frontier, the large force we would lock up at Candahar, with only one approach from Pesheen, would be a constant source of anxiety and of strain, without fulfilling any well-defined object whatever, beyond annoying the Afghans and, probably, amusing the Russians.

Sukkur and Mithunkote supplement each other most conveniently on the alternative independent routes. In summer, when marching is most painful, the floods which make railway communication round Sukkur so precarious, would bring troops rapidly and comfortably by boat or steamer to Mithunkote, whence in five marches they would be in the Shum Plain at an elevation of 3,000 feet, with the climate growing cooler every day. In winter, when the rivers are too low for steamers, the railway from Sukkur would be perfectly secure, and the heat of the Cutchee quite bearable. In the Bhoree Valley, no opposition need be anticipated to any force stronger than a weak brigade; as the country is perfectly open, and full of flourishing villages, which are ex-

cellent bail lodged for good behaviour. Had time permitted, I would have described the Kakur clans of Bhoree, who combine the most ruthless disregard of what we in Europe consider the most elementary principles of right and wrong, with an honesty and unselfishness which would have done honour to the primitive Christians.

The Afghans themselves have not got the least idea who will ultimately be the acknowledged ruler of Afghanistan; and, to them, nothing seems more natural and proper than that a change of government should be preceded by years of anarchy. Knowing, as they do, that all stable Native rule in Afghanistan is based on murder, they would be greatly amused at the sentimental talk in England about our being morally bound to establish a stable government. The German victories let loose the Commune; and the Prussians looked on while the Tuileries were burning. We can look on as calmly, until the scramble in Afghanistan results in the survival of the fittest. We should declare our intention of leaving Candahar next spring to take care of itself, intimating to Ayooob Khan, through his brother Yakooob Khan, that we would turn him out of it should he venture again to occupy it. Sir Louis Cavagnari's murder has been fully revenged; and if it has never fully been brought home to Yakooob Khan, he might now be released to share in the scramble for power; thereby at once becoming his brother Ayooob's determined enemy.

To prevent Ayooob's annoying us for the present, it would be sufficient to invite Persia to take Herat, merely requiring her to let us keep an agent there. If Persia were strong enough to take it she could not permit Ayooob to use it as a base against Candahar or Cabul. If she were too weak to take it, the knowledge of her having our permission to do so would make Ayooob so distrust her that he would, in all probability, never dare to leave Herat. In any case we would be the gainers. Herat, in Persian hands, would belong to a professedly friendly and comparatively civilized Power, whom we can put pressure on, if need be, from the sea, and who cannot be more dangerous to us than Ayooob has proved himself. Herat, merely threatened by Persia, would oblige Ayooob to take no part in the coming scramble for power in Afghanistan, and to await the attack of any ruler who may consolidate himself at Candahar, and whom we might assist with money to retake Herat. Russia has probably now got unrecognized agents at Herat, which we have not. We would, therefore, be the gainers in this respect by ceding Herat to Persia, and although it may be a reversal of our policy, it seems quite justifiable under altered circumstances. Had the negotiations regarding the cession of Herat not been so abruptly stopped, we might never have been troubled by Ayooob, who has since probably



been secretly helped by the Persian Government to force our hand, and to regain Herat for itself. As however his defeat may now induce Persia to abandon him altogether, we can, for the present, afford to wait, and not to hurry on the possible complications which such a cession might entail.

The events of the last two years seem to point, for the scheme of defence of our North-west frontier, to a compromise between the dull prose of Lord Lawrence, and the fantastic poetry of Sir Henry Rawlinson. Rhapsodies, regarding the past and future splendours and riches of Herat, fall very flat on men who have personally experienced the delights of Quettah, and Candahar, and Ghuznee. The wild proposal, of checking the advance of Russia in Central Asia by holding Herat, Khulm, and Fyzabad, from India, with 30,000 Indian troops, can now be fully appreciated in all its enormous absurdity. The only check to such an advance will be the natural law, which has baulked every attempt of Russia to ingratiate herself with the Finlanders, the Germans of the Baltic provinces, the Hungarians, and Albanians; and which delayed her forty years in the Caucasus. A Russian officer who had served nineteen years in Turkestan, compared the advance of Russia in Central Asia to the mingling of a salt with a fresh water lake. The elements being identical, the slight superior density due to the salt sets up a current until both are equally salted. The salt is the very meagre element of European civilization, which, given similar elements to work upon, sets up a current of Russian influence from Cossack to Kirghiz, and from Tartar to Uzbek, which must stop short, possibly with the Turkomans, certainly with a semi-Arab, semi-Arian race like the Afghans. In this opinion I entirely agree; and I believe that had the Russian Ambassador stayed a little longer in Cabul, he would have been murdered like Sir Louis Cavagnari. However much they may hate us, the Afghans dislike the Russians more; and a favourite simile amongst them is that Afghans and English are like the two ears on a horse's head, which turn two ways when listening to one sound, that sound being hostility to the Russians. Except under the influence of the grossest political mismanagement on our part, the Afghan is for the Russian an impossible ally. Like the Seikh and Ghoorke he respects us the more, and bears us no spite for a fair defeat in the field; and he is, in consequence, probably better disposed towards us now than he ever was before. Thanks to the war, there is no harm done as yet, but if it be possible to make the Afghan an ally of Russia, it might perhaps be done by the time-honoured British policy of declining any responsibilities for ourselves, whilst asking him to accept engagements binding on himself.

If, however, the wild dreams of the forward school have hopelessly collapsed under the test of facts, the "masterly inactivity" theory has fared no better. Every day brings fresh information as to the unsoundness of the idea that our old frontier was theoretically a secure one; that it needed no improvement; and that we could, behind it, calmly await all possible future contingencies. The danger of the cover afforded to an enemy by the screen of the Suleyman range, has been proved by the fact, that although we were at Cabul, at Kurrum, at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, at Candahar, and at Chumman, Sir Frederick Roberts was, for about eighteen days, quite unable to send us information of his movements, although we were everywhere on the very tiptoe of vigilance. The old illusion, regarding the Khyber and the Bolan being the only practicable cross routes into India, having now been dispelled, would it not be perfectly easy under cover of such a screen, to organize a most formidable army and to fall suddenly upon any of our frontier stations when, cut off to the rear by the flooded Indus, and to the flanks by unbridged flooded rivers crossing heaps of piled-up mud called roads, they were complacently supposed to be enjoying the advantages of easy support from India, of good lateral communications, and of an impassable range of mountains to their front? To me, the sonorous phrase "the strongest natural frontier in the world" which has done general duty so long for the John Lawrence school, had lost all significance, since the two days in September, 1862, during which I saw 12,000 men, women, and children and 8,000 laden camels, issue from the Gomul Pass opposite Dehra Ishmael Khan. Only two months previously, a Native infantry regiment, marching along the border, had been detained seven days by impassable roads. To revert to such a frontier even if it were possible to do so without the most cruel treachery to our ally the Khan of Khelat, would be almost as absurd, and less dignified, than to advance to the Oxus.

The measure of the value of our political information as guarding us against surprise, is best given by late events at Candahar, which might have done honour to the sleepy "Native news-writer" at Cabul, whom "masterly inactivity" would have constituted its sole intelligence department, with possibly the equally disgraceful, but politically more dangerous result, of a Maiwand disaster at Bunnoo or Dehra Ishmael Khan.

As, in view of a possible future collision with Russia, and even of a possible future development of the Afghan military power, such a danger is not an imaginary one; and as we are clearly bound to provide India with the strongest possible frontier, it is absolutely necessary, by holding a post of observation behind the screen at Pesheen or Candahar,

to secure for ourselves the remarkable facilities for lateral communication between Cabul and Candahar, while completing the communications along the Punjab border, which for thirty-two years of Lawrence policy we have never attempted to improve. That policy has cut off the Hill tribes from plundering the border; and deliberately cut them off from any means of earning an honest livelihood, by working on the construction of a great bridged road or railroad, which would in itself have immensely strengthened our military position, whilst bringing civilizing influences to bear on the Wuzerees or Afreedees of a very different description to the dispensaries for old women and schools for little boys and girls, the educational durbars, and conservancy conferences, which the district officer on the frontier so dearly loves.

In the face of the more urgent claims of railways to Pesheen, to Peshawur, and to Thul in the Kurrum Valley, a railway along the Punjab border is admittedly not an urgent want. It would suffice for the present, to construct a good bridged road, so as to insure easy communication between the frontier stations, whilst establishing common interests and a better feeling in place of the bitter hatred with which the tribes now regard us. This would prepare the way for the construction and safe maintenance of a future railway which, to use fortification terms, would be the direct connecting link along the curtain between the bastions, of which Pesheen to the south, and Peiwar to the north would be the salients. The whole front of defence would be further connected, by rail to the rear, with Calcutta, Bombay, and Kurrachee; and linked together by a cross line from Ghazee Khan to Mooltan and Lahore. Should Russia's advance, either towards Herat or towards Badakshan, require the precaution, the frontier railway, and its connecting link from Dehra Ghazee to Mooltan, should be completed in time to enable us to concentrate, as needed, to the north or to the south, or at the mouth of any of the very numerous passes which pierce the Suleyman range between the Khyber and the Bolan.

If this be a reasonable scheme of defence for the no very distant future when India takes her place as a great continental power, the Lawrence policy is responsible for having neglected so long to civilize and conciliate, by the most efficient means, the tribes who command the whole connecting line of direct lateral defence. Further, by taking the Indus Valley Railway over the river at Sukkur, and thereby deliberately ignoring the requirements of an occupation of Candahar, and of railway defence for the Punjab border, the Lawrence policy has irretrievably weakened our whole system of defence. Had the railway been taken to Dehra Ghazee and thence to Mooltan, the Kusmore embankment would have covered and supplemented the railway, and safely thrown off

unchecked the Indus floods over the left bank. The unbridged line to Sibi would then have been perfectly reliable, a large section of the Punjab border railway completed, Upper Scinde would not have been ruined by floods and the cost of bridging the Indus and Sutlej saved. Does "masterly inactivity" in this case mean internal improvement?

As we can force the Khyber when we like, there would be neither sense nor science in entangling ourselves at Lundi Kotul, and in a formidable defile. With a railway to, and a garrison at, Thul, we could hold the whole country up to the Peiwar; the valley to Thul being so open, that a railway could be easily made and protected. Kurrum has so many decided advantages, that the Afghans should not be allowed to return to it. The location of a garrison at Thul, which would completely command the Cabul Kheyl Wuzerees, and the back of the Afreedee and Orockzaie country, agrees well, on engineering grounds, with the proposal for a bridged road, and ultimately a railroad, down the Punjaub border; as the best and shortest line from Kohat to Bunnoo, passes through Hungoo and Thul, and thence down the Kurrum River. The Peiwar could be occasionally inspected by British officers from Thul, just as Thul has been visited for many years back from Kohat; and from it, diversions could be made against Cabul and Ghuznee, or against the Teerah Afreedees, in connection with possible operations towards Candahar, or towards forcing the Khyber.

A long experience as an explorer in Afghanistan and on the Punjab border, as a military engineer with Frontier expeditions, and as a civil engineer constructing roads in the Himalayas, has convinced me that, for military or engineering purposes in mountainous countries, the reports of untrained Natives are perfectly useless and unreliable. I believe therefore that the line of the Upper Indus, where between Karatagheen and Gilgit the frontiers are not 300 miles apart, is *quoad* Russia our most vulnerable point in India; and that, notwithstanding all Native reports to the contrary, the passes from Badakshan and Wakhan into Chitral, if not easy, are perfectly practicable.

I consider therefore that, for the present, having shown our power and moderation most conspicuously in Afghanistan, as compared to the poor appearance made by Russia in abandoning the Ameer Shere Ali, we can well afford to give the Afghans another chance, by retiring from Candahar in the spring. I believe that by retaining Pesheen, Bhoree, and the Peiwar, with complete railway communications in our rear, with an available military road from Mithunkote into Pesheen, with a good cart road or railway along the Punjaub border, we will dispel any illusions the Afghans may yet entertain as to our relative powers, whilst practically showing them how little we desire to interfere with their indepen-

dence. Russia will be thrown back on the line of the Upper Indus for any fulfilment of her somewhat problematical designs upon India by the knowledge of the enormous power we could concentrate from north and south, by road and by rail on to the plateau of Southern Afghanistan; and by a consideration of the immense distance and comparative disadvantage under which an attack on the Lower Indus, *via* Herat and Candahar, could alone be delivered. If, in carrying out the military and railway programme for the retention of Pesheen, the Afghan War of 1878-80 should succeed in thus localizing and confining the weak point of our frontier *quoad* Russia to the line of the Upper Indus, it cannot be considered to have been barren of results.

For all present purposes of Afghan or Frontier politics on the line of the Upper Indus, the onward move to Thul, the completion to that point and to Peshawur of railway communication, with a bridged road along the Punjaub border, is all that is required. Should events develop the possibility of a collision with Russia on this line, the construction of a frontier railway, linked into Mooltan by bridging the Indus and the Chenab, would complete our scheme of defence, and enable us to concentrate the whole strength of British India on one point at Peshawur, by two independent railway systems. May it not be worth considering whether a European military colony in Cashmere and Hazarah might not immensely strengthen our position in that quarter, whilst helping to solve some important social questions in India, and doing away with some of the expense and difficulties which short service and the abolition of a local European army have brought in their train? With this suggestion, which may be a fit subject for discussion by the East India Association, I now conclude this lecture on the retention of Candahar, and the defence of the North-west Frontier.

The CHAIRMAN then invited gentlemen present to address the meeting on the subject of Colonel Browne's valuable paper.

General ORFEUR CAVENAGH said he must preface the few observations he was about to offer by remarking that even those who might not agree with the gallant lecturer must confess that they were greatly indebted to him for the able manner in which he had treated the question, and for the very interesting information he had afforded. As regarded himself (the speaker), he could only say that the lecturer had formed an opinion similar to that which he had expressed in a paper published some months ago, in which he urged the retention of the Pesheen and Kurrum Valleys as our frontier. His argument was simply based upon general experience and general principles, whilst the lecturer

had the advantage of local and engineering knowledge upon which to base his reasonings, and consequently to make them much more cogent and forcible. At the same time, there were two points on which he was somewhat at issue with Colonel Browne. One was the proposal to pay to the Afghan ruler a subsidy in acknowledgment of his sovereign rights over the Pesheen Valley. Now, he considered that it would be unwise to recognize in any way those sovereign rights over the country to be held by British troops, although it might be good policy to pay an annual subsidy, receiving a *quid pro quo*; a subsidy not based on a political treaty, but granted under a simple commercial agreement to the effect that so long as our trade and traders were protected and relieved from heavy exactions or prohibitory duties in Afghanistan, the stipulated sum of money should be paid; that upon any interference, however, with our trade, or attempt at imposition, there should be a suitable reduction, or, if deemed proper, a total cessation of the subsidy. The next point upon which he somewhat differed from the lecturer was a military one. It was relative to the giving up of the Khyber Pass.\* He (General Cavenagh) was of opinion that it was not advisable, for political as well as military reasons, to surrender the command of the Pass and Jellalabad Valley. He did not consider it necessary to have a large force beyond the Khyber, but a brigade supported from Peshawur would be ample. Those who were disposed to talk of the necessity for a large force he could not forbear reminding of events that had taken place in the previous campaign, when our troops were armed with only the old musket. Did they forget the defence of Jellalabad, when 2,000 men held their own against the whole army of the Afghans, and ultimately defeated them? Looking to what had been done, he believed that a small force, well posted, would be sufficient to maintain a position beyond the Khyber, whilst the Pass itself should be guarded by a militia formed from the neighbouring tribes, and made responsible for its protection. In such a force discipline need not be very strictly maintained, nor need its existence entail a very heavy expense; but it would have the effect of securing the Pass, and at the same time, as the Sepoys would, as far as practicable, be kept under the command of their own chiefs, enable us to bring a civilizing influence to bear on the tribes through the means of their members thus employed.

General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM said that while he thanked Colonel Browne for his interesting lecture, he could not at all agree

\*N.B.—It is presumed that, in the event of another Afghan War, the Pass would be scientifically defended, and consequently would not be carried without great loss.

with the soundness of his propositions in advocating a withdrawal from Candahar, and taking up the line of the Khojak and Khoja Umra Range, eighty miles back, with the view that from thence we should again advance on Candahar if our new position were threatened. Such a circumstance will assuredly arise, when we shall find that an advance will require a very large force, and will involve a far larger sacrifice in men and money than would be incurred if we stood fast at Candahar, to say nothing of the loss of character and *morale* which the abandonment of that city will involve. (Hear, hear.) The advantages set forth by Colonel Browne for its abandonment are all nullified by the timidity of the measure. (Hear, hear.) It is a retrograde step which will encourage our enemies and discourage our friends, and the result will be a complication which will not only upset all our relationships with tribes who otherwise might be friendly, but will force us to advance under immensely increased difficulties; or, more probably, under the retiring spirit, will induce us to retreat further, which will end in still greater difficulties. A character for courage and manliness is our charter for holding India. (Hear, hear.) We have a great empire to maintain; antagonism to this empire, and danger to it, have sprung up in Afghanistan, and we must face them and overcome them. Our troops under General Roberts have proved themselves equal to any emergency, and that same energy must be maintained until we prove to the Afghans that we mean to carry out our ascendancy in Afghanistan. The more emphatically we undertake this great task the less blood and treasure it will cost. He confessed that he did not see that spirit active at present, but he trusted that it might be roused, for upon it depended that character for indomitability upon which our rule in India rests. The *Times* said, the other day, that the future relations of India and Afghanistan involve the interests of millions of our subjects, and must determine the development of one of the most important regions of the world. Can we hold aloof from this settlement with impunity, and leave it to be arranged by our antagonists? If we do, it will be the first step to leave Russia and Persia master of the situation. England does not seem alive to her position in India. It is beset with danger—only a danger because it is ignored. The enemy is pooh-poohed. The might of England, if roused, is quite sufficient; courage and determined counsels will soon set in motion the resources of our great empire; and the more of these means and of our traditional character we call into play the safer and less costly for us in the end. Our ascendancy in Afghanistan will only be obtained by displaying to the Afghans our power. The Afghans would view our scruples about the Candahar people not wanting us, and our consulting the feelings of Abdurrahman, as simply

a subterfuge to avoid facing our difficulties. (Hear, hear.) If we run away from danger, danger will follow us. If we wish to hold India, we must take our part in the events going on, and hold positions which the Natives acknowledge as evincing our ability and determination to control circumstances for the safety of our Indian Empire, whose interests are identical with the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. J. M. MACLEAN (late Editor of the *Bombay Gazette*) said he would like to say a few words on the address which they had just heard, and to which he had listened with great interest. He must apologize for venturing to do this by saying that he could not speak as one having had practical or professional experience in these matters; but he had been connected with India for the last twenty years, and he had taken a deep interest in these questions, and had studied and written much upon them in that time; and that must be his apology for taking part in the discussion. (Hear, hear.) He would first ask the meeting, What is the problem we have to consider with regard to the retention of Candahar? He had seen it stated by a great many people that what India wants is rest—rest from all schemes of aggression of every kind. In reply to that, he would say that there can be no rest for India where there is no military security. Hence it is our chief task to provide that indispensable condition; and so long as we are exposed to danger from Russia advancing and forming combinations of the tribes for the invasion and the plunder of its people, so long shall we have the minds of the people of India unsettled, and so long will there be no rest for our empire there. (Hear, hear.) It is said that that danger does not exist, and that we need not be afraid of Russia. Lord Northbrook, the other day, quoted a remark of Lord Beaconsfield a few years back, to the effect that there is room enough in Asia for both Russia and England; and Lord Northbrook asked, Why, if that was true then, is it not true now? Well, England would be perfectly willing to act upon that view if Russia herself would only show a disposition to act upon the maxim. (Hear, hear.) But what are the facts? We know that Russia is ceaselessly sapping up to the British frontier, that her intrigues are incessant, that when she retires from one point her agents make their appearance in another, and that she only recoils for a time to advance again with greater vigour than before. (Hear, hear.) Admitting that that is the danger we have to face, he would ask, What is the nature of the remedy which Colonel Browne suggests? He says we should withdraw from Candahar and take up a position in the Pesheen Valley. He (Mr. Maclean) knew nothing of the engineering circumstances of the



present line of railway, although he had no doubt there was a good deal in what Colonel Browne had said in objection to it; but it seemed to him that the weak point in Colonel Browne's criticism was the ignoring of the fact that the real base of our operations is the sea, and that we must be dependent upon our communications with the sea to sustain or strengthen our forces in Candahar against any possible enemy. That binds us down to the adoption of a railway from Sukkur to Quettah, and it suggests that, possibly, a mistake has been made in allocating the line of the railway to run from Sibi into the Pesheen Valley, instead of taking the Bolan Pass, because we cannot abandon the Bolan Pass, and we now have to use forces to maintain both lines of communication. Supposing they had the third line suggested by Colonel Browne, look at the cost involved by the further scattering and increase of forces required. For his part, he thought it would be a great advantage if we came to have only one line of communication, and that by the Bolan Pass. When Colonel Browne said that we should then be trusting too much to the Beloochees, we cannot forget that they have been steadily faithful to us in trying circumstances, and that we are bound to stand by them. The Bolan Pass is a great trading route, and it will be much to our advantage to construct the railway up that Pass, or as near as possible. If there are engineering difficulties in the way, our engineers will know how to overcome them. Our great object should be to get Candahar within five weeks' journey from London, as might be done by this railway; and when that is accomplished, you have the best security from aggression on the part of Russia or any Central Asian Power. (Hear, hear.) He objected to Colonel Browne's proposal to evacuate Candahar, and he regarded the trade reasons for its retention as of great importance. Candahar has been for ages one of the principal points on the chief commercial highway of Central Asia; it is in one of the most fertile districts, and still supports a considerable population. It has been ruined by the rapacity of bad governments. Establish settled government there, and you will renew its prosperity, and restore the natural fertility of the province. M. Vambéry and others have told us that there is scarcely a tent or a hut in Central Asia which does not possess articles of Russian manufacture; and if we want to compete effectively in trade with the Russians, we must push our way as far as we can into Central Asia to do it. It is surely better for us to remain at a well-known market like Candahar, with a great population, than to retire into Pesheen, leaving a big mountain frontier between us and the districts in which trade can be successfully carried on. It seemed to him that the same objections to Colonel Browne's

proposal might be raised from a military point of view. Colonel Browne says it would be cheaper for us to stay in Pesheen, and that we should not then offend the susceptibilities of the Afghans by occupying their country. But would they not be as much offended by our stay at Pesheen, with the additional disadvantage that we should have given them greater facilities for combining against us? What was the lesson taught by the recent operations in Southern Afghanistan? General Phayre was unable to advance for six weeks after the defeat of Maiwand; he could not get transport. Where should we be if it were necessary to advance upon Candahar again, supposing we have no railway to carry our troops, and no fortified position held by a strong force? We should be as badly off as ever, with no General Roberts to come to the rescue from Cabul. He confessed he thought they might just as well retire altogether as keep Pesheen. The tribes might combine and league with Russia, and come down upon India through one of the passes without our Pesheen force knowing anything of it, for there is no lateral communication from the Valley with the Kurrum and Khyber Passes. So that upon all grounds, military and strategical, as well as commercial, he did not think there would be any advantage to be obtained by retiring to Pesheen; we should be better behind the Indus altogether. (Hear, hear.) It is often urged that so much has been done by the victories of General Roberts to impress the Afghans with a sense of our power, that it will not be necessary for us to again interfere in their affairs. He was far from sharing that opinion, but believed that if we were now to retire from Candahar, the chief events which would remain impressed upon the minds of the Afghans would be the murder of our agent at Cabul, the sacking of the city before the eyes of the British army encamped at Sherpur, and the siege of Candahar after the defeat of a British army. (Hear, hear.) The abandonment of Candahar would be universally interpreted by them as a sure mark of timidity on our part, and an acknowledgment that we cannot overcome them in open warfare. (Hear, hear.)

Sir ALEXANDER ARBUTHNOT had listened with great interest to Colonel Browne's lecture. He was not prepared to express a decided opinion on the question of the permanent retention of Candahar, but he was convinced that if that question should be settled in the affirmative, the occupation should be limited to a military occupation, and should not include the assumption of the civil administration, and of the revenues of one of the richest provinces of the Ameer of Cabul.

General MACLAGAN said there were two parts of Mr. Maclean's

speech which he desired to notice. Mr. Maclean had observed that Persia, with support from Russia, may be expected at some time to make an attempt upon Southern Afghanistan, and that if our most advanced position is in the Pesheen Valley, as proposed by Colonel Browne, we should be leaving Candahar open to the invaders. This is to take a very low view of our capacity, political and military. It implies that Persia, backed by Russia, would be allowed to come on unopposed, or without our knowledge. If we suppose them to reach a position within as short a distance of Candahar on the west as we should be on the east, we are to conclude, according to this view, that they would have the advantage of us, and we should be unable to meet them. Mr. Maclean had referred to the importance of our maintaining and strengthening the confidence of the people of India in our power; but such an admission of inferiority and feebleness would not do much to raise the opinion entertained by the people of India of our power to hold our own and protect them. And we are not prepared to admit it. Then, Mr. Maclean had supported his low estimate of our powers by reference to the recent great delay in the movement of General Phayre's force, which, he thinks, shows what would happen if, when stationed in Pesheen, we wanted to advance on Canhahar. Well, the delays on the occasion referred to were, as we all know, very distressing and disappointing. The troops under General Phayre had not been provided with the means of moving readily. But the condition in which that force found itself when a speedy advance to Candahar was desired is not to be considered the normal condition of a force placed in such a situation as that which the lecturer had proposed. And the loss of time on that occasion need not be taken to show what is likely to happen in the case of our watching Candahar from Pesheen. It is an essential part of the arrangement proposed by Colonel Browne that the body of troops stationed there should be always in readiness for forward movement. Those who have some acquaintance with the troops of the Punjab Frontier Force, and their arrangements with respect to this matter, know how, on many occasions, regiments have been able to start within six hours of receiving their orders, to go out to check or punish a marauding raid, and have with rapidity accomplished the work required of them. The force occupying an advanced position such as that which Colonel Browne has suggested, would be kept provided with the necessary means of transport, in readiness for active movement. And if we are asked to look at the unfortunate delay of General Phayre's Division, we feel equally entitled to point to the rapidity and success of the march of General Roberts.

General Lord MARK KERR, who considered that Candahar should be retained, adverted to the alleged difficulty of recruiting our forces for service, and pointed out that it was a fact that in this region, and on our line of communication with India, we could raise as many Native regiments as we pleased. With a due proportion of English troops, there was, therefore, no need to transfer unwilling Sepoys to join them; besides that, a more liberal treatment would make the Sepoys very willing. Both these courses are open to the Government of India. This seemed to dispose of Sir Alexander Arbuthnot's objection. The other remark he would make in agreement with a previous speaker, Mr. Maclean: in India we cannot step back; there is no retiring. Sermons might be preached upon that solemn fact, but the truth could not be gainsaid. (Hear, hear.)

Rajah RAMPAL SINGH expressed briefly his opinion that the balance of argument was in favour of the retention of Candahar. A strong position had been acquired, and if it would give security to India against attacks from without, it would be a mistake to abandon it. The able lecturer himself admitted that Candahar was a point of immense strategical importance, and conceded also that if we were at war with Russia aided by the Afghans, it would be very foolish to give it up. Having gained a position so valuable, it seemed to him to be unwise to shut their eyes to the probabilities of the future by retiring to the line advocated by Colonel Browne, only to be obliged to return thither at the first alarm. (Hear, hear.) As to one other point, which had been rather overlooked by preceding speakers, he considered there was much to be said in favour of handing over Herat to Persia, and assisting the latter to suppress the marauding tribes in the neighbourhood, who are now able to distress the Persian frontiers with impunity. It should be remembered that Herat at one time belonged to the Persians, and that but for our intervention Persia would have held it again. Seeing that we cannot hold Herat ourselves, it is better to allow it to pass to some authority who will have power to enforce order and relieve the Heratees from the temptation to raid and marauder. On the other hand, Persia will feel under obligations to us, which may be turned to useful purpose at some future time. The Persians say, and with great apparent truth, that they cannot deal effectively with the troubles in Khorassan; but that could secure a ready means of access to the locality *via* Herat. In fact, the cession of Herat to Persia would be a wise step, not only in our own interests, but in those of Persia and Herat itself, and in the interests of peace, progress, and civilization.

throughout a wide district now desolated by constant rapine and lawlessness.

Colonel WOOD said he had but a few remarks to offer. It had been said by a former speaker that it would be difficult to provide a Native army in Afghanistan; but he should recollect that in our first war there we subsidized large armies of Afghans, and surely we could do the same if we retained Candahar. Then, the financial point had been brought forward, and it had been said that expenses would be enormous; but he wished to remind the meeting of former days, when we had the civil conduct of Cabul on our hands, and managed to pay expenses both civil and military. He asked, why not again? He happened to know a little about Afghanistan; not from service there himself, but through his son, a major in the Engineers, who died a short time ago in India. He was permitted by the Grand Duke Constantine to accompany the Russian expedition into Central Asia, and was the only British officer who accompanied that force, and afterwards published a book advocating the idea of Russia and England coming to some friendly understanding as to the joint occupation of Afghanistan, as he considered there was ample room for both countries civilizing the different tribes without disagreeing. That might be so, if experience had not proved that no reliance could be placed on Russian promises; therefore, it would be folly to trust the safety of India to any such policy. During the thirty years he (the speaker) had served in India every émeute or disturbance that had occurred was always attributed by the Natives to Russian emissaries endeavouring to undermine the feelings of the Natives against the Government; and he believed that if we gave up Candahar, the Natives of India would put it down to fear of the Afghans and we should invite all hostile to our government to rise against us. The retention of Candahar was, in fact, an insurance against Russian intrigue, and would add to the security and tranquillity of India.

Lieutenant-Colonel BROWNE, in replying, alluded to General Cavenagh's remarks, who had asked him to remember the defence of Jellalabad in 1842, as illustrating the ease with which we could hold the Khyber. He did not, however, think that in 1880 we were in any way dependent upon the experience of 1842 for a knowledge of what our difficulties would be in entangling ourselves in a mountainous country amongst Afghan tribes. He had no doubt we could hold the Khyber; but he saw no advantage in doing so, as the whole of the Khyber positions could be turned from the Peiwar for nine months in the year. A little vigilance on the part of the Peshawur political autho-

rities could always prevent the Khyber being fortified without our knowledge; and experience had shown that we could force the Khyber if we wished to do so. The Umbeylah campaign of 1863, in which we suffered so severely, illustrated how serious were the difficulties connected with the maintenance of a British force in an isolated position beyond the frontier; and the only advantage of holding Lundi Kotul would be that, besides having to pay large sums to the Afreedees as subsidies, we would have to maintain, at Peshawur, a large force ready at a moment's notice to move to the relief of Lundi Kotul whenever the tribes thought fit to annoy us. He thought General Cavenagh's suggestion regarding a trade subsidy being paid for Pesheen an exceedingly good one. With reference to the remarks by Sir George Malcolm, Colonel Browne did not understand why it should follow that by holding Pesheen we should be obliged at some future day to reoccupy Candahar "under immensely increased difficulties." It seemed to him, on the contrary, that if we had at some future time to reoccupy Candahar, we would do so "with immensely increased facilities," from having established ourselves securely within eighty miles of it, and with complete railway communication with India in our rear. A skilful engineer designed a bridge so that it should be as little strained as possible by its own weight, and have as much surplus strength as possible to meet the probable rolling load. If he so designed the bridge that it suffered severe strain from its own dead weight, the bridge was badly designed. Similarly, if we could minimize the strain on all the resources of India by keeping to Pesheen instead of going on to Candahar, our scheme of defence would be skilfully designed, as it would give us complete command over Candahar at the least cost and strain on the army and revenues of India. Mr. Maclean had laid great stress upon the proper base for England being the sea. That was a self-evident proposition which no one would deny; but he (Colonel Browne) quite failed to see how the fact of having an alternative marching line to Pesheen from Rajanpur, in any way took us away from our base on the sea. He had, in the paper under discussion, pointed out that our main line of communication would be the railway from Kurrachee, *via* Sukkur and Sibi, to Pesheen, but that if, from natural or political causes, the railway from Sukkur to Pesheen were interrupted, the alternative marching line would come into use; and troops and stores, landed by sea at Kurrachee, could be sent by rail just as readily, and practically almost as fast, to Kahnpur, on the Indus Valley line, as to Sukkur, and could thence start by the Bhorree Valley route, which was just as dependent on the sea as its base, as the more convenient railway route by Sukkur. He could not see how, by

having two routes instead of one to a railway in direct communication with the sea, we were in any way abandoning our base on the sea. In one important respect, however, the proper base for England was not always the sea; and that was as a recruiting-ground for Seikhs, Dogras, Goorkhas, and Rajpoots, who, with due respect to the Bombay Army, would not be undesirable allies in an encounter with Russia in Southern Afghanistan; and who would certainly not come up from the sea at Kurra-chee, but more probably from Mooltan and the Punjaub. Mr. Maclean and Sir George Malcolm appeared to think that the Russians on the Caspian would be as near Candahar as we would be if occupying Pesheen. This appeared to him to be to place a very low valuation on our political and military resources—to be, indeed, looking at the power of England through the large end of the telescope, and at the power of Russia through the small end of the telescope. He, of course, assumed that a garrison at Pesheen would be provided with proper carriage, and that it would not be denuded of carriage as General Phayre's force had been; and further, with a railway extending from India to Pesheen, such delay could only occur from the grossest mismanagement—a factor in bringing about disaster which we cannot well provide for, and which recent events would lead us to suppose is just as likely to assert itself whether we occupy Candahar or Pesheen. Mr. Maclean said he could see no reason why we should not trust the Beloochees entirely and keep to the line of the Bolan, as our engineers could, no doubt, make a railway up the Bolan if it were absolutely necessary. Mr. Maclean is evidently unaware that the Murrees and Bhoogtees, who plundered the whole of the railway stores and a lakh and a half of rupees on the new railway line on the very first rumour of the Maiwand disaster, were pure Beloochees, and subjects of the Khan of Khelat; and that these very tribes, who attacked our escorts and murdered a number of our camp followers on the first opportunity and first appearance of disaster to our arms, can and do plunder along the whole line of the Bolan just as easily as along the proposed line of railway from Sibi to Pesheen. Mr. Maclean's condemnation of adopting more than one military and political line of communication does not support the usually-accepted wisdom of the proverb regarding not putting all our eggs into one basket. Our engineers could, no doubt, make a railway up the Bolan; but, *ceteris paribus*, it was a huge financial and engineering mistake to adopt on a railway bad gradients and sharp curves, if they could be avoided, particularly on the first section of what would probably be the main Indo-European railway—to reserve to ourselves gradients up which a locomotive could draw a train of 200 tons, whilst providing Russia, at the other end of the line, with

gradients up which the same locomotive could draw 500 tons; to say nothing of diminished dividends from extra wear and tear of stock and plant, on greatly-increased original capital cost. As to the view held by Mr. Maclean regarding Pesheen having no lateral communications, it need only be said that, as a geographical fact not admitting of discussion, Pesheen had twelve outlets, at least, whence its garrison could strike, by good military routes, at practically every point of the compass, and at every important town and district in Afghanistan and Beloochistan, including the Khyber and Kurram. He could most strongly corroborate everything stated by Sir Alexander Arbuthnot as to the enormous importance of retaining as few Native troops as possible in Afghanistan. He could from his own experience attest the loathing and horror with which our Native troops, before the breaking out of the war, regarded the prospect of a turn of garrison duty at Quettah. It was, further, a significant fact, that the portion of the garrison of Quettah which most detested the place, and expressed their aversion most openly, were our Pathan troops, Zuzufzaies, Khuttucks, and Afreedees, although at the time no cause of dissatisfaction existed on patriotic or religious grounds. On account of this aversion of our Native troops to garrison duty in Afghanistan, he thought too great importance could not be attached to having our Afghan garrisons in direct railway communication with India, and to the fact that by holding Pesheen, we would save to thousands of our Native soldiers the terrible trial to their discipline which they had hitherto manfully withstood, but which it was our duty to remove as much and as early as possible. He should be very sorry to think that anything he had said in the lecture should be ascribed to any personal feeling against Lord Lawrence, with whom he had never, either privately or officially, had any relations whatever. In common however, with almost every Public Works officer who had served on the border, he felt very strongly what a grave mistake had been made in neglecting to provide great and long-continued public works for giving employment to the frontier tribes, which would have been incomparably more powerful civilizing agencies than the petty dealings, by the medium of corrupt Native go-betweens, between the district magistrates and the tribes, which were honest and well-meant attempts at doing good, but had practically done nothing whatever to lessen and to leaven the mass of barbarism on the frontier, which was more bitterly hostile to us now than it was thirty years ago. In finding fault with a system which had brought about such results, he hoped it would not be supposed that he was actuated by any personal feeling whatever for or against Lord Lawrence. He quite agreed with Sir A. Arbuthnot in placing a much higher value upon our prestige



amongst our Indian fellow-subjects than upon our prestige amongst the Afghans, which he thought comparatively unimportant. Our retirement from Candahar would not give our Native troops the impression that we were too weak to hold it; but they would, after the repeated defeats we had inflicted on the Afghans, return to India and talk with a swagger, in their villages in the Punjab, in Oudh, or Kangra, or Nepaul, how they had taken Cabul and Candahar; and how they would go back and do it again if the Afghans did not behave themselves. He thought our prestige amongst our Native troops had been immensely improved by the events of the late war; and that the fear of Russia, with which the Indian populations had been so generally credited, existed much more in the Presidency towns than amongst the martial races of India. The view expressed by Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, that the deportation of Yakoob Khan was a political mistake, was confirmed by the opinion expressed by an old Afreedee contractor, who, on seeing Yakoob Khan leave Cabul under escort for India, told one of our officers, "There are two parties at Cabul—one for, one against, Yakoob Khan; the Jacobins and anti-Jacobins. Yakoob is the fulcrum of the balance on which the two parties balance each other; neither daring to attack you for fear of the other party combining with you to crush them. Now Yakoob Khan is gone, both parties will combine against you, and there will be a grand row." Surely enough, a few days after Yakoob's deportation, a general combined rising drove us into Sherpur, and plundered Cabul under the eyes of our soldiers. Abdurrahman having now had a fair start, he (Colonel Browne) thought Abdurrahman's best chance of popularity amongst the Afghans consisted in our liberating Yakoob Khan, and thus freeing Abdurrahman entirely of the stigma (a fatal one amongst Afghans) of being a nominee and *protégé* of the Feringhees. Lord Mark Kerr had remarked that the recruiting difficulty in holding Candahar could be got over by raising troops in the country itself, and from among the Afghans. He would not say anything that might hurt the feelings of some of the officers present at that meeting, but there was not a shadow of doubt that the whole experience of the last two years, as of the first Afghan War, pronounced most decisively against trusting Afghan soldiers to fight their own countrymen. Afghans made good soldiers, but for years to come, our garrisons in Afghanistan could, with prudence, only consist of Indian troops recruited in India. Rajah Rampal Singh advised the retention of Candahar on the ground of prestige and of strategical position. On the latter ground opinions differed, and he (Colonel Browne) had endeavoured to show the special strategic advantages of Pesheen. On the ground of prestige, he was

rather doubtful whether the inhabitants of India would care to pay additional taxes for the mere object of securing a very doubtful and shadowy prestige, when they did not much appreciate additional taxes levied for internal local improvements. He thought that, as stated by the Rajah, Native opinion in India would, in general, be favourable to the cession of Herat to Persia. Colonel Wood's remarks about the danger of showing the white feather expressed a sentiment which was, no doubt, very laudable in the abstract, but which, as Colonel Wood applied it to our retention of Candahar, might be made to mean that true courage consisted in getting into an unfavourable military position and remaining there to keep up one's prestige. As to Colonel Wood's proposal of making Afghanistan pay the expenses of its military occupation, as he stated had been done in our first war in 1842, he (Colonel Browne) had always been under the impression that the Afghan War of 1842 had cost the Indian exchequer at least 15,000,000*l.* sterling. We now governed India at something like five times the cost per square mile to what we did in 1842; and, in the same manner, the cost of all military operations was so enormously increased that all comparisons founded on financial data collected in 1842 were pretty certain to be entirely misleading. In conclusion, he would remark that he had on several occasions heard it stated that the want of supplies in Pesheen was in itself sufficient to condemn it as a point of concentration for a large body of troops, such as might be required to overawe and capture Candahar. As such a concentration has already twice been effected, under Generals Stewart and Phayre, when we had no roads, no depôts, no railways, why take the pessimist view that with cart roads all over the country, supplies stored in every fort, and a complete railway system in our rear, we would run any risk of the starvation to which we had never yet been exposed under vastly more unfavourable circumstances? He (Colonel Browne) had had the good fortune to capture the vernacular returns showing the taxes paid in wheat and produce from Pesheen to the Ameer Shere Ali; and from the knowledge so obtained, and from having had to feed troops in almost every part of Pesheen, he affirmed that our troops in Pesheen had never yet run the risk of running short of food, and that, even without a railway in our rear, such a risk was entirely imaginary.

The CHAIRMAN, in closing the discussion, said: In the excellent lecture to which we have just listened, two questions seem to me to stand forth of chief importance. The one is the selection of the best place for us to hold on what I may, in a rough way, call the high table-land of Afghanistan; the other is the line or lines of communication to be provided and guarded leading from that selected site to the plains and

the railway system of India. On each of these questions I would like to say a few words. We are probably all agreed that the Soliman range is really a screen which effectually cuts off India from Afghanistan. We can see but a little way into it—we cannot see through it at all; and yet behind it much might be happening of the utmost importance for us to know. It is in consequence, very necessary for us to maintain a suitable garrison on the Candahar side of the range; and the question before us this afternoon is, should it be posted at Candahar, or eighty miles nearer India, at Pesheen? Colonel Browne prefers Pesheen, and has stated his reasons fully—reasons which cannot, it seems to me, be controverted. I may sum them up in a general way by saying that at Pesheen the difficulties and risks of all kinds are much less, and that, in consequence, you may occupy it at a much smaller expense than you could Candahar; while a garrison there would quite answer our present purposes, and leave us free to reoccupy Candahar at any time, or to make any other forward movement that circumstances might seem to call for. The strategical importance of Candahar is as against an European enemy advancing from the West. But then there is no such enemy at present; and if we wish to be on good terms with Afghanistan, our lecturer has shown that we had very much better keep clear of Candahar. Colonel Browne estimates that it would cost 2,000,000*l.* a year more to hold it than to garrison Pesheen instead. This is a large sum to save. A good share of it will be wanted to put our lines of communication with India on a proper footing, and this is all the more reason why we should make the saving while we can. Wherever we may plant ourselves, our real business at present is to perfect our communications; and to this question I would now turn. The railway from India must in any case pass through Pesheen; about that there seems to be no question. Colonel Browne has shown that the present surface line through Scinde cannot be counted on during the rainy season. For two or three months in every year railway communications between Pesheen and the Indus may be cut off. In consequence of this state of affairs, he urges that an alternative line is quite essential, and he shows that by his position in the Bori Valley, with the force necessary for the protection of the railway, the alternative line he requires can be secured. It would be a road from Pesheen traversing the Bori Valley, which is now known to be wide and open, and rich in supplies, and passing on either to Dehra Ghazee Khan or to Mithunkote. Here, then, is a complete project, and it may be said of it with confidence that it is the cheapest possible. But can we wisely rest satisfied with a railway line which may be useless for months at a time? I do not see how

we can. The necessity for a thoroughly efficient railway between the Afghan and Indian cannot be too strongly insisted on. It is altogether too serious a matter to allow us to deal with it in a half-hearted way. During the last two years we have heard enough of the difficulties of transport in these regions to bring home to us that we are bound during the times of peace which are, we hope, before us, to place the railway communication between India and our position on the Afghan highland on such a footing that we shall know for certainty that when the strain of transporting and supplying an army is thrown upon it it will be equal to the occasion. With anything less than this we ought not to be satisfied. The last matter Colonel Browne deals with is the defence of the North-west Frontier. He presses the importance of providing a good bridged road along its whole extent, which might be eventually developed into a railway linked on to the existing lines at each end. He would also push on the Calcutta and Bombay trunk lines of railway from Lahore both to Peshawur and to Thul. In these views we shall probably all, in a general sense, concur. I would say, however, that it has always been allowed that a good road along the frontier is much wanted, and that if the present road is not all that could be desired, want of cash is to be blamed, and not want of good will. And as to a railway if one be ever constructed, it should not—and in this Colonel Browne concurs—be placed on the frontier road which lies along the exposed bank of the Indus, between it and the hills; but on the left bank, where the river intervening would protect it from all danger. Colonel Browne says that in some respects Lord Lawrence's frontier policy has failed. Well, absolute perfection may not be claimed for any policy. Especially, he thinks, strongly, that many valuable opportunities of making friends with the independent tribesmen were lost by P. W. officers having been prohibited from dealing direct with them, by their having been required to use the Civil officers as middlemen. No doubt this was a damper, and in case of men with such special qualifications as Colonel Browne possessed, it is much to be regretted that the prohibition was not relaxed; still, as a question of general policy, it cannot, I think, be doubted that some restriction on the action of our energetic frontier officers generally was necessary, and is so still.

On the motion of Sir GEORGE BALFOUR, M.P., a cordial vote of thanks was given to the gallant Chairman, and the sitting then terminated.



JOURNAL  
OF THE  
EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

---

Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, C.B.,  
R.C.S.I.

ON the 27th of January last, the East India Association lost one of its most valued supporters in General Le Grand Jacob. He possessed all the courage and ability of his renowned cousin, General John Jacob, of the Sindh Horse, but with a more genial disposition. He was the youngest of ten children of John Jacob, of Roth Court, near Cardiff, and was born April 24, 1805. In 1815, the family moved to Guernsey; and five years afterwards George Le Grand Jacob went to London, and became a pupil of Dr. Gilchrist, the well-known teacher of Urdu. Next year he sailed to India as a cadet, and Sir Alexander Burnes was one of his shipmates. He soon passed, at Bombay, in Urdu, Maráthí, and Persian. His regiment was the 2nd Grenadiers, and he served against the Bhils, in the jungles, north of Khandesh. Subsequently he served in Kachh and Akalkot, and in 1831 went to England on furlough, and was appointed Staff Officer at Addiscombe. In June, 1835, he married a sister of the Bishop of Guildford, and sailed again for Bombay. His wife died on the voyage, and he himself all but died. On his recovery he was appointed to the political line, and was second assistant to the Political Agent in Kathiawar, where he did good service, and proved himself a good rider and courageous sportsman. When the rebellion, which broke out in Kolhapúr, in 1844, and extended to Sáwantwadi in 1845, Le Grand Jacob distinguished himself at the storming of the forts of Mansantosh and Manohar, and led the assault. He was severely hurt by a huge stone rolled down on the assailants by the enemy, and, as he lay stunned and motionless, was saved and carried off by Lieutenant (now General) F. Schneider.

After the insurrection was crushed, and Jacob had restored Sáwant-wadi to order, he was promoted to the higher post of Political Agent in Kachh, and was subsequently deputed to Sindh to investigate the case of Mir Ali Murád. After concluding this duty, he went on a tour to Java, China, and Sarawak, in Borneo, where he met Rájá James Brooke. He went on to Australia, and was wrecked on his return voyage in Torres Straits. In the Persian Campaign he commanded the Light Battalion; and when that war was over, was sent by Lord Elphinstone to Kolhapúr, where the 27th Bombay N.I. had mutinied, and for his services there he received the thanks of the Governor. In 1859 he returned to England, with a broken constitution. He had been created a C.B. for his services in Persia, and he now received the K.C.S.I., honours, which hardly sufficiently rewarded his long and noble service. He was a true friend of the people of India, and thought he could not testify his friendship better than by the warm support he gave to this Association.

### Major-General Sir Vincent Eyre, C.B., K.C.S.I.

THE East India Association has lost a most valued member and supporter in Sir Vincent Eyre, who died at Aix-les-Bains, in Savoy, in the middle of last September. He was born in 1811, and was the third son of Mr. Henry Eyre, of Bath; his mother being a daughter of Mr. J. Concannon, of Loughrea, in Galway. Like many of his family, he was destined for a military life, and having obtained a cadetship, entered Addiscombe College, from which he came out, in the Bengal Artillery, in the year 1828. He was one of the officers in the English Army which garrisoned Kabul in 1841; and his wife, a daughter of Colonel Sir James Mouat, was with him when the Afghan insurrection broke out on the 13th of November, when Brigadier Shelton was sent to dislodge the Afghans from the heights of Behmaru. Their cavalry broke through our force, but Lieut. Eyre brought up his Horse Artillery gun into a gorge, whence he soon cleared the plain, which was covered with the enemy's horsemen. His conduct on that day mainly contributed to the victory. On the 22nd of November, Lieut. Eyre was in command of a Horse Artillery gun, with Major Swaine's column, and was severely wounded in the hand. His house was much exposed to the enemy's fire, and cannon balls were picked up close to the verandah. When the Afghans demanded, in exchange for the hostages, all the married men and their families, they unanimously refused to risk the safety of their wives and children, except Lieut. Eyre, who said that if it was for the public good, he would stay with his wife and child. He accordingly remained, and was one of the

captives, and suffered much from fever. He afterwards served in Burmah, but it was during the Indian Mutiny that he most particularly distinguished himself.

In the year 1857 Vincent Eyre was a Brevet-Major of the Bengal Artillery. He had acquired reputation as a soldier and a military historian, and had been selected to organize and command the Artillery of the new Gwalior Contingent. He had been to England on sick leave, and returned to command a company of European gunners, with a horse field battery of six guns, with which he was sent to Burmah, but was recalled when the Mutiny broke out, and arrived at Calcutta with his sixty European artillerymen on the 14th of June. On the 10th of July he embarked with his men in a river flat, and was tugged up towards Alláhábád. He arrived at Dinapúr on the 25th of July, the very day the native regiments mutinied there. He offered his services to General Lloyd, but next day was allowed to proceed to Buxar, where he learned that the Dinapúr mutineers had marched upon Arrah. He immediately resolved to relieve that place. Having procured 100 men of the 78th Highlanders from Gházipur, he returned to Buxar, and found 160 men of the 5th Fusiliers had arrived there, under Captain L'Estrange. He then sent back the Highlanders, and marched with the men of the 5th, fourteen mounted volunteers, and thirty-four gunners with three guns, in all 198 men, upon Arrah. On the 2nd of August he put to flight a large body of the insurgents, and made his way to the Railway Works, in the direct road to Arrah. Here he fought a second and more severe action with the rebels, but, having no subaltern with him, was obliged to direct the fire of his guns, while at the same time commanding the whole force. After a furious conflict with a force twenty times outnumbering his own, he drove the enemy off the field, and relieved the heroic garrison of Arrah. Arthur Scott, who had just come from the Redan, said that the fire of the rebels at the battle near Arrah was hotter than at the Redan itself.

On the 15th of August Eyre took and destroyed Jagdespúr, the stronghold of the rebel, Kuwar Singh. He subsequently commanded the Artillery at Lakhnau, and closed his career in India as Inspector-General of Ordnance. He was married, a second time, to his cousin, daughter of Captain Eyre, R.N., who survives him.

### Lieutenant-General Colin Mackenzie, C.B.

IN General Mackenzie the East India Association has lost another valued member. He died on the 23rd of October, at Edinburgh, aged seventy-three, having been born in 1808. He entered the Army in

1826, and served with General Lindsay's column, in Coorg, in all the actions of the campaign of 1834. In 1841, he led the advanced guard at the storming of the Khurd Kabul Pass. He was with Sir W. Macnaghten when he was murdered, and was previously wounded on the 23rd of November. He was one of the captives, having been given up at the special demand of Akbar Khan. He was twice sent, disguised in Afghan dress, to negotiate with General Pollock, and distinguished himself in the storming of Istalif, in September, 1842. In the campaign of 1848-49 in the Punjab, he raised and commanded the 4th Sikh Light Infantry. His services in India repeatedly obtained the thanks of Government.



*Education in India : a Case for Enquiry.*

---

PAPER BY THE REV. JAMES JOHNSTON.

---

READ AT THE MEETING HELD IN THE ROOMS OF THE ASSOCIATION,  
THURSDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 5TH, 1881.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HILL, K.C.S.I.,  
IN THE CHAIR.

A MEETING of the members and friends of the East India Association was held in the rooms of the Association, 20, Great George Street, Westminster, on Thursday afternoon, May 5th, 1881; the subject for consideration being an address delivered by the Rev. James Johnston on "Education in India : a Case for Enquiry."

Major-General Sir WILLIAM HILL, K.C.S.I., occupied the chair, and amongst those present were Sir Thomas McClure, Bart., M.P.; Lady McClure; Mr. George Palmer, M.P.; General Maclagan; Major-General J. Puckle; Colonel James Browne, R.E., C.S.I.; Colonel R. M. Macdonald; Captain W. C. Palmer; Captain Ross; Rev. Samuel Dyson, D.D.; Rev. J. Long; Surgeon-General Balfour; Dr. Vincent Ambler; Dr. Hinckes Bird; Mr. C. W. Arathoon; Mr. Hamid Ali; Mr. George Bain; Mr. Robert Bain; Mr. C. N. Banerjee; Mirza Peer Bukhsh; Mr. Dolatras Surbhai Desai; Mr. Alexander Fowler; Mr. Lockhart Gordon; Mr. P. Pirie Gordon; Mr. Arthur Howell; Mr. James Hutton; Mr. William Lockhart; Mr. O. C. Mullick; Mr. B. Palchondhuri; Mr. A. C. Sen; Syed Mohamed Habib Ullah, &c., &c.

The CHAIRMAN, in opening the proceedings, said the subject they were assembled to consider was one of the greatest possible importance in relation to the future of India; and it was a subject which had en-

gaged the careful attention of a Council here in London and in Edinburgh for more than a year past; and officers and gentlemen, who have been in all parts of India, have proffered their counsel, advice, and experience on the problem. The facts and arguments which would be submitted by the Rev. Mr. Johnston, as well as those included in a memorial which was presented to Lord Hartington about a month ago, were so cogent as to justify the hope and expectation that a great change in the Indian educational system must soon take place. The great object of those who are moving in the matter might be briefly stated as the spread of education throughout India. That was not the case at present; the money, to a large extent, being spent upon one class of individuals—those who sought the higher education of the colleges. Yet it was twenty-seven years ago that, in a Despatch under the hand of Lord Halifax, the Government expressly announced its intention to regard first the elementary education of the people, leaving higher education, as soon as possible, to be supported by voluntary effort. The Government, at that time, recognized the utter impossibility of carrying on the vast undertaking of both high and elementary education amid a population so enormous; and they elected to give chief attention to the spread of elementary instruction among the people. The Rev. Mr. Johnston would show how these pledges and instructions had been disregarded since the publication of the Education Despatch of 1854.

Mr. JOHNSTON then read the following address:—

Time turns the tables on the venerable nations of antiquity. For a nation like England, which could boast of no books more venerable than those of Bede or Arthur, to speak of teaching a people who boasted of a golden period of literature thousands of years before Chaucer, was adding the insult of the assumption of wisdom to the injury of the assertion of power.

It is no matter of surprise that our first attempts to introduce the literature and science of Europe to a country like India, was resisted as an insult by a hereditary *literati* of great antiquity. It was a reversal of the order of nature—a sun-rising in the west.

The modern learning of Europe was not only humbling to the pride of the learned class, it was offensive to the prejudices of the people. Indian literature was not only venerable from its antiquity; it was sacred in its origin and associations, and attractive from its fanciful, or, as we might call it, fantastic character. Its hold upon the religious feeling and imagination was deep and strong.

To give up a literature and history stretching back to an age when

the supernatural heroes played their part on the human stage, for a hard and fast record of facts, where all is brought down to the common experiences of every-day life, and even the flights of the poet are limited to the range of the actual, or possible—a cosmogony in which the gods played such a conspicuous and personal part, for a system built up by cold inexorable law, from which the caution of “the Company” had shut out a presiding deity; to accept of science, a new study, with its strange nomenclature and questionable discoveries, at variance with their old beliefs, and turning up by the roots the foundations of their religions and the seats of their gods,—was hard to be borne by a proud and exclusive *literati*, who saw in this new order of things a revolutionary system which would abolish the long-established distinction of caste, and raise the despised pariah to the level of the privileged Brahmin.

But the serried phalanx of stubborn facts could not be resisted by the light infantry of Eastern fancy, and India is now more willing to submit to the science and learning of the West than to yield to the power of her conqueror.

When Englishmen in India found leisure for any pursuits beyond those of commerce and war, it seemed at first as if Indian literature were to engross all our attention, and that we were to be the pupils and not the teachers. The novelty of the disclosures in this vast and newly-discovered storehouse, and the æsthetic and even moral beauty of some of the passages dug up in works reputed of such great antiquity, carried our Orientalists off their feet. All other literature, classical and sacred, was lightly esteemed in comparison with these venerable records of an early age; and the sages of Greece and Rome, as well as Moses and the Prophets, might be thankful if they got off with no graver condemnation than that of being of later date. They were often spoken of as imitators, if not plagiarists, from these ancient stores of primeval knowledge.

But the truth began to dawn as the search went on, that while there was much of unquestionable antiquity, and many precious truths and beautiful passages to be found, the labour of searching for them was like the healthful exercise of fox-hunting—the best part of the reward. The results were hardly worth the toil, and the discovery was made that all was not ancient that was venerable, and all was not worthy of veneration that was ancient; and it was discovered that some of the most valuable treasures found in this mine were like the old coins hid by Dr. Dousterswivel in the ruins of St. Ruth—put into manuscripts to tempt the antiquaries. Even men like Sir William Jones could not escape the imposition of the skilful forgers of documents and ideas of which he was known to be in search.

The successors of these early explorers have been much more cautious and successful in their researches, and have, by careful and critical translations, put the English reader in a position to assign to Indian literature its proper place—a place of importance, though not of pre-eminence.

When the East India Company was compelled by Parliament to depart from its traditional policy, and to devote a portion of its revenue to education, the Oriental tendency came out in a new form. Colleges were set up for teaching the Natives their dead languages, literature, and laws; and in 1813, 10,000*l.* a year was set apart chiefly for this object. The Court of Directors sent out specific instructions, which are worthy of record as a sample of the views then prevalent:—

We are informed that there are in the Sanskrit language many excellent systems of ethics, with codes of laws and compendiums of the duties relating to every class of the people, the study of which might be useful to those Natives who may be destined for the Judicial Department of Government. There are also many tracts of merit, we are told, on the virtues of plants and drugs, and on the application of them in medicine, the knowledge of which might prove desirable to the European practitioner; and there are treatises on astronomy and mathematics, including geometry and algebra, which, although they may not add new light to European science, might be made to form links of communication between the Natives and the gentlemen in our service who are attached to the Observatory and to the Department of Engineers; and by such intercourse the Natives might gradually be led to adopt the modern improvements in those and other sciences.

Not only were we to benefit by the knowledge we would gain from the Natives of India in the departments of medicine, astronomy, and mathematics; even in the matter of general civilization we were to sit at their feet as docile disciples. In an admirable report to the Indian Government, the following passage occurs:—

It is remarkable that, so far from thinking that any measures for the enlightenment of the people of India ought to be originated in England, the general tenor of the evidence of the old Indians was that any such measures would be in the highest degree dangerous, as illustrated by the meeting at Vellore, and that the people of India had little to learn on the score of morality from England. Indeed, Sir Thomas Munro did not hesitate to declare his conviction "that if civilization were to become an article of trade between the two countries, England would be the gainer by the import cargo."

But these things are all changed now-a-days, and it is possible that the rebound from Oriental to Occidental methods has been carried too far in some directions. In 1833, on the renewal of the Company's Charter, a clause was inserted requiring that not less than 100,000*l.* be expended on education, and the imparting of European learning was clearly indicated as the great aim of the Home Government. A keen conflict was at once raised in India as to the sciences to be taught, the man-

ner in which they were to be taught, and the medium through which they were to be imparted. The war of the languages continued for many years, until Macaulay came to the aid of the Anglicans, and by his famous Minute of 1835 completely silenced the Orientalists, and established the English language as the grand medium for communicating instruction in the higher departments of education.

Education in India was not established on anything like a national system until the Despatch of 1854 was sent out. This great charter for the education of the people was the outcome of a long Parliamentary inquiry, by which important information was gathered from every possible source and all classes of informants. It was part of a great measure for India, introduced and carried through Parliament by Sir Charles Wood, the present Lord Halifax, whom every friend of India rejoices to see enjoying his well-merited honours in a green old age, as warm in feeling and active in mind as when, in a five hours' speech of singular clearness and force, he kept up the interest and carried the convictions of the House of Commons more than a quarter of a century ago.

As President of the Board of Controul, Lord Halifax laid down the lines on which the Education Despatch of 1854 was to be drawn up; but we have heard him say, with that genial respect for the talents, and delight in the success, of their juniors, characteristic of men who retain in advanced life the freshness of youthful feeling and intellect, "The credit of drawing up that Despatch is due to Lord Northbrook, who was then acting as my private secretary."

We cannot measure the share of each, but we can appreciate the merit of a work which is as clear and minute in detail as it is broad and comprehensive in its principles. The highest tribute to the merits of the Despatch and its illustrious authors is that, after more than a quarter of a century of trial, the warmest and wisest friends of education in India desire nothing more than to see its provisions faithfully and fully carried out. This, we regret to say, has not been done. Let us glance at its leading features, and see how its rules have been applied.

In our present lecture we confine ourselves to the narrower definition of education in its professional aspect. We leave out of account all those many-sided agencies which are indirectly but powerfully tending to the education of the Natives of India. A strong and righteous government, a pure and impartial administration of justice, a comparatively honest and thoroughly earnest spirit of commercial enterprise, science applied to the construction of railways and telegraph lines, the measurement of the land, and the culture of the soil—these and many other influences are all helping on the education of India, as was lately shown in an able lecture to a cognate society by Sir Richard Temple.

The most important feature of the Despatch is that its first and great design was the elementary education of the body of the people. This runs through the whole Despatch. We quote only one paragraph. After referring to the higher education "of those who desire a liberal "European education," it is added in paragraph 41 :—

Our attention should now be directed to a consideration, if possible, still more important, and one which has been hitherto, we are bound to admit, too much neglected—namely, how useful and practical knowledge, suited to every station in life, may be best conveyed to the great mass of the people, who are utterly incapable of obtaining any education worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts; and we desire to see the active measures of Government more especially directed for the future to this object, for the attainment of which we are ready to sanction a considerable increase of expenditure.

In giving a summary of the Despatch, in a Return to the House of Commons in 1870, Mr. Arthur Howell, then Acting Secretary to the Home Department of the Government in India, in his first sentence, says :—

The main object of the Despatch is to divert the efforts of the Government from the education of the higher classes, upon whom they had up to that date been too exclusively directed, and to turn them to the wider diffusion of education among all classes of the people, and especially to the provision of primary instruction for the masses.

Now what do we find after twenty-six years of the operation of the Act? Has the elementary education of the humbler classes been the great aim of the administrators of the Act? Have their efforts, and the funds at their disposal, been directed specially to the education of the poor? Far from it. Hear what Mr. Howell, in the Return referred to, says :—

At a time when there were not 12,000 pupils altogether in the Government colleges and superior schools for general education in all India, the framers of the code were of opinion that the efforts of Government had been too exclusively directed theretofore to the higher classes, and that all that then remained for Government to do for these classes was to establish universities to complete the educational machinery in each Presidency. After the establishment of universities, it was stated that "we shall have done as much as a Government can do to place the benefits of education plainly and practically before the higher classes of India."

After copious extracts from the highest authorities, Mr. Howell goes on to say :—

These extracts seem to show that until the State has placed the means of elementary vernacular education within the reach of those who are unable to procure it for themselves, an annually increasing Government expenditure in any province upon "the higher classes, who are able and willing in many cases to bear a considerable part, at least, of the cost of their own education," is not in accordance with

the main object of the Educational Code, nor with the subsequent views of the Home Government.—*Return to the House of Commons*, 1870.

Speaking generally, then (he goes on to say), elementary education is one of the points in which the full intentions of the Educational Code have yet to be carried out.—*Ibid.*

If that could be said in 1870, it may be said in 1880 with much greater truth. Instead of 12,000 in colleges and high schools, there are now *twenty times that number* in high and what are now called middle schools, which are equal to the high schools of '54. By last report they are returned at over 290,000; and general colleges, which in 1854 only numbered fourteen, with a few hundred students, are now returned at ninety-three, including medical, engineering, and Mahomedan colleges, with 7,194 students. Of these forty-eight are "general."

We do not under-estimate the value of the higher education, nor do we desire the facilities for a collegiate course to be beyond the reach of those capable of benefiting by it; but we do object to the disproportionate amount of money expended on the class who are now receiving the highest education, at such a trifling cost to themselves, and at so great an expense to the State. The colleges alone cost Government more than 100,000*l.*, while colleges and high schools receive as much as is set apart for the elementary education of all the millions of India.

Of the small sum of 750,000*l.*, set apart from the Imperial Treasury for education in the whole of India—a sum miserably inadequate to the wants of the country—the higher education gets the lion's share. After deducting the sum spent on the staff of directors and inspectors, with all their office and necessary expenses, which are common to all departments of educational machinery, we find that the higher department receives the sum of about 300,000*l.*, or more than a third part of the entire sum voted; while to the lower only about 100,000*l.*, less than a seventh, is given from the Imperial Treasury. These sums are augmented by fees and "fines in both" cases, and in the elementary department by a "cess" and "grants from municipal bodies" to the extent of about 300,000*l.* a year—an essential condition to a national educational system, but, in this case, a hardship to the poor, when we take into account that so large a portion of the Imperial revenue, to which they are the chief contributors, is given to educate the richer few for lucrative appointments.

The needless extravagance in the higher department of education is shown by the following figures taken from Parliamentary Returns:—

"Even if we add those who had passed the F.A., or First Arts examination, at the University of Calcutta, costs the Government Rs. 805, and in those of Madras and Bombay more than Rs. 1,200, while candidates from aided colleges cost less than a fourth of that sum."

Upwards of 90,000*l.* per annum is expended for the education of about 3,500 undergraduates of the richer classes for lucrative appointments, a sum nearly equal to that set apart from the Imperial Treasury for the elementary instruction of the millions of the poor in all India. The sum set apart for elementary instruction does not yield *twopence* for each child of school age, or about *one farthing* a head of the population.

For the best collegiate education under high-class professors from Oxford and Cambridge, the richest Native in India only requires to pay in fees; in Calcutta, 14*l.* 8*s.* per annum; in Bombay, 12*l.*; and in Madras, 6*l.* The same pupil costs the Imperial Treasury, in Calcutta, 20*l.*; in Bombay, 54*l.*; and in Madras, 37*l.* per annum; while of 3,500 undergraduates thus educated at the expense of the Government, not 1 in 10 takes the degree of B.A., and only 1 in 62 the M.A. degree.

We leave our readers to calculate the cost of each B.A. and M.A.

While we would not lower the standard of education in the high schools and colleges, or withdraw it from the regulative control of Government, or deprive it of substantial State aid, we would give the Indian community, both native and resident, more power in the management and a greater share in their maintenance. This of itself, as was pointed out by the Duke of Argyll when H.M.'s Secretary for India, would be an excellent educational process for the richer classes of Indian society, making them feel their responsibilities, and teaching them to share the burdens of that higher education which they value so much, and to diffuse the benefits of elementary instruction to their less favoured brethren. Nor would we grudge the large sums devoted to the higher education, were it not that it leaves so little for the more needy class, who, as the Despatch says, "cannot help themselves."

If we look at the rate at which the elementary education of the country is carried on, it will be found to be so slow that it is a matter of great doubt whether the education of the body of the people will ever be overtaken if we do not mend our pace. It is usually said that there are now about 2,000,000 of children in India under instruction, leaving out of account the *indigenous* schools, which, in the present form, are allowed to be unworthy of any place in an educational system. The 66,000 institutions, with 1,877,942 pupils—the number given in the Government abstract—must be taken *cum grano*, we may say, with two or three grains of salt. First of all, it includes 23,261 "unaided schools," with 358,710 pupils, which the directors of public instruction admit to be, in the vast majority of cases, thoroughly unsatisfactory. This reduces the number to 43,946 Government and aided institutions, with 1,519,232 pupils on the roll. Many of these are not satisfactory, especially in regularity of attendance, the average attendance being only 1,179,217. The population of British



India is said to be 191,000,000. If we take the proportion of school age at one in six of the population, as is done in this country, this would give 31,000,000 who ought to be at school; and in India, by comparing the birth and mortality rate, there are more children of what we would call school age than in Europe. But allowing for the diversity of habits in the East, let us say only one in seven, and we have in British India 27,000,000 of children of school age, and there are not more than *one million and a half on the roll of Government and aided schools, and little more than a million in regular attendance*, and, on the most liberal allowance, under 2,000,000 in schools of all kinds which can be even named in a Government return.

But, it may be said, are we not making rapid progress? Let us see. It is more than a quarter of a century since our present system was set up, and if we were to allow that the entire number of 1,519,000 was clear gain—that there was not a school or scholar prior to 1854, which is far from being the case,—that would still be only an increase of 60,000 pupils per annum for twenty-five years. At this rate, it will take 450 years to overtake the population, even if it were to remain stationary all that time.

But we shall be told that the rate of increase is in geometrical, not arithmetical ratio. So is the increase of the population. Apart from all addition by conquest, of which we hope we have seen an end, the birth-rate in India is far ahead of the death-rate. The rate of increase by births, under our peaceful rule, is more rapid than in England. The population of England is doubled in about seventy-two years; that of India is said to be doubled in a much shorter time.

In looking at the Government returns, we find that in 1854 the population of India was estimated at 143,000,000. It is now not less than 191,000,000. This would give 7,000,000 more children of school age in 1880 than in 1854; so that, even allowing that 2,000,000 more were under instruction now than then, *it leaves a vast number more of uneducated children in 1880 than in 1854.*

The present state of education in India is as follows:—

Sum voted annually from Imperial revenue for education, about	... ..	£750,000
The population of British India to be educated		191,351,049
Number of children of school age, reckoning only one in seven of the population	...	27,335,864
Pupils attending Government Institutions	... 678,653	
"    "    Aided Institutions	... .. 846,783	
"    "    Unaided Institutions	.. 286,912—	1,812,348
Children of school age for whom no provision is made	...	<u>25,532,576</u>

Number of Educational Institutions of all kinds	...	...	63,624
Average number of square miles to each Institution	...	...	14
Number of pupils to each <i>thousand</i> of population	...	...	9

Provision is made in England for 15 in the *hundred* of the population.

The fact is, that at the rate of increase for the last quarter of a century, the education of India seems hopeless. By mathematical rules it may be proved that the school rate of increase will overtake the birth rate. But the calculation will carry us into the vast depths of an uncertain future. Population has got the start, and a stern chase is proverbially a long one. It may be calculated as in school days we found how far a hare would run before it was overtaken by the greyhound. But in this case the illustration must be reversed; population, with its long but slower stride, is to be caught up by education in short but more rapid bounds. If we make the calculation, we shall find that it will take, not centuries, but *thousands of years, before education overtakes population in this great race*: a dark prospect for India, and a worse outlook for England.

Let it be distinctly understood that in what follows we do not disparage the work of the Government in the education of the people. We know the difficulties they have encountered, and we gratefully acknowledge the good work they have done. Be it also understood that, in comparing the present with the past, we speak of absolute numbers apart from all comparison, and desire to arrest attention on unquestionable facts. The educated classes have been increased by the Despatch of 1854 nearly fiftyfold—a great and noble work in itself. But let us see what remains to be done.

Compare, then, for a moment, the birth and education rate of increase.

The increase over the whole of India is not exactly ascertained, but we can form an estimate from certain known portions. According to the highest authority we can quote, Dr. Hunter, Director-General of Statistics for the Government of India, the rate of increase in Bengal was *threefold in a century*. In a lecture before the Philosophical Institution, in Edinburgh, he is reported to have said: "In Bengal the population had increased not by one-third, but by threefold. The land which had to feed 21,000,000 in 1780 had in 1880 to feed 63,000,000." And again, "Dr. Hunter showed that during twenty-five years, ending in 1878, the population in Madras Presidency had increased one-half."

We do not presume to question the accuracy of Dr. Hunter's statements, but we are content to take a much lower figure, and accept the estimate of the officials in the India House. They give the rate of increase at 1 per cent., a low one when compared with the above, or even

with the known rate in England or Scotland. In the former, the population doubles itself in seventy-two years; in Scotland, in seventy-four. We shall assume that India only doubles its population in a hundred years. This estimate is more than borne out by the Census returns. In 1857, the earliest statistical abstract at hand, the population of British India was given at 143,585,789; in 1875, it was 189,613,238; and the number remains at about the same figures in the returns awaiting correction by the census to be taken this year. To avoid the possibility of exaggeration, let us take the population in 1854, when the Despatch on Education came into force, at 140,000,000. At 1 per cent. this gives an increase of 1,400,000 a year. Taking one in seven as the school age, we have 200,000 added every year to the number needing instruction. But the rate of increase in schools has been only 60,000 a year, leaving 140,000 added every year to the untaught masses. It thus appears that, by the lowest calculation, there are in British India THREE AND A HALF MILLIONS MORE UNEDUCATED CHILDREN IN 1880 THAN THERE WERE IN 1854.

If we take the Government returns of pupils and population, it will be found that the numbers outside all schools have increased by much more than this. In 1857, with a population of 140,000,000, there were about 200,000 in average attendance at school, and about 20,000,000 outside. In 1879, with a population of 191,000,000, there were 1,500,000 in regular attendance, and 25,500,000 outside.

Let it not be supposed that we say that ignorance is on the increase because we have shown that the number of the ignorant has increased. There is now a much larger circle of light. We have only shown that the outer circle of darkness is larger also. That inner circle does not permeate or partially light up the surrounding darkness; its brilliance only makes the darkness appear more dense and dismal.

A distinguished friend of education, formerly an Under-Secretary, now one of Her Majesty's Commissioners in the Central Provinces, says, referring to the claims of the elementary or the higher education: "It is not till you get far away from the influence of Calcutta and Simla that you really appreciate where the larger claim is, and how large it is, "The dense ignorance of the masses is not to be imagined or even described. It is darkness that may be felt. Let me give you a common instance, familiar to every district officer in these provinces. Every year, almost, nature avenges herself by epidemics, chiefly cholera, on the filthy habits of the rural community. Now, what do the rural communities then? The first step is to take a man or woman who has died of cholera, and bury the corpse in the public tank or reservoir. Then, if the disease continues, a village conclave is held, and some old woman

"is pronounced a witch and the author of the disease. She is then led out and solemnly beaten to death with bamboos. Then the Government steps in and, of course, hangs the murderers. But this is like killing a single mosquito in the Sunderbunds, instead of draining and clearing the jungle. If we are to prevent such crimes, of which I could give other instances, we can only look to education."

Other evils arising from ignorance are well brought out by Dr. William Hunter, Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India, in his able lectures before the Philosophical Institute, Edinburgh; as, for example, the impoverishing of the ryots, who are kept in a state of chronic penury by their unnaturally early marriages, their reluctance to emigration to other countries, or even to migrate to less populous or more fertile portions of their own, by their inability to appreciate improved agricultural implements or methods of husbandry; and, as a result, 40,000,000 of the population do not get two full meals a day, and never know what it is to be free from a sense of hunger; while with a proper distribution of the people, and even very moderate skill in agriculture, the soil would produce more than enough for all.

One consideration lays on this country a special responsibility to educate the people—that it is our strong and peaceful rule that makes the rapid increase of the population possible, so as to exceed the ordinary supply from the soil, by preventing internecine wars or desolating invasions, which formerly kept the numbers down, under Native rulers or former conquerors.

Even the administration of justice makes education more of a necessity under English rule. It enables the money-lenders—those necessary pests of the poor—to lend more, though, perhaps, at a little less exorbitant rate of interest, because they can make sure of repayment, and that without lessening their profits, by a bribe to the judges, who will compel payment with all the terrible certainty of inexorable law, and if the poor ryot cannot meet the bond which he signed without being able to read, he will be evicted from his ancestral patrimony, and cast out among the landless class—a fate which could not have befallen him, except in rare and exceptional cases, under the old Native governments. But we cannot enumerate, nor do we need to enlarge on the evils of ignorance before such an audience.

We would now ask what prospect there is of our overtaking and dispelling this darkness? Only by a vastly greater effort than we have been making hitherto. By geometrical ratio, schools and pupils increased rapidly at first under the Education Act of 1854. From 1857 to 1866, allowing three years for organization, they rose from 8,490 institutions with 190,856 pupils to 18,563 institutions with 590,217 pupils in average

attendance, *trebling the number of scholars in nine years*. And had this fervour of early zeal, under the able and disinterested management of members of the Civil and Military service of the Government been kept up, there would have been hope for the education of India. But the management has got into other hands. Education has become a bureaucracy, and, like other bureaus, it is steadily settling down into a self-contained, self-satisfied, if not self-aggrandizing system. Government, neither in India nor in England, has any proper department for its superintendence and control. It is a fragmentary part of a large department which has other onerous duties to attend to, too important and importunate to be put aside for educational work, which can be left over and attended to, in a way, by men whose professional work it is, and who can carry it on indefinitely, and satisfactorily to themselves, as a bureau.

We are far from intending these remarks to apply to all. There are noble examples of disinterested devotion to the cause of popular education found in the ranks of directors, inspectors, and professors. It is the general policy and practice of which we complain. It is all the more to the credit of these men that they rise above the influence of the system and the class of which they form a part. The framers of the Despatch of 1854 never meant the management to get from under the strict and vigilant control of Government. To expect men whose speciality was the higher education to give their chief and most earnest attention to the lower, would have shown little knowledge of the ordinary laws of human nature. To ask professors to perfect their collegiate system, and then, as soon as they had shown the higher classes how to manage such institutions for themselves, to hand them over to local management, or to give way to a rival college, as the code requires, would have been like asking an Englishman to perform the *happy dispatch* practised by discredited Japanese officials—a process he objects to amid the mists and fogs of his own country, much more under the bright sky of India, with a good salary and the prospect of a pension.

This change of management is not the result of any law or plan; it is the result of the tendency of human institutions when left to themselves, and the members of the educational bureau in India are no more to be blamed than the members of any other bureau. They have the idea that the grand panacea for India is the higher education of which they are themselves both the representatives and ornaments, and they tell us that education will descend from the higher to the lower strata of society. They look upon learning as a liquid, and society as a gravelly soil, through which it will percolate as naturally and gently as the rain from heaven. They forget that ignorance, when general and of long duration, as in India, is a stiff clay which needs the ploughshare and a

powerful motive force to break it up. They ignore the lessons of experience, and seem unconscious of the facts which lie before their eyes.

The question may naturally be asked, Why is it that the policy of Government, so clearly and uniformly expressed in favour of elementary instruction, has not been carried out? We give a partial answer in the words of an interesting and valuable report prepared for the lamented Lord Mayo, who longed to see a generous measure for the education of the poor in full force. It is said, p. 61: "But so strongly opposed is this view to the traditional policy of the preceding forty years that it has not as yet in any province been sufficiently realized. Why it has not been realized is a difficult question, only to be approached *per ignes suppositos cineri doloso*. It is not that the educational policy prescribed from England has been directly opposed; it has simply not been carried out,—partly, I venture to think, owing to the strong tradition of former years, and partly, perhaps, owing to the direction given by the Educational Departments, recruited, as a rule, by men of English university distinctions." In another place it adds, significantly, "While no one will regret its growth, all will admit that the system should be watched and directed, lest, instead of being a grant for education, it may become a grant to maintain the so-called vested interests of those engaged in education." We find an interesting illustration of the homely adage, "There's nothing like leather," in a fact quoted in a Government Report. It is well known that the University of Bombay is based on the classical model of Oxford, while that of Calcutta is formed on the more scientific and mathematical type of Cambridge; the reason being that it was an Oxford Professor who went out as the first Principal of the Bombay College, and a Cambridge man who went to Calcutta; and each, like a true-born Englishman, could think of nothing better for India than a reproduction of his *alma mater*. It is only within these last two or three years that Sir R. Temple had a battle to fight in introducing a better course of scientific study into Bombay.

Another important feature of the Despatch of '54 is now practically ignored. It was distinctly laid down that education was to be directly and constantly under the control and direction of the Government. But, unhappily, there is no educational department in either England or India. If an Education Board is considered essential to the working of the educational code in this country, with all the force of public opinion and a vigilant press watching over every part of the country, it is surely much more needful in India. This is well brought out in a recent letter from one of Her Majesty's Commissioners in India. He says: "You

"will remember that there is no educational department attached to the *Government of India*. Educational business is a parergon of the over-worked Home Department—a Department which was, I know from experience, overworked before, and which now must be hopelessly clogged by Lord Lytton's recent abolition of the separate Revenue Department. Again, Lord Mayo's decentralization measure, though admirable in many matters, has not, I think, worked beneficially for education, for it has left the control and direction of education to the several local Governments, whose action is disjointed, dependent on officials constantly being changed, and, what is more serious, never reviewed except by itself, or brought to the light of public opinion, or to any general focus. Hence education in India is, in my humble opinion, drifting mainly at the will of the Educational Departments in each province; and I say deliberately, but with regret, that these Departments, far from being left without strict control and supervision, should be used as instruments only to carry out the declared and recognized principles of the Despatch of 1854. My experience is that the Educational Departments think and care more about the Department than about the education of the people."

As the result of this change of practice in education, while there is no change of policy in the Government, look at the results of later years of the working of the Despatch of 1854. We have seen that in nine years, from 1857 to 1866, the number of pupils multiplied threefold. What is the rate of increase since? From 1866 they only rose from 590,317 in average attendance to 1,153,217 in 1879. *They barely doubled their number in thirteen years.* And on comparing the return of 1879 with that of 1878, we find that there is *an actual decrease* of 25,862 in average attendance, and of not fewer than 65,000 of the pupils on the roll.

I have no doubt we shall be told that this is owing to the famine or some other causes over which the directors of public instruction had no control. But during the nine years in which the number was trebled, the managers of those days had a mutiny to contend with, which reduced their number in 1858 by 40 per cent. We admit there are difficulties in the way, but they can be overcome, and must be conquered if India is to be educated.

In concluding, we ask, When will India be educated by England? We leave the facts we have given to return the answer. We leave our hearers to make the calculation by the data we have given. It is an interesting and vital, but a difficult problem. The solution will impress our readers with the vastness of the subject, and we hope it will lead to a deep sense of the importance of the question we have raised.

One of the most painful and alarming facts we have to record is that, a few years ago, the order went forth that the miserably small sum devoted to education was to be reduced! And retrenchment in expenditure has of late been the order of the day.

It seems a suicidal policy. In a country like India it should have been the last item in the revenue to be curtailed, more especially when the sum set apart for such a large and important work is so trifling compared with the State expenditure. *Three-quarters of a million* for the education of 191,000,000 of people out of a revenue of *sixty millions* a year, is a mockery. Next to the preservation of peace and the administration of justice—if even second to these—education is the first care of a wise Government. The time has arrived for a revival of the educational policy of 1854; 1881 will, we trust, witness a new departure.

There are two great obstacles in the way of any great and decisive action at present. The first is the want of funds, the second the want of information. We hope that peace and prosperity will gradually supply the former, and it will only be by a gradual process that education can increase its claims on the exchequer. The latter should be supplied at once; and we think we have made out a case for inquiry by Government into the working and results of the Education Code in India. It has now been a quarter of a century in operation, and no inquiry has ever been made by Government at all like that to which the East India Company was subjected every twenty years on the renewal of its charter. A return was laid before Parliament in 1870, and "ordered to be printed," but I have looked in vain in *Hansard* and the *Times* for the report of a discussion or a motion. It is not thus the education of an empire should be neglected. India is now on the verge of a great change for the better or the worse; let us at once inquire what can be done for the education of the people—the first step towards her political and social elevation.

We may be met by an appeal to the voluminous records of the India House as sufficient for all inquiries, and I frankly admit that there is in the Education Reports of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Returns which have been laid before Parliament, a most valuable mass of information. Indeed, we may say there is a glut of information of a certain kind, and much of it is both valuable and interesting; but it fails in several most important particulars. First, it is almost exclusively a record of work done, and is too apt to leave the impression, from the minute and voluminous details, that the work is greater than it is. Second, the official character of these reports limits them to a narrow and professional view of the subject,



which greatly lessens their value as a guide to future or extended operations. These records are, in fact, too vast, and seem to a large extent a waste of time and talent, that might be better employed. They have cost me many a weary hour of study, and I have a profound respect for the gentleman in the India Office who condenses the thousands of folio pages into three or four pages of the statistical abstract.

What we want is an outside and unofficial view of this whole question, not a boastful parade of the amount of work done, but a humble, earnest, and comprehensive view of the character of the work, and of what remains to be done, with a careful enquiry into the ways and means by which it may be accomplished.

A solemn responsibility rests on us as the rulers of that vast empire, entrusted to us by a wise and beneficent providence—not for our own advantage and glory, but for the material and moral well-being of the population. And we do not need to prove to such an audience as I now address that the true way to raise a people in the social or political scale is to diffuse the genial influence of a sound and liberal education through the length and breadth of the land, and that as philanthropists we cannot rest until every village and hamlet in India is enlightened and elevated by the diffusion of a healthful literature, as well as the power to read it.

Rajah RAMPAL SINGH said he had listened with peculiar pleasure, and could say that to a very large extent he shared the views of the reverend lecturer. The topic had been most ably handled, and it would be quite impossible, in the limited time allowed to a speaker, to deal adequately with it. One or two points, however, he would venture to remark upon. He thoroughly agreed with the principle that education ought to be spread rather amongst the poorer population than reserved for the culture of the higher classes of society in India. Speaking from his own personal observation, he knew that in a great many instances the gentlemen who went up for the higher examinations were men of means, who did not require Government aid. Indeed, many of them proved this sufficiently by undertaking at their own cost the expense of a voyage to Europe to continue their studies still further. Nor was it only in this respect that the poor of India were placed at a disadvantage in respect of Government education. The course of instruction was chiefly, if not wholly, in English. To give the people greater educational facilities instruction books should be in the vernacular—(hear, hear)—and schools in villages and towns should be provided with them. At present the only thing the child learnt in the village

school was his own dialect and a very few of the rudiments of education—no mathematics, no arts. Then, too, it should be remembered that too often the higher education was destructive to the well-being of the students themselves. Having learned the English language and culture they became indisposed to return to the fields and the labours of their fathers, but remained to fill the crowded ranks of those who vainly sought literary or Government employment. Undoubtedly ignorance was the great bane of India, and had brought many evils upon the country; but there were evils also in an injudicious system of high education. Incidentally he might say that, ignorant as large masses of his countrymen were, he could not credit that they could be so foolish as to throw cholera corpses in tanks or beat women to death to cure contagion. Speaking for himself, he would say that when he had the smallpox he was neither allowed to go to a doctor nor send for one, but was allowed to suffer the torture of the disease until nature or death ended the struggle. In conclusion Rajah Rampal Singh reiterated his thanks to the lecturer for his interesting and valuable statement.

Mr. A. HOWELL (Central Provinces) said he had only recently arrived from India, and came to the meeting intending to be no more than a listener to an address upon a subject in which so many engaged in the services of India were deeply interested. However, as the lecturer had, in his able and suggestive paper, mentioned his name more than once in a very flattering way, he would like to say a few words on the subject. The purport of the Rev. Mr. Johnston's remarks was to remind the meeting that in 1854 those who had the general control in England of Indian education sent out a Despatch to the Government of India ordering, distinctly and specifically, a certain course of action. The meeting had been informed that the main author of that Despatch was a man whom all India would remember with respect and esteem—namely, Lord Northbrook. Well, Mr. Johnston urged that the terms of the Despatch were clear and explicit, and yet that as a matter of fact they never have been carried out; and Mr. Johnston's case is that there is room for serious enquiry on this subject. The case might be strengthened by the fact that the Despatch of 1854 was not the only one on the subject. After the assumption of the Government by the Crown a similar despatch was issued by Lord Stanley in 1858; and again in 1870-71 there was a Despatch from the Duke of Argyll confirming the tenour and purport of the two previous Despatches. Mr. Johnston and many others were now asking why these reiterated orders have never been carried out; and there is no question that it is a proper case for enquiry. While Mr. Johnston quoted from the returns of 1870, he of course allows

that since then a great deal has been done, especially in Lower Bengal, a province which in 1870 was very backward in elementary education for the masses. Before any conclusion could be formed in 1881 the meeting ought to know more fully how the facts stand in 1881. Since 1870 Sir George Campbell, when Lieutenant-Governor, had initiated reform in the right direction, and the reform had been maintained and extended by the present Lieutenant-Governor, Sir A. Eden. The same might safely be said of other provinces. In the Central Provinces, for instance, where he had lately been serving, much had been done. The direction in which it was found practicable to get on best with the work of education was to consider the village the unit of government, in which either the Government located its own school or induced some authority there to establish and maintain a village school. Similarly it was found that municipalities can be induced to do a great deal for education, and that municipal committees often display an intelligent interest in the work. For his own part, he looked to the extension of municipalities as a favourable augury of the extension of a practical system of popular education in India. For it must be borne in mind that it is quite beyond the capacity of the Government—however sincere in its intentions—to educate the enormous masses in India. Mr. Johnston had calculated that there are in India 27,000,000 of children of school age; and that is really almost an astronomical quantity. What we should work for is to try to teach the people to educate themselves, leaving the general duty of inspection and direction to Government. It was almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of the subject before the meeting, for, apart from the enormous numbers to be dealt with, there is the inevitable conclusion that if we are ever to develop the resources of India—a point about which we hear a good deal—it must be done mainly by developing the intelligence of the industrial classes. This is what we want to bring out. We do not want more lawyers or more literary men—we want better farmers, better mechanics, and better artisans; and we can only get them by educating the classes from which such men are recruited. We do not want to see the arts and industries carried on in the same humdrum immemorial fashion: we want them renovated and extended by the fresh and educated intelligence of the people, and this, he thought, was the “useful and practical knowledge” which the Despatch of 1854 had in view. This should be the first and main object of the efforts of the Government, and of such funds as could be provided for education. Higher education might be safely entrusted, to a much larger extent than now, to those classes who benefit by it. One other point he might mention as bearing upon the subject of an enquiry why elementary education deserves attention,

although he was aware it was a point of some delicacy and difficulty. It is this: that the higher education, as a rule, has the effect of destroying the religious feeling of the Native who receives it. Coming home from India just now he found an immense deal of excitement about the admission to Parliament of one man who is understood to deny the existence of a God. Then what is to be thought of a Government which is maintaining a number of institutions from which hundreds, and possibly even thousands, of youths are turned out every year who learnt to deride the religion of their fathers, and in many cases to abjure religious belief altogether? Is this absolute religious neutrality the declared and only sound basis of the Government educational policy? On this occasion, however, time would not permit the consideration of the enquiry whether there is not a remedy for this state of things; but it should be borne in mind that elementary education is not subject to the same difficulty, and may, therefore, be prosecuted with more unfaltering zeal. Elementary education would not interfere with the religious belief of the child, who would be constantly at home with his own family, and not, as in the case of college students, removed from home influences and associations. He noticed that the Rajah Rampal Singh seemed inclined to doubt the accuracy of the description of the superstition of those who placed the dead body of a cholera patient in the tank to procure the extinction of the pest. Yet he could vouch for it as a matter of fact; and within his own positive experience he knew that year after year there were instances such as had been described. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Howell concluded by thanking the meeting for the courtesy with which it had listened to the scattered and disjointed remarks which he had ventured to utter.

The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Howell if he thought Native gentlemen with sufficient money would gladly co-operate in advancing education in India.

Mr. A. HOWELL replied he had no doubt that some, indeed many, would. From the interest which he had seen taken by headmen in villages, and by municipal bodies in the establishment and care of schools, he had no doubt that much might be expected from voluntary effort and co-operation; especially for local objects. If the Natives got a school in their own village or town to which they could send their own children, and in the management of which they could take a part, they would certainly take a great interest in education.

The Rev. JAMES LONG said the paper was calculated in one

respect to discourage, in presenting the great difficulties to be encountered in the enormous population, and, above all, the financial difficulties with regard to the Government. He thought, however, there was another element arising which pointed to a more cheering solution of the problem. The day was not far distant when the ryot would not be dependent on the Government or any State grant for education. That time he thought was rapidly approaching. Three thousand years ago there was a village system which pervaded India. That gave the people great power. Each village was a little republic. That system was carried to Europe and extended through Russia and England. It existed in England before feudalism was brought in by the Norman Conquest. It was the principle of that village system that would again enable the ryot to achieve independence and give him the means of educating his family. Then his independence would also give him knowledge. One of the most encouraging things at the moment was that the voice in favour of the peasant was now heard in St. Stephen's, and the feudalism of England was doomed, and the time approaching when the landlord and peasant would unite, each in his own way, to support the other. In conclusion Mr. Long referred to Sir Henry Maine's idea that the peasant and the landlord had beneficial interest in the land as joint property, and said that to this and the revival of this he looked as a measure to benefit the masses of India.

The Rev. Dr. DYSON, after expressing the pleasure Mr. Johnston's paper had given him, proceeded to say it was clear that the Despatch of 1854 had been carried out in a very one-sided way. No doubt attention was given to the higher classes and to higher education; but, as Sir Arthur Helps said, "everything depends on proportion." This had been neglected in carrying out the Despatch, and it seemed now, after twenty-five years' experience, that the result of the disproportion was seen in the character of the class educated, and in the neglect of other classes—the masses. Mr. Johnston had not professed to speak of the results, in all directions, of the education that had been going on during the period which was in question; so he (the speaker) might be allowed a word or two. Those who were familiar with the provinces of India would be aware that since higher education had been spread so extensively, there had grown up a large and increasing class of discontented subjects. In consequence of the disproportion to which he (the speaker) had before alluded, they found numbers of men familiarized with the best of English literature and science, and yet without a sphere for the employment of their talents or information with which they had been, so to speak, crammed. The universities were turning out in-

creasingly large numbers of graduates year by year, and the commercial value of a degree of the University of Calcutta was exceedingly low. The consequence was that large numbers of this class of young men were in the labour market, clamouring for some kind of congenial employment, and were a source of great anxiety to the Government. He (the speaker) thought these men had reason to complain of the action of the Government in continuing this education so long. He knew, however, that if it were proposed to curtail or gradually withdraw from the Government colleges—i.e., colleges managed and maintained exclusively by Government—it would be met by a great outcry in Bengal. All the same he thought it would be in the interests of the people themselves that the Government should loyally attempt to carry out the principles of the Despatch of 1854. He only asked that the Local Government should carry out the declared policy of the superior and Home Government; nothing more and nothing less. He had just said that if the Government were to close the colleges there would be a great outcry, in Bengal especially. He thought, however, the people of Bengal should remember that they had been, for some years past, advocating their own “nationality.” It was not in accordance with that claim that they should be content to receive, generation after generation, this education from the Government. In his judgment, education was something peculiarly national, which a people should be anxious and proud to take into its own hands. When occasion had required, the response from the wealthy classes in India to appeals for donations and subscriptions in support of the higher education had been most liberal, as was seen in the endowments and scholarships in connection with the old colleges and the new colleges that had been opened and largely endowed. Rajah Rampal Singh could speak of colleges endowed in the North-west Provinces; others could speak of scholarships in the Presidency College of Calcutta. Again, reverting to Bengal, Dr. Dyson said there were those among them who were capable of relieving Government from the charge of education, and he appealed to the “patriots” of Bengal to do so in furtherance of that claim they were putting forward to the possession and maintenance of their own national life. He would add one word with reference to the effect of secular education in undermining religious belief. He thought in one respect this secular education was in the interests of morality; an English educated man being generally a more trustworthy man. In one respect, however, this secular education did operate most injuriously. The national feeling—the public sentiment—was in favour of the maintenance of the national religion, and yet there was an almost universal disbelief in its truth among educated men in

all large towns. Now if there was this disbelief, and yet the forms and observances of belief were maintained as a badge of native respectability and under the penalty of social exclusion if neglected, the nation was being subjected to a process which would ultimately kill all religious conscience and all serious regard for religious truth. There were those present who could contradict him if what he had stated was not the fact, viz., that there was a large and increasing class, mainly consisting of the leaders of native society, who still maintained religious institutions and observances, and yet had not a particle of belief in them. This he urged had a deadening effect on their souls, and the question now arises how far the powerful system of education, which has been enforced and paid for by the Government for twenty-five years out of the public revenue, is responsible for it. Surely, at least, the subject rightly demands enquiry.

MIRZA PEER BUKHSH said he would not venture to speak at any length, but he could not allow so able a lecture to pass without expressing his obligations for it. It was a great thing to have the case of his countrymen put so ably; but the lecturer made it more than ever astonishing that the English nation—the most highly civilised in the world—should so long have neglected the great question of the education of India. Only a very small portion of the imperial revenues was given to the work of education of any kind; and only a miserable percentage of the population got any education at all. As stated by the lecturer the population of British India is 191,000,000, whilst the number of those attending colleges and schools of all descriptions is only 1,877,942, or hardly 1 per cent. of the population. The revenue of the country is 65,000,000*l.*, from which the Government gives a grant for educational purposes of 750,000*l.*, or equal to 1.15 per cent. of the revenue. Yet all the while large salaries were given to hosts of officials, and there was a most liberal expenditure of funds upon military armaments and the like; and year by year millions of money were drawn from India for remittance to England. On an average the Government draws about 450,000*l.* per week on India at a ruinous exchange; this amounting in the course of every year to about 23,400,000*l.* This also was going on in a country which, once ignorantly supposed to be very rich, is now known to be very poor; a land where good wages reached 1*d.* a day, and the ryot hungered through life on about eighteen pence a month. Surely it should be for such as these that education should first be furnished, giving them the means by which their extreme poverty might be alleviated. The young gentlemen who passed through the higher education, and even came to England to pursue their studies,

had good claims upon the consideration of the Government, but not in preference to or exclusion of the claims of the masses of the poor. As a remark had been made upon the subject of religion, he might be permitted to say that he thought it should be carefully separated in India from the course of secular education. The British clergymen who first introduced European education in India early found that the suspicions of the people were quickly excited on this subject, and that they were afraid to send their children to schools where their religion would be interfered with. There were some persons who advocated the keeping of the people of India in a state of utter ignorance, and who prophesied the downfall of British rule as the consequence of popular education. But this was surely a narrow-minded idea: for the provision of a popular system of education would secure the regeneration of India and a restoration of its prosperity; and an India educated and prosperous could not be disloyal.

General MACLAGAN said there were some points in the remarks made by Mr. Howell to which he desired to draw attention. Mr. Howell had rightly observed that the chief aim of our educational efforts in India must be to encourage the people to educate themselves. This, in fact, is one of the principal objects of the Despatch of 1854, to which reference has so often been made. To stimulate and help local effort is repeatedly stated to be the great purpose that should be kept in view. The spirit of nationality, among the people of any part of India, as had been well remarked by the gentleman who spoke on the other side of the room (Dr. Dyson), had often been exhibited in various ways, but had not often taken a very practical form. Here was a practical form which it was much desired that it should take. It was stated in the Despatch of 1854, and has been repeated since, that the Governments in India should be prepared to retire from the direct management of schools and colleges at any place where they are satisfied that similar education can be given in institutions under local management. Where the people show the sense they entertain of the value of education for their children, by establishing efficient schools for themselves or by being prepared to take over charge of the Government schools, the Government will aid with grants towards the cost and cease to keep up their own institutions. This is an arrangement greatly to the advantage of the Government as well as of the people. None are more directly interested than the Government in carrying it out, when the educational wants of the place are thereby well provided for. The expenditure in the form of a grant in aid is much less than the cost of the Government institution, and money is thus saved to Government and made available



for other purposes. When the Government of India is blamed, as it sometimes has been, for not proceeding more rapidly in this direction, to act on the instructions of the Despatch, it may be concluded that there is some reason for this, and that the desired step would be taken, and the money saved, if the arrangement could be suitably carried out with due advertence to the wants of the people and the duty of the Government. Mr. Howell, in his remarks on the effects of the higher education in India, to which so much attention has been given, has noticed the observation often made that its natural result is to make the pupils cast off false beliefs without adopting anything in their place, and so to rear a class of men who may be called infidels. Mr. Howell referred, of course, to the higher education given in the Government schools and colleges, which is altogether secular. The remedy, in the view of many people in England and in India, is that which it is the purpose of Christian schools and colleges to supply. Now with reference to the proposal that the Government should close its schools or colleges at any place, and give support to others under local management, there are certain considerations which have to be borne in mind. Where the school, in favour of which it is desired that the Government should withdraw, is a school maintained by a missionary society, then the support of this school and the closing of the Government institution would not be an encouragement of local effort in the sense intended in the Despatch. The Government is quite prepared to aid missionary institutions, and it does so, making grants to them in consideration of the secular instruction which they give, when the means of giving such instruction are satisfactory. But this does not draw out the efforts of the Natives themselves, which is the great object to be aimed at. Again, if, by the closing of a Government school or college at any place, the *only* one left at that place which can provide the secular instruction required is a missionary institution, in which Christian instruction is obligatory, this arrangement would mean that no one thereafter could, at that place, receive the secular instruction he wants, except along with the teaching of Christianity. The Government could not with propriety, in the present state of most parts of India, be a party to an arrangement of this kind. In many places it is true there is great change of feeling with respect to this on the part of the Natives. The dread or dislike of Christian teaching is greatly abated. Many of the people have no scruples or apprehensions with regard to it. The time is coming when it will cause no difficulty. But at present the Government could not rightly enter into an arrangement which would require that all the people should receive Christian instruction, or be debarred from the secular instruction which they want. There must be no favour

on the part of the Government to those who accept Christian teaching, which is not equally bestowed on those who object to it. Then there is also a difficulty of another kind in the closing of a Government school or college in favour of one to be maintained by local effort. How is the first move to be made? On the one hand the Government must consider that the college cannot be closed when there is no other that can efficiently take its place. On the other hand the people disposed to make the needful local effort see that there is no use in attempting to start a college of their own, when there is a Government college there doing all that they require, and without cost to them. This is a matter which might suitably be arranged in each case by conference between the Government officers and the people of the place who may be willing to make the local effort required. The whole subject treated in the paper which had been read is one of great interest and importance. He (General MacLagan) had had the advantage of discussing it more than once with Mr. Johnston, and he trusted that the attention which was being given to it would do much for the advancement of the interests of the people of India.

Mr. O. C. MULLICK said he had not come to the meeting with the intention of speaking, but as a native of India, and one taking considerable interest in the topic of discussion, he felt emboldened to make a few observations. He entirely sympathized with the main object of the address given by Mr. Johnston, which is to ask for an enquiry to be made into the way in which the education of India is being carried on. No one could doubt that there was ample room for improvement of the Government system. Further, he might say that he sympathized fully with the expression of sentiment that a real improvement of education should be in the direction of popular instruction for the masses, and that the efforts of Government should be directed to stimulating the people to undertake popular education for themselves, and by showing them a way to a better state of things. But he owned that he thought a one-sided view of the subject had been taken in the discussion, and that the value of the work of higher education had been too much overlooked. It appeared to be supposed that high and elementary education were opposed to each other, and that the two could not move forward hand in-hand. In considering the relative importance of the two branches, he could see no reason for thinking that high education had been promoted to the neglect of mass education; nor did he at all agree that mass education should be promoted to the detriment of high education. When they spoke of high education it was not model schools or vernacular schools which were meant; it meant the liberal education imparted

by the colleges in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and elsewhere; and no one could deny that there is still a considerable field in India for an increase of similar great institutions. If the question which has for some time past been engaging the increasing attention of the British Government—the question of enlisting the Natives of India in the work of government and administration—is to receive any proper solution, it must be at the hands of those who pass through the high education of the colleges. The model and vernacular schools will not be the institutions which will turn out the men who will be fitted to aid in the government of the country. In saying this he was far from attempting to solve the difficult question as to what should be the proportionate amounts spent upon high and elementary education. As to the question whether the Government should directly aid education or not, he noticed that some advocated the withdrawal of the State from the duty. Now the abstract proposition—that the people of a country should educate themselves—was as true as that the people of a country should govern themselves. Both were sound theoretic propositions. But in India we have to deal with living and present facts; and the practical question is, How, under present circumstances, can the education of the people be carried out? If we look back to the history of high education in India we find there was a period of strong opposition, and it required very steady and judicious efforts on the part of distinguished officials to overcome the prejudice. The prevalent idea was that the moment a boy went to an English school his religion was undermined, and hence the system was regarded with profound aversion. That prejudice, however, has gradually died away, and the people as a rule no longer contemplate with horror the sending of a boy to an English school. Still, the time is not yet come when the people can be left to undertake for themselves the higher education of the country without any aid from the State. Of course it is not true that the State is exclusively, at its own cost, carrying on the work of high education: the people do contribute not only in the way of fees and fines in the schools and colleges, but by way of voluntary subscriptions and gifts. Whenever they are required the people come forward cheerfully and liberally, and that is a very encouraging sign for the future. Upon the point of the religious belief of the people being undermined by education, and the suggestions by some preceding speakers that theological instruction should be given, he would only say this—that, so far as he knew, the Indian people did not desire the introduction of a religious element in the educational system. Those who advocated religious instruction overlooked the question of what that religion was to be. The people of the country have their various religions: the rulers have theirs. Is the English Government

to introduce the Vedas, the Zendavesta, the Koran, or the Bible for religious instruction? It seemed almost needless to say that the attempt to introduce the Christian religion would meet with the strongest and most determined opposition from the people; and therefore the only form of education which can be supported by a Government which does not profess the religion of its subjects must be one which carefully abstains from raising any questions of religion, but furnishes instruction in an entirely secular form.

Mr. C. N. BANERJEE thought Mr. Johnston had made out a good case for enquiry. Facts had been given which showed the lack of education among the masses, and the question arose, "Has Government done anything, or left undone what it should have done?" Now, the proper duty of the Government was not education; it might help, but it was not its main duty. Higher education, it was true, was needed, because that would help Indians to govern themselves, and what was now chiefly required was that Government should give grants in aid of education on a more extensive scale than hitherto. Apart from higher education he could testify to the increase of village schools in India, and these, he urged, should receive a larger share of assistance from Government than what was now given, although he quite admitted that the Government could not undertake to provide education so extensively as to overtake the large masses of the population. He, for one, thought this should not be done at the sacrifice of higher education. So much allusion had been made to the famous Despatch of 1854, without a word being said about the education of girls, and he asked what the Despatch meant. Was it simply meant that the male portion of the population should be educated? (A voice: "No.") Well, a large number of efficient girls' schools were wanted, then. But there were difficulties in the way. Early marriages and the social customs of the country stood in the way, especially in those parts of Bengal where healthy opinion on such matters had not been yet created. To produce such a desirable improvement it would require a tremendous effort. He did not quite see how it was to be done, except by getting people to do for themselves and encouraging them to promote education in every possible way that might suggest itself, and which it would be impossible here to discuss.

Colonel JAMES BROWNE said he would like to offer what seemed to him a practical view of the matter. The lecturer had taken rather a pessimist view of the facts, and had been rather unfair in his criticisms on the Indian Government for neglecting to carry out the principles of Lord Halifax's Despatch, which enjoined that

education should be given to the lower classes. Before the building can be erected the scaffolding must be prepared. Twenty years ago in India it was almost impossible to know how to set about the work of tackling and of lifting the enormous mass of ignorance. No fulcrum existed; and it was necessary to obtain a fulcrum whence the power of English education could be brought to bear upon the people. And what was done was to induce the most intelligent and most willing to receive instruction, so that through them influence might be brought to bear upon the lower class. India must educate itself; the work is far too vast for any Government to undertake effectually without help from the people itself. The lecturer seemed to attach too little importance to the leavening influence of example in education. From what he had seen in India generally he did not think it by any means true that it was the wish only of the higher classes to take advantage of the education which the Government furnishes. He knew numbers of men—artisans and workers—unable to read or write, who earned the means to send their sons to the schools by the hardest manual labour. Mr. Johnson's view was rather too much an arithmetical one. We have no idea of how a little educational leaven will leaven a whole mass. If that leaven was working as he thought it was, it was doing the work in the only possible way; that is to say, the people at large were being stimulated to self-education and a recognition of its value. It is with education as with missionaries. We wish, as far as we can, to aid English missionaries in their work, but the work cannot be done without a Native Church. Without Native agency our missionaries may hammer away for ever without Christianizing India. The lower classes in India were naturally so wonderfully apt that a very little help would convert the people into one of the ablest and most intelligent nations of the whole earth. (Hear, hear.) He had no hesitation in saying that, man for man, the Indian labourer is a far more intelligent man than the English workman. His education is deficient, but he never objects to learn all he can. And when our education once begins to leaven the whole mass it will involve a change which will grow with unexampled and unimaginable rapidity. He sympathized with the lecturer's views to the extent of admitting that perhaps too large a proportionate share of attention in the way of education had been given by Government to the higher classes, but, as he had explained, this originally arose from the force of circumstances. Regarding the ignorance of the masses in India there could be no doubt, despite the sensitiveness displayed by some of the Native gentlemen who had spoken. To these he could only offer the solace that circumstances were almost daily occurring to show that gross ignorance and superstition exist among the masses in England just as much as amongst the

masses in India. (Hear, hear.) The defect in the education given to the upper classes in India is that we simply "cram" them, and do not teach them to think for themselves. He had been brought in contact with a crowd of B.A.'s and M.A.'s who were simply machines, but who could not be entrusted with anything which required the exercise of independent practical thought. Colonel Browne concluded by expressing his concurrence with the lecturer's incidental remark on the increasing bureaucracy in India. It is an increasing evil, and an official Englishman now is getting more and more of a bureaucrat and a machine, and is not what an Englishman of the past was in India—a thinking, feeling man of flesh and blood, to whom the Natives could confidently look for encouragement and help and sympathy. This growing dissociation of the governors from the governed is, he said, a matter of the most serious moment, the worst consequences of which we had yet to feel.

Sir THOMAS McCLURE, M.P., said he attended the meeting as a member of the House of Commons to learn what opinions were current on this question of education. He quite agreed with the suggestion that the Government authorities should co-operate in the education of the masses of the people. At home in England this was done by grants from Parliament, and he thought that the same principle, modified so as to meet the requirements of India, would be the means of stimulating Native effort and encouraging education generally.

The Rev. JAMES JOHNSTON, in replying, took occasion to say that he had felt it a great pleasure and privilege to read his lecture in the presence of Mr. A. Howell, who knew more of this question than any man, either in India or England. He might also mention that he had with him a letter from an official at Calcutta whose name, were he at liberty to mention it, would command the highest respect, and who confirmed every statement that he (the speaker) had made. Another gentleman to whom he referred was a distinguished member of the Indian Council: he said in this letter, which he had lately received, "There cannot, I think, be two opinions as to the thorough soundness of the principles laid down in the Education Despatch of 1854, or the fact that in India we are still a long way from seeing them fully carried out, and that we require every now and again to be reminded of them. The amount spent on primary education is quite inadequate to the requirements of the population, while the cost to Government of higher education is altogether excessive and unfair and has resulted politically in a crop of difficulties which now engage the serious consideration of Government. . . . I am, naturally perhaps, more disposed

"than you appear to be to attribute the present state of things rather  
 "to the force of circumstances than to neglect on the part of the  
 "Government of India, or to the want of appreciation of the principles  
 "of the Despatch. No doubt the wider the grant-in-aid system can be  
 "extended, and the sooner Government can dissociate itself from direct  
 "teaching and restrict its action to inspection of schools and training  
 "of normal teachers, the better. No doubt the direct connection of  
 "Government with this higher education should be looked upon as  
 "temporary, and terminated gradually and cautiously. In the mean-  
 "time the Government colleges should by the increase of fees and other  
 "means certainly be made more self-supporting than they are at present."  
 This gentleman, universally respected for his judgment, expressed entire  
 sympathy with the movement which he (Mr. Johnston) advocated. He  
 might add that the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, who is also  
 a member of Council, in a speech made at Calcutta confirmed these views,  
 and spoke highly in favour of the Government colleges being handed  
 over to local management. He (Mr. Johnston) was pleased with the  
 remarks made by General Maclagan, and with his suggestions of a con-  
 ference between the Government and the local authorities about the  
 transference of Government colleges. He quite understood that there  
 were difficulties in the way, but he might say that he did not contem-  
 plate that the Government should hand over secular colleges to Christians.  
 It would be obviously unfair to shut up the natives to attend Christian  
 colleges against their will. But there were benevolent gentlemen who  
 would co-operate with the Natives in carrying on higher education if  
 they could get a fair amount of encouragement and support from the  
 State in doing so. In reply to remarks made in the course of discussion  
 Mr. Johnston said he had no desire to place higher and lower education  
 in antagonism. He agreed with the gentleman who said that the system  
 of cramming was far too common, and that what was wanted was a  
 thorough education of the whole man, intellectually and morally, so as  
 to fit him to take that high position which he (Mr. Johnston) thought  
 Natives capable of in the education of their countrymen, and the ad-  
 ministration of the affairs of their country. He had a remark to make  
 with reference to what was said by Colonel Browne, who seemed to think  
 that he took a pessimist view of education in India. In reply to that he  
 desired to say that every statement he had made was borne out by facts,  
 and he was prepared at any time to substantiate them. He did not, like  
 pessimists, despair of the future. He hoped for great good if the  
 Education Act were fairly carried out. To show what could be done  
 Government gave about 100,000*l.* for elementary education, and that was  
 increased by 300,000*l.* in grants from municipal bodies and local assess-

ments on land; so that it would be seen that every pound given for this object called forth three pounds from local sources, and chiefly from the poor, and to a large extent among the ryots, because it was throughout the provinces that the lower education was being carried on in this way. If, instead of giving 100,000*l.*, the Government would set apart a larger sum of money for this object—say, that they were to add 100,000*l.* every year for the extension of this lower education, and thereby calling out three times as much from the local efforts of the Natives—improvement might go on in a ratio which would give some hope of overtaking the necessities of the country. It was because Government did not do this that he found fault with them. Although admitting that they had done much, at the same time he was compelled to add that in his judgment they had not done what they should do or might do, or what he considered they should be called on to do in the future for the education of the millions of India.

The CHAIRMAN, in closing the discussion, observed that all appeared to agree that the Despatch of 1854 was drawn up with the best intentions, and that the Government should have the greatest credit for it, as a step towards fitting the Natives to participate in the administration of the country. Of course in a country such as India it would be impossible to educate the whole of the people; but it was intended that when some of their number qualified themselves they should be allowed to co-operate in the government of the country. He (the Chairman) had with him a paper he received from Madras a fortnight ago, and he found in it something said by a learned pundit who had been sent from Calcutta to Madras to lecture on the duties of educated Natives. He said that two things were necessary, viz., that they should combine and co-operate with the Government for the purpose of educating the people of the country, and the other thing was that they should cultivate their minds. He also said that the Government were thinking of retiring from educational work, so that it was essential that the people should prepare to carry it on. In view of this then, he (the Chairman) cordially accepted the idea of a conference as suggested by General MacLagan, and he hoped that, by what was going forward, the Government would be stirred up to carry out what was desired; for the object was to advance the interests of the whole country. When it was remembered how, through lack of education, the ryots were often imposed upon by the Native money-lenders, and rose in rebellion in several parts of the country, it would be seen that it was of the highest importance to put these people in possession of a little knowledge, so that they should be able to manage their own affairs.



On the motion of the Rev. J. LONG, seconded by General MAC-LAGAN, a cordial vote of thanks was accorded to the Chairman, who in responding said he esteemed it a high privilege to have been allowed to preside at so interesting a meeting.

On the motion of MIRZA PEER BUKHSH, seconded by the Rev. J. LONG, a vote of thanks was also unanimously given to the rev. lecturer, who duly acknowledged the compliment.

The sitting then terminated.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE, M.P., D.C.L., FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY AND CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, &c., &c.

*The Humble Memorial of the Managing Committee of the Bombay Branch of the East India Association*

RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH :

1. That your Memorialists have observed with the greatest regret that Her Majesty's Government still seem inclined to throw a considerable portion of the expenses of the Afghan War on the Indian revenues, and they therefore beg to approach you with this earnest appeal in the hope that it will, through your all-powerful influence, receive the gracious consideration of the Honourable House of Commons. And in doing so, your Memorialists venture to point out, *firstly*, that though the expenses of the Afghan War were directed to be paid out of the Indian Treasury with the sanction of the Honourable House of Commons, yet the full merits of the question have not yet been placed before it to enable it to decide the question on grounds of justice, equity, and legality; *secondly*, that the sanction which the Honourable House of Commons, under very imperfect conditions, accorded to the decision of Her Majesty's Government that India should pay for the war, is quite inconsistent with the repeated declarations of Her Majesty's Ministers that the Afghan War arose out of European complications, and that it is an Imperial, not an Indian war; and *thirdly*, that the decision to make India bear the expenses of the war is diametrically opposed to the letter as well as the spirit of the Act of Parliament (21 and 22 Vict. cap. 106) passed in 1858, under which the direct government of India was assumed by Her Gracious Majesty, and which statute is still the law of the empire,

2. And first, as to the imperfect conditions under which the subject was brought before the Honourable House of Commons, your Memorialists beg to point out that although the question of making India pay for the war was brought forward for discussion on three several occasions, still, on none of those occasions were all the facts of the case placed before the Honourable House. The first occasion upon which a motion was made not to saddle India with the expenses of the war was soon after war was declared. At that time, the question failed to receive the attention due to it, because of the argument urged by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer that it was improper

to decide the question of the apportionment of the expenses of the war at that early stage, and because of the assurance then given by him that the merits of the question would have to be considered when the occasion arose. The Chancellor of the Exchequer observed on that occasion (December 17, 1878) "that it was at present too soon " to decide what would be the character of the present war; it might " be that it would soon be terminated, and no necessity for appealing " to the British Exchequer would arise; but if it should turn out to " be a war calling for the whole strength of the country to be put " forth, then, undoubtedly, India ought not to bear the whole cost."

With reference to the last sentence of these remarks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, your Memorialists would beg to point out that the contingency referred to by him long since actually happened, upwards of fifty thousand troops of Her Majesty having been engaged in the war in Afghanistan; and yet your Memorialists regret to observe that, in spite of the assurance contained in the above-quoted words of the Chancellor, the expenses of the war were continued to be regarded as leviable on India. The second occasion when the question was brought before the Honourable House of Commons was in July, 1879, when the Indian Budget was introduced into the House, so that the subject could receive only passing attention. The only occasion when the subject came before the Honourable House in definite shape was when, in February of last year, the Honourable Member for Hackney made a motion on the subject. But the question even then failed to receive the consideration it demanded, and the Honourable House of Commons could not give it full attention, probably in view of the dissolution that was then impending.

8. The first of the grounds on which your Memorialists beg to base this appeal, through yourself, to the Honourable House of Commons is that the war was repeatedly declared by Her Majesty's Ministers to be *Imperial*, and not Indian. In the first place, your Memorialists would draw the attention of the Honourable House of Commons to the acknowledged fact that the war arose purely out of complications in Europe; and, to support this statement, they have only to notice one among the many utterances of Her Majesty's Ministers taking this view of the war. In a speech delivered by him at a Conservative Meeting at Manchester on the 17th October, 1879, the Marquis of Salisbury declared that the orders of Her Majesty to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan were executed at a time "when the Servian " invasion by Russia had commenced, and a strong probability of a Russo-Turkish war was patent to the world;" that "the Ameer thought he " saw a prospect of Russia and England going to blows, and thought it

" was possible to defy us," and that " he refused to receive the English Embassy when he actually received the embassy of a Power hostile to, or in conflict with, England;" and, previously, when on December 10th, 1878, the question of the policy of the war was put to the vote of the Upper House of Parliament, the Earl of Beaconsfield distinctly stated that the war was a purely Imperial matter, and concerned "*the character and the influence of England in Europe.*" His Lordship's words were these: "What I want to impress upon your Lordships before you divide—which you will do in a very few minutes—is that you should not misapprehend the issue on which you have to decide. It is a very grave one. It is not a question of the Khyber Pass merely, and of some small cantonment at Dakka or Jellalabad. *It is a question which concerns the character and the influence of England in Europe.*" It was on the strength of this representation—that the war affected "*the character and influence of England in Europe*"—that a majority in last Parliament was induced to approve of its policy finally. And it is for the Honourable House of Commons to decide whether this solemnly acknowledged character and nature of the war—that it is Imperial and not Indian—should be disregarded in deciding the vital question as to whether England or India should sustain the cost thereof. Not only the Prime Minister of the period, but all the other members of his Ministry have more or less distinctly declared that the war is Imperial and not Indian. As was stated by the Honourable Member for Hackney in the Honourable House of Commons in February, "So far from this war being a mere frontier war, as was now attempted to be shown, it had been stated by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, and the Viceroy of India, that it was undertaken for Imperial purposes, and, indeed, that it was a part of the great Imperial question. Moreover, the Chancellor of the Exchequer last year had, as he thought, admitted the responsibility of England to contribute something; and, as a means of maintaining the financial independence of India, had proposed a loan without interest of 2,000,000*l.* If England was not called upon to make some contribution, why was not India allowed to borrow the money in England, which she might very well have done?" The then Member for Greenwich, your honourable self, also reiterated the same view. "With regard to the substance of the motion of my honourable friend," you said, "there is not a constituency in this country before which I would not be prepared to stand, even if it were the poorest and the most distressed in the land, and plead that when

“ we have made in India a war which has been declared by our own Government as in part an Imperial war, we ought not for a moment to shrink from the responsibility of assuming part of the charge of that war in correspondence with that declaration, instead of making use only of the law and argument of force, which is the only law and the only argument which we possess or apply, to place the whole of this burden on the shoulders of the people of India.” The Honourable Member for Orkney, formerly Finance Minister of the Government of India, expressed himself in the same strain on the view taken by Ministers of the Imperial character of the war. He observed: “ The Prime Minister had admitted that the Afghan War was undertaken for Imperial purposes, and it seemed that it was only fair that England should bear a portion of the expense. The result of the Afghan War would in any case add to the burden of India. Even if they retired within the scientific frontier of the Treaty of Gundamuck, the increase of the expenditure was estimated at 1,000,000*l.* a year, and if they occupied Candahar and other points it, was impossible to say what the expenditure would be.” The Honourable Member for Bradford also said that he felt much surprised to hear the “ Under Secretary in his very able speech describe this war as a frontier war. The descriptions of Ministers which had already been referred to in the debate were absolutely inconsistent with the statement.” Your Memorialists, in citing these statements of responsible Ministers of the Crown and other Members of Parliament, beg to submit that in the face of those statements, no doubt can be entertained that the war is Imperial, that it is entirely the outcome of the British Cabinet’s foreign policy, and, as such, its expenses should be borne by the British Exchequer.

4. The second of the grounds on which your Memorialists base this appeal to the Honourable House of Commons is the constitutional aspect of the question. You, honoured Sir, need hardly be reminded that the Statute under which the charges of any war can be thrown on India is the Statute for “ the better government of India ” passed in the year 1858 (21 and 22 Vict. cap. 106), when Her Majesty assumed the direct sway of India from the East India Company. Section 55 and part of 56 of that Statute runs thus :—

“ 55. Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty’s Indian possessions, or under other urgent and sudden necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of the both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers

" of such possessions by Her Majesty's force charged upon such revenues.

" 56. The Military and Naval Forces of the East India Company shall be deemed to be the Indian Military and Naval Forces of Her Majesty, and shall be under the same obligations to serve Her Majesty as they would have been under to serve the said Company, and shall be liable to serve within the same territorial limits only for the same terms only," &c., &c.

In drawing the attention of the Honourable House of Commons to these important clauses, your Memorialists would beg leave to observe that to justify the defrayal of the expenses of any war out of the Indian Exchequer, there should be, according to this clause, either " urgent and sudden necessity " or " actual (or threatened) invasion " of Her Majesty's Indian possessions, which cannot, with even any show of plausibility, be pretended in presence of the real history of this Afghan War. As your Memorialists have already pointed out, the war arose out of complications in Europe, and Lord Salisbury, in the very speech from which your Memorialists have taken the foregoing extract, distinctly stated that from the time the Conservative party came into power, they desired to dominate the affairs of Afghanistan, and that at a time when the ruler of that State was on avowedly friendly terms with Her Majesty's Government. His Lordship's words are: " When we came into office, we found this state of things in existence all over the world, that wherever the enormous territories that own Her Majesty's rule bordered on the territories of any other Power, and, in fact, wherever they did not, the Powers cheerfully received the representatives of Her Majesty at their Courts, and there was not one exception—barbarian or semi-civilized—wherever the English Government desired that its representatives should be received; with the solitary exception of Afghanistan, no objection was made throughout the world." The Honourable House of Commons will see from this that the war with Afghanistan was undertaken, not because there was either any " actual or threatened invasion," or any other " sudden or urgent necessity," but because, firstly, the Ameer refused to receive an English embassy, and secondly, this refusal was made at a time after he had temporarily entertained a small mission from the outlying representatives of a Power which at that time seemed likely to come in conflict with England. Your Memorialists are aware that it may be argued, that the reception by the Ameer of an embassy from the Governor-General of Turkestan, at a time when Russia was supposed to be hostile to England, may be taken in the light of a threat against

India; and it may be pleaded that, having regard to that circumstance, India should, under the sections above quoted, sustain the cost of the war. But even under this plea, the expenses of the war cannot be charged on India. For when the clause referred to was the subject of debate, in 1858, in both Houses of Parliament, the late Earl of Derby (then Prime Minister) distinctly repudiated the notion that India could be made to pay for such a trans-frontier war as this in Afghanistan, merely because a Power like Russia might at some future period invade Her Majesty's Indian territories. When the Statute which contains this clause passed, the Conservative party was in office, and (the late) Earl Derby, the then Premier, thus explained the clause: "The effect of the clause would be that Indian troops, except for the purpose of preventing anticipated invasion or of repelling actual invasion, should not quit their own territory; or if they did, the expense should be defrayed out of the revenues of this country, and not out of the revenues of India. If the troops were employed out of India, it would be for Parliament to decide whether they were employed for Indian or Imperial objects.

"He did not think that the words 'preventing or repelling actual invasion,' would have covered such a case as that of the (1839) Afghan War, because that war was carried on at a great distance from our then frontier in India, for the purpose of establishing a safeguard, *not against actual invasion, but against a nation that at some future period might have attempted to invade our territory.*"

5. Thus the Honourable House of Commons will perceive that the plea of menace from Russian commanders in Turkestan, or possible future attack through Afghanistan, is utterly futile in presence of this authoritative exposition of the Act of 1858, which wholly and emphatically repudiates the liability of the Indian revenue to be saddled with expenditure incurred in military operations "against a nation [or its irresponsible representatives] that at some future period might have attempted to invade our territory."

From both the above authoritative and recorded explanations the Honourable House of Commons will easily see that it was the distinct opinion and intention of Parliament that, under the Act, India should on no account be charged with the expenses of such a war as that which Her Majesty's advisers in 1878 entered on with Afghanistan. Your Memorialists' appeal is thus justified not only by the official declarations that the war is Imperial, but also by the express terms and the whole spirit of the Act of 1858, on which the people of India and its services have always relied as their charter of defence under Her Gracious Majesty.

In considering the political justice of this appeal, your Memorialists would also beg to draw your earnest attention to these two circumstances :—

Firstly: That although the Earl of Beaconsfield, one of Her Majesty's Ministry to whom the policy of the war is mainly due, has, in regard to the present war in Afghanistan, allowed its expenses to be thrown on the Indian Exchequer, yet when in 1842 the question of defraying the expenses of the Afghan War of 1840 was before Parliament, he (then Mr. Disraeli) was strongly opposed to the imposition of the burden of those expenses on India. He then said :—

" If ever we lost India, it would be from financial convulsion. It would be lost by the pressure of circumstances, which events like the war in Afghanistan were calculated to bring about by exhausting the resources of the country, and by our consequent inability to maintain those great establishments which were necessary to the political system that we had formed and settled in Hindustan. . . . He could not believe that an empire thus constituted could be endangered by a single military disaster in a distant land. It was not one nor three such defeats that could endanger our Indian Empire. . . These were not the casualties that alarmed him any more than the proud boasts of Ava or the dark designs of Nepaul; but seeing that we had reared in India a structure of society of a very complicated nature, which was upheld by great civil and military services, and that wars beyond our frontiers were draining and diverting the revenue which was necessary for the support of these establishments, *here was the danger; hence might be the catastrophe.* . . . Was England to remain inactive if Russia invaded India? India was part of England. He (Mr. Disraeli) protested against the principle that if our empire in India was menaced by Russia, the struggle was to be confined to Asia. . . . If the operations were undertaken to check a EUROPEAN POWER, he could not understand how we (the British Parliament) *could refuse to pay the cost of the expedition*; and he acknowledged the justice of the late declaration of the Chairman of the E. I. Co., that he looked to the Government of this country to defray the expenses."

Your Memorialists venture to submit that the circumstances and origin of the war of 1840 do not differ much from those of the present war, and that the same object has led to both.

Secondly: The Statute of 1858 which transferred the government of Her Majesty's Indian territories from the East India Company to the Crown, was first brought before Parliament in February, 1858, by Lord Palmerston's Ministry, then in office. On that occasion the



Earl of Beaconsfield (Mr. Disraeli) was the first to point out to the Honourable House of Commons that the effect of the transfer intended by the Statute would be to make English and Indian finances identical. His words were:—

“It is idle any longer to distinguish between English and Indian Finance. If the President of the Indian Council—the Queen’s Minister in Downing Street—should find it necessary to raise money by a public loan, to pay Her Majesty’s troops in India, it will be idle, when the dividends on that loan are due, if the Exchequer of India is empty, to pretend that the revenue of India is alone liable. Every gentleman must feel that immediately after such change (as the transfer of the government of India from the Company to the Crown) takes place, the difference between the finances of India and of England cannot be maintained for a moment, and that a blow to British credit in the very metropolis would be inevitable if such a plea under such circumstances could be urged by a British Minister.”

These remarks specially derive their importance from the fact that when the Government of India Bill passed the Honourable House of Commons and the House of Lords, the Conservative Ministry, of which the Earl of Beaconsfield (then Mr. Disraeli) was a member, was in power, and the view which that Minister entertained as to the identity of English and Indian finances ever since the government of India passed under the direct control of Her Majesty, has, on the occasion of the present war, been acted upon only so as to make the Indian Treasury sustain the cost of a British Ministers’ war—a course entirely opposed to the declarations of all Her Majesty’s Ministers of the period, as well as to the spirit of the Statute.

6. The main reason which has been assigned for the defrayal of the expenses of the war out of the Indian Exchequer is that India is perfectly able to bear the burden. Your Memorialists beg to submit, however, that this is not either a full or a correct view of the financial condition of India, either present or prospective. The Honourable House of Commons will realize to itself the true nature of that condition when the fact is stated that the additional taxes which were raised in 1877-78 for the “insurance of this country against famines,” have been appropriated to the purposes of the war, so that the Famine Insurance Fund, which those taxes constituted, has, on the admission of the Government of India and their Finance Minister, “ceased to exist;” that the Salt duty has been raised, increasing the cost of living for the general mass of the population—Native States being also compelled to enhance their charges on that necessary of life—and that the small surplus which the Indian Budget—was able to show for the year

1879-80 was nearly all due to the sudden increase in the opium revenue, which is itself of a very variable nature; and that, but for these additional taxes raised for famine insurance, and this suddenly increased opium revenue, there would have been, as has been distinctly admitted by Sir John Strachey, a deficit. And it should also be remembered that since then—that is, under the present Budget, the cash balances were being indented upon to the amount of 2,000,000*l.*, as estimated by the Finance Minister. The Honourable House of Commons need hardly be reminded, further, that only in 1879 a loan of 2,000,000*l.* was paid to India out of the English Exchequer, to be repaid without interest—a fact which clearly shows how much the credit of India had been shaken in the English market. In this connection your Memorialists would here refer to what the Honourable Member for Hackney pointed out in February last year to the Honourable House. He observed: “He dared say that he should be told, “first, that the Government of India had consented to the arrangement, and secondly, that the finances of India enabled them to “do so. As to the first allegation, however, in *an unrepresented country*, “the consent of the Government did not necessarily imply the consent “of the people; but even so, all the unofficial members of the Viceroy’s “Council were, according to his information, against the proposal. “The finances of India had been improved in the last three years by “taxation specially imposed to meet famine contingencies, and yet “they had by their action *taken every penny of this famine fund to pay “for this war.*”

7. That your Memorialists would further take this opportunity of entreating you to bring two considerations to the notice of the Honourable House of Commons which arise out of the history of this Afghan War:—

(a.) The alacrity and loyalty with which the Princes and Chiefs of India came forward, as soon as the invasion of Afghanistan was entered upon at the close of 1878, and, without stopping to ask the reason why, placed their troops and contingents at the disposal of the Government of India for field service, if necessary, beyond the frontiers of India, are circumstances well known to Parliament. The services rendered by the Contingents from Native States, commanded by General John Watson, V.C., were acknowledged at Lahore in fitting and handsome terms by Her Majesty’s representative, H. E. Lord Lytton. Your Memorialists submit that this episode affords a very suggestive reply to the furtive proposals made, in the course of 1877-78, with certain semblance of authority, which pointed towards the suppression or absorption of the forces of Native States, which forces,

maintained pursuant to treaty rights and intimately connected with the past history of the British Empire in India, afford, especially when viewed in the light of the recent episode above referred to, a strong and assuring guarantee of the mutual confidence and political unity which subsists between the British Crown and the Native kingdoms and principalities of India.

(b.) The recent position of affairs when more than 50,000 of picked troops, British and Native, maintained wholly out of the revenues of British India, were engaged in field service far beyond the frontiers of India, affords unmistakable demonstration that the military armaments, as kept up for many years past under the Government of India, are far larger than are needful for the maintenance of order in India, and for the defence of the natural boundaries of the Empire. Since the Afghan invasion commenced there have been intermittent disturbances in the rural districts of the British Deccan, more extensive and intractable disorder has been prevalent in the jungle districts of the northern provinces of the Madras Presidency, while on the north-east frontier of Assam a formidable raid of savage tribes had to be repelled by active military operations in difficult and perilous warfare. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that such a large portion of the ordinary military forces of British India—nearly one-fifth of the whole—were engaged in a protracted campaign in the foreign territory of Afghanistan, there has been no lack of military force to keep up sufficient garrisons in India and engage in three special operations in widely distant portions of the country. Your Memorialists therefore venture to submit that, now that the Afghan difficulty has been overcome, a strong necessity exists for withdrawing the force which now occupy Candahar, and for a substantial reduction in the military forces hitherto kept up under the Government of India, and that thereby very large relief may be given from the pressure of unproductive expenditure.

8. That your Memorialists therefore humbly appeal to the Honourable House of Commons to avert from the people and revenues of India the threatened imposition of the cost of the Afghan War. They urge that such imposition is unconstitutional; that it overrides the terms and drift of the Statute of 1858, corroborated as the letter of that Statute is by the express declaration of British statesmen of the period on both sides of the House; that the infliction of the heavy charges of this trans-frontier war on India will check the industrial progress of the country, and tend to deepen the poverty of its people; also that the precedent threatened to be created, of impressing Her Majesty's forces in India in furtherance of diplomatic or other political

policy arising out of party exigencies in England or the complication of European politics, must prove disastrous, if not ruinous, to the interests of Her Majesty's Empire in India.

9. Here your Memorialists would point out that there is much danger of the actual cost of the Afghan War being misunderstood and underrated, thereby India being left to sustain a far larger burden in respect of this wholly uncalled for expenditure than Parliament may itself formally prescribe. The glaring discrepancies that have occurred and still exist between the estimates formed by the Finance Department and the actual cost of the trans-frontier operations since October 1878, are sufficiently notorious. No adequate determination on the part of the authorities is yet apparent to face all the facts of the case; although it is reported that your colleague, the Secretary of State, under date of 4th November, faithfully rebuked the Government of India for "having publicly expressed confidence in their estimates (as "affected by trans-frontier outlay) without the least justification." The information available to your Memorialists on this subject is as yet informal and incomplete; but they count upon that rebuke being intended to apply also to the fresh estimate dated October 26, 1880. The estimate then mentioned as that of the Indian Government—viz., 17,500,000*l.* sterling, including the capital outlay on the frontier and trans-frontier railway, is, as your Memorialists confidently believe, preposterous and absurd. For instance, it must be well known to yourself and honourable colleague, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, that several millions of expenditure by that larger portion of the Indian Commissariat which is under the direct control of the Government of India are, up to this date, not yet brought to account, though possibly a rough estimate of the proportion of those "out-standings" that are irrecoverable may have been placed before the Financial Department. This is one of several illustrations that might be given of the grave risk to future Indian finance that may be incurred by the Honourable House of Commons, at this stage of the question, accepting responsibility for a certain fixed sum of the Afghan expenses, and leaving India to sustain the rest, whatever that may be, and also the burden of the utterly unremunerative frontier and trans-frontier railways.

10. That your Memorialists therefore humbly pray that as this foreign war was not undertaken for the purpose of "preventing or "repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty's Indian possessions," the Honourable House of Commons will adopt such steps as may insure that an exact account shall be taken of all costs of the operations in Afghanistan since November 21st, 1878, as was done in the cases of

the Abyssinian Campaign and the Malta Expedition, and that such costs be charged to the British Treasury, and not in any way imposed on the revenues, people, or resources of India.

And your Memorialists, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

(Signed by order of the Managing Committee)

KASSINATH TRIMBAK TELANG,

MANCHERJEE MERWANJEE BHOWNUGREE,

Honorary Joint Secretaries.

BOMBAY, *January 26th*, 1881.

*Reply.*

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,  
9th March, 1881.

SIR,—Mr. Gladstone has had the honour to receive the Memorial transmitted by you from the Bombay Branch of the East India Association, urging that the whole expenses connected with the war in Afghanistan be charged on Imperial revenues; and in reply I am directed to state that Her Majesty's Government have given their best consideration to the important subject of meeting those expenses, and are about to make known to Parliament their proposals forthwith.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) E. W. HAMILTON.

# EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION.

Instituted for the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion, by all legitimate means, of the public interests and welfare of the Inhabitants of India generally.

14, BEDFORD ROW, LONDON, W.C.

## President.

SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, BART., G.C.S.I.

## Vice-Presidents.

The Most Hon. the Marquis of SALISBURY,  
K.G., P.C., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.  
The Most Hon. the Marquis of TWEEDDALE.  
The Right Hon. the Earl of SHAFTESBURY,  
K.G., F.R.A.S., F.S.S., &c.  
Right Hon. Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY.  
Right Hon. JAMES STANSFELD, P.C.,  
M.P.  
Field-Marshal Lord STRATHFARN, G.O.B.,  
G.C.S.I., Member of H.M.'s Most Hon-  
ourable Privy Council of Ireland.  
His Highness the Nawab of JOONAGHUR,  
K.C.S.I.

His Excellency RAGOONATH ROW.  
General Sir GEORGE RALFOUR, K.C.B.,  
M.P.  
General Sir ARTHUR COTTON, K.C.S.I.  
Major-General Sir HENRY RAWLINSON,  
K.C.B., K.C.S.I., &c.  
Sir JAMES FERGUSSON, Bart., Governor of  
South Australia, P.C.  
Sir CHARLES EDWARD TREVELYAN, K.C.B.,  
F.R.G.S., &c.  
Major-General E. W. S. SCOTT, R.A.  
Major-General Sir R. WALLACE, K.C.S.I.  
Sir DAVID WEDDERBURN, Bart., M.P.

## COUNCIL, 1881-82.

Chairman—E. B. EASTWICK, Esq., C.B., F.R.S., F.S.A., M.R.A.S.

Vice-Chairman—Sir CHARLES JOHN WINGFIELD, K.C.S.I., C.B., &c.

C. W. ARATHOON, Esq.  
Major EVANS BELL, M.R.A.S.  
General Sir OBEUR CAVENAGH, K.C.S.I.  
DADABHOY BYRAMJEE, Esq.  
DADABHAI NAOROJI, Esq. (in India).  
CHRISTOPHER B. DENISON, Esq., M.P.  
ROBERT H. ELLIOT, Esq.  
GEORGE FOGGO, Esq.  
Lieut.-Colonel P. T. FRENCH.  
JAMSETJI JIVANJI GAZDAR, Esq., M.A.  
PATRICK PIRIE GORDON, Esq., J.P., M.A.  
JOHN FARLEY LEITH, Esq.


Rev. JAMES LONG.  
STEPHEN P. LOW, Esq., F.R.G.S.  
General Sir GEORGE MALCOLM, K.C.B.  
O. C. MULLICK, Esq.  
JOHN BRUCE NORTON, Esq.  
GEORGE PALMER, Esq., B.C.S.  
Captain WILLIAM CHARLES PALMER.  
Colonel A. B. RATHBORNE.  
RAJA RAMPAL SINGH.  
P. M. TAIT, Esq., F.R.G.S., F.S.S.  
WILLIAM TAYLER, Esq., Retired B.C.S.  
W. MARTIN WOOD, Esq.


## Honorary Secretary.

Captain WILLIAM CHARLES PALMER.

## Honorary Solicitor.

T. LUXMORE WILSON, Esq.







*"A book that is shut is but a block"*

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA  
Department of Archaeology  
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book  
clean and moving.

---

S. B. 149, N. DELHI.